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Abstract 
Concepts, models, or theories that end up shaping practices, whether those 
practices fall in the domains of science, technology, social movements, or 
business, always emerge through a change in language use. First, communities 
begin to talk differently, incorporating new vocabularies (Rorty, 1989), in their 
narratives. Whether the community’s new narratives respond to perceived 
anomalies or failures of the existing ones (Kuhn, 1962) or actually reveal 
inadequacies by addressing previously unrecognized practices (Fleck, 1979; 
Rorty, 1989) is less important here than the very phenomena that they introduce 
differences. 
Then, if the new language proves to be useful, for example, because it 
helps the community solve a problem or create a possibility that existing 
narratives do not, the new narrative will begin circulating more broadly 
throughout the community. If other communities learn of the usefulness of these 
new narratives, and find them sufficiently persuasive, they may be compelled to 
test, modify, and eventually adopt them. Of primary importance is the idea that a 
new concept or narrative perceived as useful is more likely to be adopted.   
We can expect that business concepts emerge through a similar pattern. 
Concepts such as “competitive advantage,” “disruption,” and the “resource based 
view,” now broadly known and accepted, were each at some point first 
introduced by a community. This community experimented with the concepts 
they introduced and found them useful. The concept “competitive advantage,” 
for example, helped researchers better explain why some firm’s outperformed 
others and helped practitioners more clearly understand what choices to make to 
improve the profit and growth prospects of their firms. The benefits of using 
these terms compelled other communities to consider, apply, and eventually 
adopt them as well. Were these terms not viewed as useful, they would not likely 
have been adopted.  
This thesis attempts to observe and anticipate new business concepts that 
may be emerging. It does so by seeking to observe a community of business 
practitioners that are using different language and appear to be more successful 
than a similar community of practitioners that are have not yet begun using this 
different language as extensively. It argues that if the community that is adopting 
new types of narratives is perceived as being more successful, their success will 
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attract the attention of other communities who may then seek to adopt the same 
narratives.  
Specifically, this thesis compares the narratives used by a set of firms that 
are considered to be performing well (called Winners) with those of set of less-
successful peers (called Losers). It does so with the aim of addressing two ques-
tions: 
 How do the strategic narratives that circulate within “winning” companies 
and their leaders differ from those circulating within “losing” companies 
and their leaders?  
 Given the answer to the first question: what new business strategy concepts 
are likely to emerge in the business community at large? 
I expected to observe “winning” companies shifting their language, 
abandoning an older set of narratives for newer ones. However the analysis 
indicates a more interesting dynamic: “winning” companies adopt the same core 
narratives as their “losing” peers with equal frequency yet they go beyond these.  
Both “winners” and “losers” seem to pursue economies of scale, customer 
captivity, best practices, and securing preferential access to resources with similar 
vigor. But “winners” seem to go further, applying three additional narratives in 
their pursuits of competitive advantage. They speak of coordinating what is 
uncoordinated, adopting what this thesis calls “exchanging the role of guest for 
that of host,” and “forcing a two-front battle” more frequently than their “loser” 
peers.  
Since these “winning” companies are likely perceived as being more 
successful, the unique narratives they use are more likely to be emulated and 
adopted. Understanding in what ways winners speak differently, therefore, gives 
us a glimpse into the possible future evolution of business concepts.  
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SAMMANFATTNING 
Begrepp, modeller eller teorier som påverkar praxis, oberoende av disciplin, 
uppstår genom enn förändring i språket. Grupper eller branscher börja prata på 
ett nytt sätt genom att ta in nya ord (Rorty, 1989) i sina narrativer och 
berättelser. Det är av en mindre betydelse i denna avhandling om gruppens nya 
narrativ och berättelser beror på anomalier eller för att existerande begrepp inte 
förmår beskriva på ett ändamålsenligt sätt helt ny praxis (Kuhn, 1962, Fleck, 
1979, Rorty, 1989).  
I fall det nya språket visar sig vara funktionellt genom att det tex. hjälper 
gruppen  lösa problem  som de existerande narrativerna inte förmår göra, 
kommer de nya narrativen och begreppen att tas i bruk mera allmänt. 
Användingen sprider sig sedan successivt . Det viktiga här är att begrepp och 
narrativ som upplevs som funktionella har en större sannolikhet att tas i bruk. 
Vi förväntas oss att begrepp och narrativ som används i affärsvärlden 
uppstår på liknande sätt. Allmänt använda begrepp och uttryck så som 
“konkurresnfördel”, “störningar” , “det resursbaserade synsättet”, användes och 
accepterades först av en grupp. Gruppen hade genom att använda bgreppen 
konstaterat att de fungerade som goda beskrivningar av aktiviteter eller 
förehavanden. Begreppet konkurrensfördel hjälpte forskare att bättre beskriva 
varför en del företag klarade sig bättre än andra i en konkurrens situation. 
Begreppet hjälpte praktiker att bättre förstå vilka val och beslut som behövdes för 
att förbättre företagets möjligheter till tillväxt och ökad lönsamhet. 
Användningen av dessa begrepp spreds till andra grupper då dessa grupper 
också fann dem funktionella. 
Denna avhandling studerar existerande och potentiellt nya begrepp. I 
avhandlingen studeras företag i samma bransch som använder olika begrepp för 
att beskriva sin framgång och verksamhet. Det förefaller finnas en skillnad 
mellan användingen av begrepp mellan framgångsrika och mindre 
framgångsrika företag. Om en grupp eller bransch är mera framgångsrik 
kommer användningen av begrepp och narrativ att sprida sig till andra grupper 
och branscher. 
I avhandlingen jämförs de narrativ som används av en grupp 
framgångsrika företag (vinnare) med motsvarande mindre framgångsrika företag 
(förlorare) i samma bransch. Avhandlingen söker svar på två forskningsfrågor: 
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 På vilket sätt skiljer sig strategiska narrativ som används av vinnande före-
tag och företagsledning från förlorande företag och företagsledning? 
 Vilken typ av nya begrepp kan sannolikt uppstå och spridas i branschen 
eller företagsgruppen? 
Jag förväntade mig att skulle kunna se att vinnande företag tar i bruk nya 
begrepp och narrativ och lämnar upphör att använda de äldre. Analysen visar en 
intressantare dynamik. Vinnande företag tar i bruk samma kärnnarrativ som de 
förlorande företagen när de beskriver hur de skapar konkurrensfördelar. Men de 
vinnande företagen använder en större mängd begrepp och narrativ. Båda 
grupperna försöker skapa ekonomiska skalfördelar, knyta kunderna till sig, best 
practice och försöker säkra resurstillgången. De vinnande företagen använder 
oftare dessutom uttryck som “koordinera det som inte är koordinerat”, och två 
beskrivningar som i denna avhandling beskrivs som “exchanging the role of 
guest for that of host”, “forcing a two-front battle”. 
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Introduction
1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Question 
Twelve years ago, I came across the translation of an ancient Chinese text called 
The 36 Stratagems (I will introduce this text in greater detail in Section 3.1 “Core 
Narrative Analysis Tool: The 36 Stratagems”). It struck me as surprising that the 
36 stratagems cataloged in this text had been almost exclusively applied to 
military strategy and had never been, to my knowledge, formally applied in 
business strategy. I initially viewed these stratagems simply as interesting 
aphorisms that offered entertaining viewpoints on, or explanations of, 
competitive behavior. However, I soon began collecting stories of competitive 
interactions in business and classifying them in the same manner as the text. 
Over the course of collecting roughly 500 such business case stories, my 
appreciation of the ancient Chinese stratagems has only continued to grow. This 
process of linking present-day business strategies to The 36 Stratagems also led 
me to start paying closer attention to how my consulting clients and other 
executives describe their business strategies.  
My effort sought not to show that the Chinese stratagems could produce 
strategies, but that they could serve as alternative explanations for the strategic 
rationales that companies and executives give for why their strategic choices 
produced the results they did. I found that categorizing a client’s description of 
their strategy as a specific stratagem (usually without the client knowing this was 
happening) helped me to then relate their description to those given in other 
business cases that I had previously associated with the stratagem. Sharing 
related business cases by saying, for example, “This sounds like what Barnes & 
Noble did when they introduced the book super-store concept …”, helped clients 
to think through with greater detail how their own strategies might evolve.   
This practice led me to notice that when business leaders described their 
strategies, they did so both in the effort to explain what worked or did not work 
with the strategy, as well as make an argument for why the strategy would 
succeed. The latter description—a predictive explanation in which a company or 
executive attempts to convince others (e.g., investors, employees, board 
members, management, and strategic partners) why their strategy will succeed— 
plays an important role in a company’s success. For example, how a company 
shapes investors’ expectations of a firm’s future earnings has been shown to be 
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the most significant influence on investors’ stock purchase decisions (Nagy & 
Obenberger, 1994), even more significant than a firm’s historical growth rate 
(Beaver & Morse 1978; Goedhart, Koller, & Wessels, 2005). Additionally, how a 
company shapes its social reputation has been shown to influence a company’s 
stock price performance (Rouso & Fouts, 1997; Sánchez & Sotorrío, 2007). 
Therefore, the ability of a company to shape key stakeholder expectations is 
arguably more important in the short-term than their fundamental performance.  
I applied insights drawn from the above efforts in my consulting practice 
to help clients conceive of and think through possible strategies that they might 
not have considered before as part of their strategic planning process, as well as 
craft ways to explain their strategies more effectively to key stakeholders. To 
make The 36 Stratagems of more practical use to managers, I sought to identify 
which might be of greater use in different types of strategic situations. For 
example, one would expect that stratagems relevant to a company seeking to 
grow rapidly might be different than those relevant to a company seeking to 
maintain and defend its current size or to improve employee engagement. 
Similarly, stratagems relevant to large companies might be different than those 
most relevant to smaller companies.  
I therefore began studying the public statements of companies with 
diverse strategies and classifying their descriptions according to The 36 
Stratagems. I was not aware of it at the time, but this practice was a form of 
narrative analysis (see Section 2.4.4: “Narrative analysis”). As I continued to 
collect and categorize the narratives told by companies, it occurred to me that 
there was a potentially important variable missing from them (beyond 
statements such as being large or small, which define a generic strategic 
situation) that might influence which type of narrative a company is likely to 
cite. It occurred to me that the narratives the companies used might depend not 
just on their situation but also to the era in which they were devised. That is, one 
would reasonably expect that prevailing narratives (or explanations) of one time 
period would change and be different in the next. The strategic narratives most 
prevalent thirty years ago may be significantly different than those of today. 
As this thesis details (see Section 2.2 “How strategic concepts may 
evolve”), several theories from multiple disciplines support this expectation. In 
general, these theories argue that new concepts are introduced when a group of 
people conclude that current concepts are inadequate. If these concepts are 
deemed to be useful in some way they may become widely adopted within a 
discipline, either supporting existing concepts or replacing them.  
I found the implications of this logic to be intriguing, as it suggests that, in 
the earlier stages of a new concept emerging, we can expect to observe two 
communities in relation: one that adopts the new concept and another that has 
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not. If the first group (the adopters) are perceived to be more successful at 
solving certain kinds of problems or realizing certain kinds of possibilities, then 
this may be an indicator that the new concept will eventually be widely adopted 
(i.e., because observers, aspiring to have the adopters’ success, will likely adopt 
their concepts).  
This suggests that if one could compare two groups of companies, one 
with companies that are considered to be more successful and another with 
companies considered to be less successful, in terms of how they speak about 
their business strategies, we may be able to get a glimpse of new concepts that are 
emerging. Such a comparison might give us some foresight into how business 
strategy concepts change over time.  
Therefore, this thesis attempts to observe this phenomenon in establishing 
two sets of companies (see Section 3.2 “Key concepts: winner and loser”) and 
conducting narrative analysis (see Section 2.4.4 “Narrative analysis”) to address 
the following two-part research question:  
How do the strategic narratives that circulate within “winning” 
companies and their leaders differ from those circulating within 
“losing” companies and their leaders?  
Given the answer to the first question: what new business 
strategy concepts are likely to emerge in the business community 
at large? 
1.2 Epistemological Approach 
In my twenty years of training and practice as a management consultant I have 
had many occasions of using quantitative arguments, which tend to be associated 
with a positivistic approach to research. I have no problems with using such 
evidence in my consulting work. This, however, does not bring me into the 
positivist camp. To me, quantitative research does not establish irrefutable truths 
and generalizations, but plausible arguments for making informed decisions. To 
me, quantitative accounts are always embedded in the narratives of decision 
makers and as such subject of negotiations.  
For similar reasons, I am not afraid of making comparisons as positivists, 
post-positivists, even qualitative researchers do. I have learned from strong 
critics of logical positivisms, such as by Karl Popper (1974), Thomas Kuhn 
(1962), A. H. Schoenfeld (1990, 1992, and 1994) whom I cite in this thesis. But 
the medium of my inquiry is language – not in the Saussurian tradition (de 
Saussure 1916) which conceptualizes language as an abstract-objectivist system 
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(Vološinov, 1986) devoid of social meanings, or Foucault’s (1970) which 
theorizes discourse and power historically. Instead, I am more leaning on the 
later Wittgenstein (1958) for his dialogical conception in the form of language 
games, on J. Bruner (1986, 2002) for describing life as narrative, G. Lakoff and 
M. Johnson’s (1980) accounts of the relationship between metaphors and reality 
as perceived, and Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) classic on the social 
construction of reality.  
This thesis takes no stance on whether it is post-positivist, radical 
constructivist, social constructivist, and the various conceptions of truths and 
reality they imply. Rather, I subscribe to the sociological “Thomas Theorem” 
(Thomas and Thomas, 1928), which asserts that narratives that are believed to be 
true have real consequences when acted upon. It suggest that a comparative 
study of the business strategies that companies enact could provide us access to 
the reality they may bring forth, whether this reality pertains to how they 
organize themselves, act, and transform their world to the better or to the worse. 
My orientation is influenced to a great extent by my father, Professor 
Klaus Krippendorff, whom one might characterize as a social constructivist, 
though he would likely resist such categorization, or any. I have over the past ten 
years read and discussed with him his work and those of philosophers he 
considers important. While my topic leads me to use the vocabulary of the 
business community, which often sounds positivist, I certainly assume an 
epistemology that emphasizes the narrative evolution of reality, not objectivist 
generalizations.  
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2. Analyzing How Strategic Concepts Emerge 
2.1 Strategic Thinking: A Review 
In this section, I attempt to outline how concepts of modern corporate 
competitive advantage have evolved over time. If we consider each prevailing 
concept as a place to look for success or competitive advantage, we will see that 
over time our attention shifts, for example, from understanding business cycles 
to achieving economies of scale to securing access to resources to understanding 
customer needs. New concepts are introduced. Some are adopted, some rejected, 
and some marginalized. Some build on and contribute to prior concepts, while 
some replace them.  
Various researchers have attempted to classify strategy literature (Schendel 
& Hofer, 1979; Fahey & Christensen, 1986; Huff & Reger, 1987; Mintzberg, 1990; 
McKiernan, 1997; Montgomery, 1988). My goal in outlining how concepts of 
strategy may have evolved is not to evaluate or add to such efforts, but rather to 
provide a reasonably rich timeline of the prevailing strategic concepts so that, 
later in this thesis, I can attempt to map these concepts to a catalog of strategic 
concepts drawn from an earlier and non-business domain with the hope of 
learning something about how concepts are evolving today.  
The term “strategy” derives from the Greek word, strategia, meaning 
“generalship,” which in turn stems from roots meaning “army” and “lead.” The 
Greek verb stratego means roughly “to plan the destruction of one’s enemies 
through effective use of resources” (Bracker, 1980). While this source might 
suggest that “strategy” stems from a purely military concept, it was, as of the 6th 
century B.C., applied equally to the political domain. In the 6th century B.C., 
“stratego” was the formal title given to a politician designated as responsible for 
raising citizens for military service and maintaining military infrastructure.  
However, scholars generally believe that the concept of strategy, if not the 
term, originated with The Art of War, a text ostensibly written by Sun Tzu, a 
Chinese general, around 500 B.C. (Huynh, 2009; Grant, 2010). While some 
scholars have challenged whether The Art of War applies to business strategy 
(McCormick, 2001), modern practitioners continue to apply Sun Tzu’s concepts 
to modern strategy, particularly in the area of game theory (Dixit & Nalebuff, 
1991; Dixit & Nalebuff, 2008; Niou & Ordenshook, 1994). More generally, 
principles of military strategy have influenced business strategy, including 
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maneuver warfare, the benefits of surprise and deception, focus, and moral force 
(Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Clemons & Santamaria, 2002; Evered, 1983). 
At the close of World War I, in the early 1920s, business academics and 
practitioners focused on applying strategy to the challenge of managing business 
cycles to create a more stable business environment (Mitchell, 1922; Stone, 
Schluter, & Stewart, 1922). This challenge fell naturally into the hands of 
economists and policy makers, since the primary concern was managing the 
cycles of employment, interest rates, growth of gross national product (GNP), 
and other macro-factors.  
By the mid-1950s, strategic planning had become a short-term budgeting 
exercise, but it was soon challenged to extend its reach further into the future. 
The economic environments in which firms competed had grown more stable 
(Terborgh, 1957), making room for the introduction of “long-range business 
planning” (Ewing, 1956; Payne, 1957).  
At this time, some of the earliest modern strategy theorists to directly link 
concepts of strategy to business did so by proposing a theory of games (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). This opened the door to a branch of strategy 
that would grow popular over the next two decades, applying concepts of game 
theory to business and politics (see, for example, Borch, 1962; Dixit & Nalebuff, 
1991; Dixit & Nalebuff, 2008; Kuhn & McDonald, 1950; Niou & Ordenshook, 
1994; Tucker, 1950). The term “co-opetition,” introduced by Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff (1997), was broadly adopted by strategy practitioners as a term to 
reference this branch of strategy otherwise known as game theory.  
Firms began establishing formal planning functions (Stewart, 1958). This 
movement helped to formalize the strategic planning function and encouraged 
the application of scientific approaches to business planning with a goal of 
establishing management as a science (Mintzberg, 1971). Pressure grew on 
leadership to think formally and scientifically about what their company’s 
strategies should be. Drucker drew attention to this by proposing that the role of 
top management should be to answer the questions: “What is our business and 
what should it be?” (Drucker, 1954, p. 77). Selznick concisely proposed the 
fundamentals of this approach by stating, “Leadership sets goals, but in doing so 
takes account of the conditions that have already determined what the 
organization can do and to some extent what it must do” (Selznick, 1957, pp. 62). 
Strategy involved considering internal factors (e.g., competencies, ambitions) 
and external requirements (e.g., what the organization must achieve to survive) 
and then, based on these, defining the organization’s mission. This theme of 
strategy being informed by external and internal factors shaped how 
practitioners and theorists defined strategy. Chandler proposed a possible 
definition of strategy as “the determination of the basic long-term goals and 
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objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the 
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals” (Chandler, 1962, p. 
13). 
Combining Drucker’s concept of strategy (i.e., that strategy defines what 
business a company is and should be in) and Chandler’s internal-external 
distinction, Andrews proposed strategy to be “the pattern of major objectives, 
purposes or goals … stated in such a way as to define what business the company 
is in or is to be in and the kind of company it is or is to be” (Andrews, 1965, p. 
28). He simultaneously introduced the concept of a SWOT (strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis (Andrews, 1965, p. 181), which 
was broadly adopted by strategy practitioners and still today broadly influences 
the strategy design practices of corporations. Mintzberg argued that Andrew’s 
framework formed the basis of what he called the design school of strategy 
(Mintzberg, 1990).  
Factors such as the acceleration of the rate of change within firms and the 
acceleration of the application of science and technology to management 
processes encouraged strategists to put a premium on the ability to understand 
external factors (Ansoff, 1969). Ansoff’s work proposed that an organization 
should manage four components in defining their strategies: the market scope of 
its products, a growth trajectory incorporating the changes the firm anticipates 
in its current product-market position, the firm’s competitive advantage, and 
synergy (O’Shannassy, 1999). Ansoff’s proposition, according to Mintzberg 
(1990), set the basis for the planning school of strategy.  
The planning school of strategy grew popular throughout the 1970s. It 
advocated that companies win by conducting thorough market analyses and 
competitor analyses, analyzing alternative strategies, and setting up dynamic 
resource allocation strategies (Gluck et al., 1980). Numerous analytical 
frameworks were introduced by management consultants and broadly adopted 
by practitioners including the Boston Consulting Group’s (BCG’s) “Experience 
Curve” (Henderson, 1973) which helped companies anticipate future cost and 
speed advantages and BCG’s “Portfolio Matrix” which helped companies 
categorize business units into “stars,” “problem children,” “cows,” and “dogs” 
and manage each classification differently (Henderson, 1968). Numerous 
consulting firms, including Arthur D. Little and McKinsey & Company, 
introduced similar frameworks to help firms analyze the fit between their 
strategies and markets. 
Several changes in the business environment over the late 1970s and early 
1980s raised the question of whether strategic planning was merely an effective 
long-term exercise or could become a science. Macroeconomic instability grew, 
exacerbated by the oil shocks of 1974 and 1979 (Barsky & Kilian, 2004). 
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Competition by companies from Japan and Southeast Asia grew (Dertouzos et 
al., 1989; Momaya et al., 2006). Growing competitiveness and market instability 
threw into question the long-term planning approaches that had dominated 
from the 1960s. Attention shifted away from strategic planning to strategic 
management; the dialogue focused on how to place a company in the right 
market and against the right set of competitors (Gavetti et al., 2005; Siggelkow, 
2002). Bracker proposed that  
“strategic management entails the analysis of internal and 
external environments of a firm to maximize the utilization of 
resources in relation to objectives…. The major importance of 
strategic management is that it gives organizations a framework 
for developing abilities for anticipating and coping with change. 
It also helps to develop the ability to deal with uncertain futures 
by defining a procedure for accomplishing goals”   
(Bracker, 1980, p. 221). 
The strategic management perspective leads to a focus on how a firm 
adapts its behavior to its environment (Chaffee, 1985; Hambrick, 1982) and 
suggests that firms should adopt different archetypes of strategy formulations 
according to their unique environments (Miller & Friesen, 1978). That a firm 
should pursue a “strategic fit” with its environment became a core concept of 
accepted models of strategy formulation (Andrews, 1971; Hofer & Schendel, 
1978; Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000), and it was established that a good “strategic 
fit” had positive consequences for the performance of the firm (Ginsberg & 
Venkatraman, 1985; Miles & Snow, 1994). This point of view also encourages the 
“planner” to define a strategy in terms of the firm’s patterns of behavior, rather 
than as its strategic plan (Mintzberg, 1978). Effective planning, it was proposed, 
should not impose rigid actions to be executed, but should rather define 
organizational boundaries, stimulate entrepreneurial thinking, and establish a 
value system that reinforces the commitment managers have to their 
organization’s strategy (Gluck et al., 1980). 
If the challenge of strategy is to align a firm’s behavior with its 
environment (or industry), then selecting the right industry in which to compete 
becomes of prime importance. Researchers therefore shifted their attention 
toward understanding the characteristics of a firm’s business environment, in 
order to assess the potential for a firm to create a competitive advantage in that 
industry. Michael Porter pioneered this approach, leading strategists to look for 
conditions like barriers to entry and buyer/supplier bargaining power (1980) and 
to dissect the role of market share and the experience curve on how profits 
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pooled between the firms in an industry (Boston Consulting Group, 1978). 
Porter’s work expands the scope and number of factors that strategists should 
consider when conducting what might otherwise have been a long-term strategic 
planning exercise. Following Porter’s contribution, the strategists began to 
consider factors such as the bargaining power of buyers, barriers to entry (which 
determine the risk of new entrants), alternative products, supplier bargaining 
power, and competitive rivalry.  
Michael Porter’s theory that firms can choose between two generic 
strategies, cost or differentiation, is one of the most influential framework for the 
study of corporate strategy. Soon after Porter published his work, scholars 
recognized it as the dominant competitive strategy paradigm (Hill, 1988; 
Murray, 1988). They have relied on his concept to study the relationship of a 
firm’s strategy to other functions, such as: 
 Information technology (Schuler & Jackson, 1989), 
 Manufacturing (Kotha & Orne, 1989), 
 Logistics (McGinnis & Kohn, 1988), 
 Industrial engineering (Petersen, 1992), 
 Environmental scanning (Jennings & Lumpkin, 1992), 
 Planning processes (Powell, 1994), 
 Management selection (Govindarajan, 1989; Sheibar, 1986), and 
 Managerial biases (Nystrom, 1994). 
Some have attempted to expand or add to Porter’s schema of generic 
strategies (Miller, 1986; Mintzberg, 1988), yet Porter’s scheme continues to be 
the dominant one laid out in most contemporary textbooks (Bourgeois, 1996; 
Pearce & Robinson, 1994; Thompson & Strickland, 1995). 
Porter’s other contributions to the field of business strategy include the 
value chain framework (Porter, 1985) and the diamond model of competitive 
advantage (Porter, 1990). But, perhaps Porter’s most significant contribution to 
the evolving discourse of strategy was his introduction of the term “competitive 
advantage,” which he argued “grows fundamentally out of value a firm is able to 
create for its buyers that exceeds the firm’s cost of creating it” (Porter, 1985, p. 
xxii). This proposition and its subsequent adoption triggered a long dialogue 
among strategy theorists about the definition of competitive advantage and its 
sources. It effectively placed “competitive advantage” at the center of strategy, 
though some have criticized Porter for narrowing the focus on strategy 
(Mintzberg, 1990; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1991). Mintzberg pointed to Porter’s work 
as the beginning of the positioning school of strategy. 
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In the 1990s, focus shifted from understanding the external environment 
to the resource-based view (RBV), examining sources of advantage inside a firm 
(Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Peteraf, 1993; Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990; Nelson, 1991; Schumpeter, 1934; Wernerfelt, 1984). The general view had 
been that a firm’s objectives should include creating a sustainable competitive 
advantage by intelligently choosing their market. The RBV contributed 
considerably to the pursuit of competitive advantage by adding to the industry-
fit view an effective internal analysis of the firm’s tangible elements (e.g., assets) 
and intangible elements (e.g., core competencies) in order to enable a firm to do 
things that “other firms are unable to duplicate” (Barney, 1991, p. 102). The firm 
can accomplish this objective if it identifies and takes advantage of its valuable, 
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) resources (Barney, 1991; Collis & 
Montgomery, 1995; Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Nelson, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; 
Wernerfelt, 1984, 1995). Hunt and Morgan (1995) further categorized a firm’s 
resources with the potential to create competitive advantage: financial, physical, 
legal, human, organizational, informational, and relational. Prahalad and Hamel 
(1990) suggested that firms combine superior skills and resources to create core 
competencies. Day and Wensley (1988) explored how firms use superior skills 
and resources to achieve an advantage.  
It is useful to analyze a firm’s competitive advantage by looking at the 
resource side, rather than the product side. The analogies of barriers to entry and 
market share are helpful to highlight strategic options that are available from 
taking the resource perspective (Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993). The resource 
perspective helps us understand the extent, pace, and geographical aspects of a 
firm’s multinational expansion by analyzing how the firm seeks out knowledge-
based and property-based resources (Tseng, Tansuhaj, Hallagan, & McCollough, 
2007). One study also suggested that limited resources can drive increased 
innovation (Katila & Shane, 2005). The resource-driven analysis allows for 
drawing a close analogy with nature and a Darwinian competition for resources, 
expanding the focus of the search for strategic advantage from the local business 
environment to include other competitors as well (Henderson, 1989).  
The search for economies of scale led researchers toward another, related, 
source of advantage: economies of “scope” described by Panzar and Willing 
(1981): “There are economies of scope where it is less costly to combine two or 
more product lines in one firm than to produce them separately” (p. 268). The 
economies of scope concept emerged from taking a resource view of the firm; the 
intuitive logic behind the concept comes from the idea that sharable inputs exist 
such as shared production capacity, equipment, human capital, and primary 
resources. The resource view also leads to the conclusion that, by viewing a firm 
as a collection of resources which can be shared, we may be able to predict the 
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rate and direction of a firm’s growth (Rubin, 1973) and the entrepreneurial 
behavior of creating resources “out of nothing” when necessary (Baker & Nelson, 
2005).  
The resourced-based view shifted the dialogue of corporate strategy 
because it places the corporation as a central player in its own strategy. A pure 
industry-fit perspective can encourage firms to pursue similar markets with 
similar strategies by suggesting markets to be either attractive or unattractive. 
RBV suggested the truth is more complex, that the beauty of an industry lies in 
the eye of the firm contemplating it.  Expanding strategic analysis from external 
attractiveness toward internal resources and capabilities led to a more complex 
view: each combination of external and internal factors combines to identify a 
unique strategic approach as best and suggests that firms must adjust as either 
the external or the internal factors change (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). This 
view led firms to explore how they are different from their competitors and 
encouraged them, therefore, to design strategies that were different as well. It no 
longer seemed logical to conclude whether a market was attractive without also 
answering the question: to whom? In the mid-1990s Michael Porter addressed 
the need to consider a corporation’s uniqueness when he proposed: 
“Competitive strategy is about being different. It means deliberately choosing a 
different set of activities to deliver a unique mix of value” (Porter, 1996, p. 64).  
The search for unique internal sources of advantage floated from tangible 
assets and economies of scale toward intangible core competencies, activities, 
and behaviors which in turn led to an exploration of culture. An early concept 
that illustrated this exploration of internal sources of advantage and the role of 
culture in strategy was the “7S” (Pascale & Athos, 1981) which became widely 
adopted among consultants and managers and proposed a firm should seek 
alignment between seven factors: strategy, structure (or organization), systems, 
staff, style, skills, and shared values (or culture). There was an apparent growing 
sense that culture may play an important role in creating a competitive 
advantage (Wilson, 1994; Bonn & Christodolou, 1996). The individual—his 
actions and decisions—were beginning to be considered as mattering more in 
shaping a company’s strategy which led many experts to turn their attention 
from strategic management to strategic thinking, as Stacey (1993) proposed: 
…that although the procedures and analytical techniques of 
modern strategic management may not be of much direct 
practical use, they do create a framework for strategic thinking 
and, it is assumed, managers who think strategically are bound to 
act more effectively in dealing with the future. (p. 18) 
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A firm’s success, it became viewed, depended at least in part on how well 
managers made decisions regarding what frameworks, policies, and procedures 
to apply and when to ignore them. One of the earliest practitioners to emphasize 
the importance of strategic thinking was Ohmae, who proposed that a company’s 
strategy evolved from the mental approach its managers adopted. His “3C” 
model, which proposed managers should consider factors related to the 
customer, competitor, and company when setting strategy, became influential 
among consultants and managers (Ohmae, 1982). Advocates of the strategic 
thinking view have suggested that strategy is an intuitive and creative art (Gavetti 
et al., 2005; Graetz, 2002; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Mintzberg, 1994) in contrast 
to a rational, analytic, convergent science (Porter, 1980; Porter, 1985; Andrews, 
1965; Ansoff, 1965). 
Another path of inquiry pushed culture into a more central role shaping 
strategy: the pursuit of temporary rather than sustainable advantages. 
Throughout the 1990s, the central goal of a company’s strategy seemed to be the 
achievement of a “sustainable competitive advantage” (SCA) (Oliver, 1997; 
Powell, 1992; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999), even while theoreticians struggled to 
reach consensus on how to define the concept (Cockburn, Henderson, & Stern, 
2000; Powell, 2001). In the early 2000s, the pursuit of sustainable (or 
“permanent”) competitive advantage was put increasingly into question, 
particularly in an environment of rapid technological change, where a firm could 
create more wealth by focusing on moving faster than the competition (i.e., 
identify new opportunities and organizing effectively to pursue them faster than 
the competition) than focusing on hindering the competition (e.g., by raising a 
competitor’s costs, keeping rivals off-balance, and excluding new entrants) 
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Christensen pointed out that a firm that does the 
right things, that protects and leverages its sources of sustainable competitive 
advantage, often make itself vulnerable to attack by “disruptive” companies and 
technologies (Christensen, 1997). He coined this dynamic “disruptive 
innovation.” 
Researchers concluded that the resource-based view “reaches a boundary 
condition in high-velocity markets” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, p. 1105). Under 
the conditions of high-velocity markets, firms would expect a reduced duration 
of resource-based advantages. Additionally, the planning process for building a 
resource advantage becomes excessively costly in fast-moving environments. 
This is not to say that resources no longer provided advantages, but rather 
that, in dynamic environments, competitive advantages emerged from a firm’s 
decision about which resources to use and how the firm uses those changes. 
Studies have shown, for example, that strategic fit and resource competition 
contribute positively to firm performance in dynamic environments (Zajac et al., 
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2000). However, many of the studies of how firms use resources to build 
competitive advantage were developed for stable, not dynamic, environments 
(Smith & Grimm, 1987). 
To adapt to radical environmental change, firms must know when to 
initiate radical organizational change and still be able to survive such changes 
(Haveman, 1992; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991). At that point, a firm’s culture starts 
to play a central role. Studies have shown a link to a sustainable competitive 
advantage if the firm’s culture has the attributes required to modify its own 
culture when necessary (Barney, 1986). When competitors start duplicating the 
firm’s successes more quickly, a common characteristic of dynamic markets, 
culture becomes increasingly important because sustaining a firm’s advantage 
depends on its ability to continue evolving faster than the competition. A “shared 
belief system” makes coordinating activity possible by providing a common 
framework for noticing stimuli, interpreting them, and coordinating appropriate 
action (Gilbert, 1989; Kelly, 1955). 
Because the dynamic view of strategy considered change that was 
accelerating, experts adopted the term “hypercompetition” (D’Aveni’s, 1994) to 
suggest that successful firms’ organizational form, function, and competitive 
advantage continually and rapidly evolve (Rindova & Kotha, 2001). This view 
built on Schumpeter’s (1939) concepts of creative destruction and business cycles 
and argued that both are accelerating across many industries.  
Sustaining competitive advantage, then, comes not from maintaining one 
source of sustainable advantage, but rather by creating over time a sequence of 
shorter-term advantages (Wiggins & Reufli, 2005). It requires building an 
advantage more quickly than the competition (as the dynamic strategy approach 
suggests), while also eroding the advantages held by rivals (D’Aveni, 1994; 
Christensen, 1997). Hypercompetition thrusts forward culture and the cognitive 
aspects of competitive advantage. It implies that success in rapidly-changing 
markets depends in part on a firm’s having the ability and habit of seeing and 
pursuing emerging opportunities more quickly than the firm’s competitors. This 
opens the door to an important new form of inquiry because a firm’s ability to 
sustain this outperformance depends on their managers’ ability to process and 
make sense from stimuli in compressed time periods (Bogner & Barr, 2000). 
Specifically, cognitive frameworks influence what stimuli the managers notice, 
how they interpret what they notice, and what actions the managers should 
consider and take (Galambos et al., 1986). The shift in focus toward strategy in 
fast-moving environments drives the origin of competitive advantages out of the 
board-room into the hands of managers and onto the shop floor. A firm’s ability 
to sustain an advantage is based on the organization’s ability to change, rather 
than to repeat a previously successful formula. 
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Researchers are increasingly exploring Mintzberg’s (1978) view that a 
company’s strategy emerges through the actions and decisions of a company’s 
people, not formulated once per year during planning sessions attended by a few 
top leaders. Many now believe the study of strategy over the past several decades 
adopted an unbalanced view, considering it exclusively a top-down management 
process (Shrivastava, 1986) in which individual behavior is almost entirely absent 
(Jarzabkowski & Spree, 2009). The focus of strategy as a fixed plan or process is 
shifting toward the view that strategy is what a firm and its multiple actors do, 
leading to a burgeoning interest in the study of “Strategy as Practice” 
(Jarzabkowski & Spree, 2009). Under this view, strategy is defined “as a situated, 
socially accomplished activity” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007, p. 7). A company’s 
strategy is viewed as being influenced by individuals and groups of individuals 
both from inside and from outside the corporation (e.g., consultants, gurus, 
trade unions, media, regulators) (Whittington et al., 2003; Whittington, 2006a). 
Jarzabkowski and Spree (2009) categorized existing Strategy as Practice 
research along two dimensions. First, they considered the level of praxis studied: 
micro (e.g., how specific decisions are made), meso (e.g., the organizational, 
business-unit, or other sub-organization level), and macro (e.g., the institutional, 
industry, or market level). Second, they considered the type of practitioner 
studied: the individual actor within the organization (e.g., Sally the CEO or John 
the human resource manager), the aggregate actor within the organization (e.g., 
the human resource department or the launch team for ABC product), and the 
extra-organizational aggregate actor (e.g., a specific environmentalist group, 
regulator, or a chamber of industry and commerce). Research in this field has 
often focused on “strategic champions,” individuals who reach beyond their 
formal organizational responsibilities to shape strategy (Mantere, 2005). Some of 
the findings from this Strategy as Practice view most directly relevant to this 
thesis are that executive teams that make decisions faster use more information, 
not less, and generate more, not fewer, alternatives than slower-deciding 
executive teams (Eisenhardt, 1989). Another study found that practicing 
strategists depend on the use of analogies, or metaphors, as a managerial 
reasoning approach more often than scholarly analyses of strategy would suggest 
(Giovanni, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005). 
2.2 How Strategy Concepts May Evolve 
Many have undertaken to explain the mechanics by which concepts emerge 
within various fields, such as mathematics (Ouvrier-Buffet, 2006; Schoenfeld, 
1992; Tall, 2004), the social sciences (Bryant, 2007; Charmaz, 2000; Glaser & 
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Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 2002), natural sciences (Kuhn, 1962; Nelson et al., 1976), 
and business strategy (Carlile & Christensen 2005; Gilbert & Christensen, 2005; 
Hambrick & Chen 2008; Pfeffer, 1993), among others. This study does not 
attempt to advance the models suggested in these works, nor does it have an 
opinion as to their validity. Instead, this study will take the position that if such 
models have be found to be useful in explaining how concepts emerge, they may 
also be of similar use in the effort to describe how the strategic concepts 
discussed above may have evolved and may be evolving. This study will draw on 
three models of concept emergence: the evolution of social movements, the 
evolution of theories, and the evolution of methods and other concepts in 
mathematics.  
2.2.1 Concept Emergence and Social Movements 
Hambrick and Chen (2008) suggested that new academic fields can be viewed as 
social movements. While the social movements that social movement theorists 
typically study—movements such as the French Revolution, the American 
Revolution, the Polish Constitutional movement of 1791, the British abolitionist 
movement, or the Russian Revolution of 1905—are generally rebellious in 
nature, requiring change of the prevailing order (Tilly, 1978; Oberscahll, 1973), 
new academic fields also act as legitimacy-seeking movements because, to 
become a field, the academic establishment must accept the field through, for 
example, the acceptance of papers from the aspiring field in conferences, the 
granting of tenure to members of the field by major universities, and the 
allowing of members of the field to supervise graduate students (Hagstrom, 1965; 
Hambrick & Chen, 2008; Kuhn, 1970; Stinchcombe, 1994). The concepts 
outlined above did not all become fields, of course. But, even without achieving 
such an accomplishment, each concept exerted significant influence on the 
domain of business strategy. The “hypercompetition” and the “disruptive 
innovation” concepts, for example, significantly contributed to and shaped our 
understanding of business strategy without becoming stand-alone fields.  
What is of particular help to us is understanding what social movement 
theory might tell us about how concepts evolve, or do not, along the path toward 
being accepted as a field. Social movement theory suggests that this path begins 
when an informal community gathers around a concept, theory, type of problem, 
idea, methodology, or technology. Members of this community share papers, cite 
each other, and attempt to engage communities outside of their own in their 
dialogue (Kuhn, 1970). This community is first attracted by the observation of 
anomalies not adequately explained by existing concepts, theories, or 
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methodologies (Merton, 1973). For this community to advance their movement 
toward becoming a field, they must (a) have a common interest (Davis & 
Thompson, 1994) in a long-term shared agenda (a community with a short-term 
or temporary agenda need not pursue creating a field to achieve its goals) and (b) 
must believe it cannot achieve its agenda while remaining an informal 
community (Hambrick & Chen, 2008). To successfully advance their agenda, 
this community must be able to mobilize support and resources. Mobilization 
can be described as “the process by which a group secures collective control over 
the resources needed for collective action” (Jenkins, 1983, p. 532). Hambrick and 
Chen (2008) have also suggested that differentiation enhances the likelihood of 
success for a community aspiring to create a new field. If the community does 
not attack existing fields but differentiates itself and focuses on a problem or 
anomaly that existing fields are inadequate to address, it will have a greater 
likelihood of success. 
Social movement theory helps us to understand the process through which 
new fields can emerge and what factors enhance the probability of informal 
communities succeeding in building acceptance and creating new fields. 
However, the usefulness of social movement theory to this study extends yet 
further. Many of the concepts outlined above failed to become fields or 
disciplines, yet still proved highly influential in shaping the corporate strategy 
discourse. Social movement theory helps us understand some of the factors that 
determine how influential concepts may become as they work their way along 
the path from conception to acceptance.  
Before we apply the relevant elements of social movement theory to this 
thesis, it helps to marry these with another approach to understanding the 
dynamics through which concepts evolve: theory evolution. Together, these 
approaches will provide a helpful model for understanding how concepts evolve.  
2.2.2 Concept Emergence and Theory Evolution 
Various scholars (e.g., Kuhn, 1962; Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Yin, 1984) have sought to advance our understanding of the process by 
which groups of scholars build reliable theories. Carlile and Christensen (2005) 
synthesized these works into a three-step model.  
Step 1: Observation 
The process begins with researchers carefully collecting observations about a 
phenomenon in the form of words and numbers. They measure and take notes. 
This data becomes the raw material upon which a new theory is based. It is 
within these observations that the researcher notices and records the anomalies 
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(Gilbert & Christensen, 2005) that attract the attention of the foundational 
informal community with the potential to initiate the formation of a new social 
movement. What attracts the researchers’ attention is the possibility that the 
observations may not be adequately explained by existing theories (Merton, 
1973).  
During this step, researchers often introduce (or create) new constructs 
that “help us understand and visualize what the phenomena are, and how they 
operate” (Carlile & Christensen, 2005, p. 3). Examples of such constructs include 
economic terms such as “utility” or “transaction costs,” abstractions which 
enable the community of researchers forming around the phenomena to label 
and discuss the phenomena. These constructs are not necessarily theories (or 
fields). They may be building blocks with which new theories are constructed.  
Step 2: Classification 
After the phenomena have been observed, recorded, and better understood with 
the help of constructs, the researcher or informal community may enter the 
second stage and categorize the observations into schemes that facilitate the 
efforts to understand the phenomena. In this paper, for example, I will later 
classify companies into public v. private entities and into Winners v. Losers. 
These categories can be considered frameworks or typologies that attempt to 
organize the observations into a simpler, more useful form.  
Step 3: Association (or Defining Relationships) 
In the third phase, researchers seek to understand the relationships between 
category-defined attributes and their observations. They may, for example, seek 
to measure the relationship between the categories public v. private company 
and company financial performance (as defined by certain measurable 
phenomena like revenue growth, profit margins, or balance sheet ratios). They 
use tools such as regression analysis to assess the strength of such relationships. 
This thesis, for example, will take the categories of Winner and Loser and seek to 
measure the relationship of these to the types of word patterns companies use to 
describe their strategies.  
Post-step 3 activity 
These three steps lead to a new or improved theory arrived at through induction. 
Researches can “test” this theory through a deductive process by using the theory 
to predict observable phenomena and assess how well the new or improved 
theory predicts phenomena. If the “test” is successful at predicting phenomena, 
the researchers increase their confidence that the new or improve theory holds. If 
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the “test” is not successful, the researchers may revisit their theory, adjust it, and 
test the revised theory, or they may abandon their effort.  
A new theory, once validated to a level deemed acceptable with the 
foundation researchers (or an initial informal community as social movement 
theory suggests), then comes into interaction with other theories. Views on how 
this interaction evolves diverge widely and likely depend on how disruptive the 
theory is to existing accepted theories. To simplify the possible paths a new 
theory may take, let us generalize that a new theory either integrates into or 
competes with existing accepted theories. In the first case, in which a theory 
integrates into existing accepted theory, the theory would fit into the prevailing 
body of accepted theories by, for example, improving an existing theory or 
helping us understand observations that current theories do not adequately 
address. Along this “integration” path, it seems reasonable to expect that the 
principles of social movement theory, as sketched above, would apply in shaping 
the theory’s evolution. In the second case, in which the theory is inconsistent 
with or otherwise challenges existing theories, the theory will enter into the 
domain of Popper (1971, 1974) and Kuhn (1962) who proposed that the 
dynamic in which theories compete with each other characterizes scientific 
progress. 
In his book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” Kuhn (1962) 
suggested that the traditional concept of science developing linearly with a 
theory being introduced and rejected or adopted by the prevailing body of 
theories did not adequately describe the pattern of scientific evolution. He 
proposed instead that science develops through periodic revolutions and 
outlined three phases through which science evolves: 
1. A pre-scientific phase in which several incompatible and incomplete 
theories compete with each other for acceptance. 
2. A normal science phase characterized by one theory, or a set of theories 
(which he termed a “paradigm”), winning the acceptance of the scientific 
community. During this phase, a scientist’s job is to expand, detail, 
elaborate, and further justify the accepted paradigm. 
3. A period of revolution science is ushered in when the scientific 
community observes a new phenomenon that the current paradigm 
cannot adequately explain and someone proposes an alternative theory or 
a redefinition of the current theory. The new theory competes with 
existing theories and may replace the existing theory and introduce a new 
paradigm that then informs a subsequent normal science phase during 
which the new theory and, potentially, paradigm are further explored and 
expanded upon.  
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This thesis is not interested in discussing the validity of Kuhn’s concept. 
Rather, I lay it out here because it has been adopted to some extent by a variety of 
disciplines, including medicine, technology, (Rogers, 2003), economics (Cook, 
2003; Smitka, 2003), software engineering (Wernick & Hall, 2004), and 
leadership, where, for example, Pisapia (Pisapia et al., 2005) suggests that 
successful leaders demonstrate an ability to shift paradigms (i.e., to be able to 
“reframe”) with greater agility than less-successful leaders. 
2.2.3 Method and Concept Emergence in Mathematics 
Several mathematics theoreticians (e.g., Lakatos, 1961; Ouvrier-Buffet, 2006; 
Schoenfeld, 1985, 1987, 1990; Tall, 2004) have looked into how concepts, 
including methods, definitions, procedures, hypotheses, and theories, develop. 
This area of exploration can complement the approaches of social theory and 
theory formation summarized above. Its contributors follow the formal process 
by which new mathematical definitions emerge as analogous to concept 
development. Lakatos (1961) proposed, “A definitional procedure is a procedure 
of concept formation” (p. 54), and he went on to consider both the social and 
technical factors that shape the process of concept evolution. Shoenfeld (1990) 
proposed a four-step process through which mathematical theories and methods 
are constructed and adopted: 
1. Anomalies are noticed in the real word of observable phenomena; 
2. Aspects of the real world are represented in a formal representational 
system (the theory); 
3. Manipulations are performed within the formal system, and the theory is 
adjusted; and 
4. The results of the manipulations of the formal system, or the adjusted or 
new theory, are translated into the real world to see if they can better 
predict real-world phenomena. 
This model shares interesting parallels with those suggested above for 
social evolution and for theory evolution. What is of particular usefulness toward 
the purpose of this thesis in the study of mathematical concept evolution, and 
the reason it is included in the study, is the attention theorists have put on the 
role of names and words in the process of concept evolution.  
Several theorists (e.g., Ouvrier-Buffet, 2006; Rorty, 1989; Schoenfeld, 1990) 
have likened concepts to technologies. New technologies influence the types of 
problems we can solve, solutions we find, and cultures we develop. The 
invention of the scratch plough, for example, made it possible for humans to 
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develop agriculturally-based communities. These communities developed 
cultural norms that differed noticeably from hunter-gatherer communities. 
Ultimately, as agriculture was broadly adopted, it transformed human society. 
Schoenfeld (1994) proposed that mathematical concepts can be viewed as 
“intellectual technologies” that work similarly to shape how communities 
approach problems and what kinds of solutions they see: 
A similar case can be made regarding intellectual technologies-namely 
that there is a dialectical relationship between the character of a 
research community and the methods it employs. On one hand, the set 
of available methods provides constraints and opportunities: it suggests 
which problems can be addressed fruitfully, and which are likely to be 
awkward or difficult. On the other hand, the choice of methods-Which 
of the many methods potentially available are used with great 
frequency? Which are under serious development, and which are 
largely ignored?-often serves as a good indicator of the perspectives 
and values of the community. In many ways, then, the evolution of 
research methods in mathematics education (and more generally, in 
the social and cognitive sciences) is deeply reflective of the evolution of 
the field.  
2.2.4 Common Agreements in the Process of Concept Emergence 
Each of the three approaches to the study of concept evolution—social 
movement theory, theory evolution, and mathematical concept emergence—
approach the general problem of explaining how concepts may emerge and 
become part of the accepted system (of fields, theories, paradigms, etc.) with 
different perspectives and vocabulary. One could say, for example, that social 
movement theory is more interested in the actors in the process: the one making 
the observation, the characteristics of the community that proposes the new 
field, and the individuals who accept or reject the field. Theory evolution and 
mathematical concept emergence, meanwhile, focus more heavily on what the 
actors of the process do—they observe, create “constructs,” propose new 
theories, test these theories, etc.—substantially ignoring the characteristics of the 
actors who do these things.  
Nonetheless, or perhaps precisely because of these differences in 
approaches, the three share notable parallels, common sign-posts in their 
processes, that may offer a useful composite model for us to describe how the 
concepts outlined above may have emerged. We can draw at least four common 
agreements among the three approaches: 
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1. The process through which a concept emerges likely begins with the 
perception that current concepts are inadequate (e.g., to explain anomalies 
or to solve certain problems). They may be responding to perceived 
anomalies or failures of the existing concepts (Kuhn, 1962) or reveal 
inadequacies by addressing previously unrecognized practices (Fleck, 
1979; Rorty, 1989). Both studies of mathematical concept emergence and 
of theory evolution speak to an individual or group noticing that 
observable phenomena are not adequately addressed by existing theories 
or models. Social movement theory contends that an informal group is 
more likely to become accepted as a field if it seeks to solve a problem that 
existing fields cannot adequately address.  
2. New words, naming new concepts, are introduced. In theory evolution, 
researchers introduce new “constructs” that will form the building block 
of a new theory. In mathematical concept emergence, mathematicians 
may introduce new “intellectual technologies” (Schoenfeld, 1994) or 
“language tools” (Rorty, 1989) that facilitate solving the problem. These 
new words, and the concepts they name, begin to define the community 
behind the new concept, theory, or potential field, as, per social movement 
theory, the informal community begins distinguishing itself.  
3. The concept and, potentially, the theory or field created through the use of 
the concept are tested and adjusted. In theory evolution, a new or revised 
theory is proposed and then tested for its predictive value. In 
mathematical concept emergence, the formal system, once manipulations 
have been performed, is translated into the real world for testing. In both 
cases, where the new or revised concept/theory adequately improves 
prediction or does not adequately fit observation, adjustments are made. 
Per social movement theory, we can reasonably assume that this testing 
and adjustment are taking place during the steps in which the informal 
community shares papers and attempts to engage other communities in 
dialogue.  
4. The new concept/theory interacts with existing concepts/theories and is 
rejected by, is incorporated into, or replaces existing concepts/theories. 
While mathematical concept emergence and theory evolution address the 
social aspects of the process with less emphasis than social movement 
theory, all three suggest that the new concept/theory will ultimately fit 
existing, accepted concepts/theories. This fit can be achieved when the 
new concept/theory (a) supports and does not challenge existing 
concepts/theories or (b) successfully replaces existing concepts/theories. 
The new concept/theory, failing to fit or replace existing, accepted 
concepts/theories, may alternatively be rejected.  
 22 
Analyzing How Strategic Concepts Emerge
2.2.5 Case Example: The Emergence of the BCG “Portfolio Matrix 
To help illustrate how the key concept emergence steps synthesized above can 
offer a credible explanation of how business strategy concepts emerge, I briefly 
outline here how one business strategy concept evolved: the BCG Portfolio 
Matrix. In choosing this concept rather than others cited above, I did not 
conduct a systematic selection process. My objective here is simply to illustrate 
how this model may help explain concept emergence. As such, I chose a concept 
with rich enough historical documentation that we would have material with 
which to map its evolution.  
The BCG Portfolio Matrix also offers another attribute that I felt would 
make it a helpful illustration of the types of business strategy concepts I will 
explore later in this thesis. One element of studying the emergence of business 
concepts that differs from the study of the emergence of concepts in other 
scientific fields is the significant role that practitioners play in this emergence. If 
we were to apply this model to the emergence of a new mathematical or physics 
concept, we would likely see that, because there are relatively fewer non-
academic mathematical practitioners or physics practitioners than there are 
business practitioners (such as managers), we can expect practitioners to play a 
less significant role in the emergence and eventual acceptance of a new 
mathematical or physics concept. Albert Einstein’s relativity concept, for 
example, needed to be accepted by physicists alone. By contrast, business strategy 
concepts emerge through a process in which both practitioners and researchers 
or academics play significant roles. We can find some business strategy concepts 
that are introduced by researchers and then tested and adopted (or rejected) by 
practitioners. We can find business strategy concepts that are first introduced by 
practitioners and then tested and adopted (or rejected) by academic researchers. 
If looked into the emergence of business strategy concepts more deeply, we 
should not be surprised to find that the process often might be characterized as a 
dialogue between practitioners and academic researchers. I chose the BCG 
Portfolio Matrix as my case study because, as we will see shortly, it illustrates 
nicely this interplay between practitioners and academic researchers.  
Observing anomalies/inadequacies 
Since its first publication in the Boston Consulting Group’s (BCG) Perspectives 
essay in 1968 titled “Product Portfolio” (Henderson, 1968), the BCG “Portfolio 
Matrix” has become a widely recognized and applied strategic framework. The 
model originated out of the conclusion of BCG consultants that standard 
metrics, such as profit and return on investment, applied for the performance 
evaluation of mature businesses did not enable managers to adequately evaluate 
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growth businesses (Boston Consulting Group, 1968). Between 1966 and 1967, 
two BCG consultants, Alan Zakon and Sandy Moose, were hired to conduct a 
study for the Mead Corporation, an Ohio-based enterprise then mainly focused 
on the paper business. The consultants concluded that, for Mead to remain 
primarily in its core paper business, it would need investments greater than the 
company’s earnings. The consultants concluded, therefore, that the company 
should begin diversifying into high-growth businesses and that the entry into 
new businesses should be funded by the profit of the core paper business, even 
though this would mean limiting the financial resources available to the core 
paper business. Convincing management of their logic would require that 
management view their company as a portfolio of businesses, a perspective 
traditional metrics and strategic models did not naturally support (Brown, 1984). 
Introduction of new words or concepts 
Zakon and other BCG consultants had been working on a model that he 
intended to help introduce the portfolio concept. Initially, the terms considered 
for the model were drawn from those of banking products and included “savings 
account,” “bond,” and “mortgage.” Kent Aldershof, one of the consultants 
exploring the framework in the mid-1960s, proposed that there were only three 
types of investments: the savings account “where you put money in the bank, it 
compounded, you get nothing back along the way, but at the end you took more 
money out than you put in”; the bond, where “you buy it, it gives you cash flow 
annually, and at the end of the maturity period you get your money back”; and 
the third, the mortgage, where, for the holder, “you’re getting a return on your 
investment, plus you’re getting your money back, but at the end of the period it’s 
worth nothing.” A fourth category named “wildcat” was later added when Zakon 
stated, “I couldn’t imagine how to deal with three” (Kiechel III, 2010). The four 
categories—savings, bond, mortgage, and wildcat—were placed into a two-by-
two matrix. 
Concept is tested and adjusted 
The two-by-two matrix proved useful in helping BCG consultants explain their 
proposal to Mead management and, more generally, in helping managers 
understand and make investment choices between portfolios of businesses. Later 
the terms were translated into metaphors that appeared to resonate more readily 
with managers: “stars,” “question marks,” “cash cows,” and “pets.” The resulting 
model is what is now termed the “BCG Portfolio Matrix.” 
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Concept fits, replaces, or is rejected 
Until this point, we might say BCG itself served the function of the “informal 
community” described in social movement theory, though the consulting firm 
enjoyed several advantages over the “informal community” you might expect to 
see converge around a concept. Because BCG was a formal organization, it 
already had in place the key characteristics that correspond with successful 
“informal communities.” Its members already had strong working relationships 
and shared a long-term agenda (i.e., the success of the consulting firm). They 
also were able to mobilize an impressive battery of resources behind their 
concept including control over the consulting firm’s publication, Perspectives, 
which was launched in 1964 and had a circulation approximately equal to that of 
BusinessWeek, BCG’s business conferences which took place biannually in five 
countries around the world and were attended by business executives paying 
$1,500 per person entry, and the far-reaching personal network of BCG’s 
founder, Bruce Henderson, which afforded him close relationships with 
academics within and outside of his alma mater Harvard (Kiechel III, 2010). 
Over the 1970s and into the 1980s, large corporations diversified, making 
the BCG Portfolio Matrix an important management tool. By the early 1980s, the 
BCG Portfolio Matrix concept was being endorsed by organizations like General 
Electric, Mead, and Olin and had “struck the minds of many corporate 
executives” (Haspeslagh, 1982). Naylor and Gattis (1976) noted, “Top 
management has become increasingly aware that the old ways of ‘muddling 
through’ are not adequate to meet the complex problems facing corporations in 
the future. The need for a more systematic approach for evaluating the 
consequences of alternative managerial policies … on the future of the 
corporation has become self-evident.” The potential of the product portfolio 
approach was endorsed through the emulation of other leading consulting firms 
such as McKinsey & Company and Arthur D. Little. In the 1970s, McKinsey & 
Company developed the GE–McKinsey Matrix, a framework based on a 3x3 
matrix of industry attractiveness and business unit strength which McKinsey & 
Company developed to help General Electric prioritize its investments in its 
numerous business units (McKinsey Quarterly, 2008). Similarly, in the late 1970s, 
Arthur D. Little’s consulting firm developed the ADL Matrix, a 5x4 framework 
to help companies generate strategies for various combinations of competitive 
position and industry maturity. 
The academic community did not adopt the BCG Portfolio Matrix as 
quickly as practitioners. Critics argued that market share does not always 
correlate with low costs, profitability, or competitive superiority, as the BCG 
Portfolio Matrix would suggest, and further argued that companies could find 
additional funding from outside the company, for instance by utilizing more 
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heavily the assistance of multinational banks (Wündisch, 1973). Critics cited 
examples of low-share, low-growth businesses that, when taken under new 
management, became profitable in articles with titles such as “No Bad Dogs” 
(Kiechel III, 2010). However, the academic community was eventually persuaded 
at least to incorporate portfolio theory as an element of business strategy. In an 
attempt to measure the extent to which the portfolio has been embraced by 
academic researchers, I conducted a search on the academic database JStor, 
selecting journals under the categories “Business,” “Management,” and/or 
“Economics” and counting the number of articles that contained both the terms 
“portfolio planning” and “strategy.” I measured the number of articles that 
contained both of these terms across three time periods: (a) between 1968 and 
1969, (b) between 1970 and 1979, and (c) between 1980 and 1989. I then divided 
the number of articles found containing the above terms by the number of years 
in the period to calculate the average number of articles published per year. I 
found that the average number of articles published per year that contained both 
“portfolio planning” and “strategy” were:  
 50 articles between 1968 and 1969, 
 100 articles between 1970 and 1979, and 
 200 articles between 1980 and 1989. 
The trend indicates either an acceptance of the portfolio concept or at least 
an interest and a willingness to engage in a dialogue about it. In 1979, almost ten 
years after the BCG “Portfolio Matrix” was initially published, Phillipe 
Haspeslagh, an associate professor at the INSEAD business school in France, 
conducted a survey backed by the Harvard Business Review. The goal was to 
determine how widespread the use of portfolio schema like the growth-share 
matrix had become in the strategic planning of major companies. The survey 
showed that portfolio planning was becoming a popular method for managing 
the diversity of businesses within large organizations. Based on the 345 corporate 
responses, the author concluded, “On the basis of my survey, I estimate that, as 
of 1979, 36% of the Fortune ‘1000’ and 45% of the Fortune ‘500’ industrial 
companies had introduced the approach to some extent. Each year during the 
last five years, another 25 to 30 organizations have joined the ranks” 
(Haspeslagh, 1982).  
2.2.6 Conclusion 
My aim in this section was to outline a possible framework for studying the 
evolution of new concepts, particularly business strategy concepts, in order to 
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suggest why it may be valuable to conduct the analysis of this thesis. I laid out 
some of the common elements of social movement theory, theory evolution, and 
mathematical concept evolution and then illustrated how these common 
elements may help us construct a useful outline for how a business concept such 
as the BCG Portfolio Matrix evolved. The four steps suggested here are: 
1. A community perceived potential value in introducing new concepts.; 
2. Members of this community begin introducing new concepts (or “intellec-
tual technologies” or “constructs” or “language tools”); whether this is in 
response to perceived anomalies or failures of the existing ones (e.g., 
Kuhn, 1962) or because they want to address previously unrecognized 
practices (Fleck, 1979; Rorty, 1989) is less important here than the very 
phenomena that they introduce new language; 
3. If these concepts prove sufficiently persuasive people are compelled to test 
and modify them as either enhancing existing models or potentially re-
placing; and 
4. The new concept, model, or theory (i) fits into existing, accepted concepts, 
models, or theories, (ii) replaces them, or (iii) is rejected.  
This model suggests that the emergence of a new concept should be 
accompanied by the introduction of new words. Before a new concept is 
adopted, it will pass through step 2 of the model. We should be able to observe a 
community that adopts new and successful vocabularies and another community 
that has not. In the case of the types of concepts this thesis addresses, those of 
business strategy, we can expect to see that managers, once they believe the new 
narratives to be true, begin acting upon the new vocabulary (see Thomas and 
Thomas, 1928). The new language then has real consequences. They change firm 
behavior, which one can expect would thereby change a company’s performance.  
I will now focus on step 2 of this model, the introduction of new concepts.  
2.3 The Role of New Words in Concept Emergence 
The theories related to concept evolution summarized above place the 
introduction of new words toward the early end of the process. New words are 
introduced and may be rejected, but may alternatively be considered, played 
with, found useful, and come to shape the strategy discourse in the form of a new 
concept, theory, or even paradigm. For example, Richard Norman (2001, pp. 20–
21) suggested that a change in the prevalence of new words introduced and 
adopted in business in the early 1970s shifted the perspective by which 
companies approached their markets: 
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the notion of the ‘market’, consisting of anonymous mass, was being 
replaced by the notion of the ‘customers’. Customers had faces, they 
became individuals. Instead of talking about ‘market’, we speak of a 
‘customer base’. Market share is no longer (only) calculated in terms of 
number of customers but in terms of share of the business of each 
individual customer. ... All this represents a radical shift of strategy and 
business model archetype compared to the industrial paradigm. 
New words, or even shifts in the pattern of word use, may serve as leading 
indicators of new theories, models, or paradigms to come. Could observing new 
word patterns, then, give us some insights into how views on strategy may be 
changing?  
To explore this question, it would help to better understand how new 
words operate in guiding the evolution of concepts, theories, and paradigms. In 
this section, I briefly summarize some key concepts drawn from researchers who 
have looked into this role of new words.  
2.3.1 Words and Descriptions as “Truth Making” 
Rorty (1989) built on Wittgenstein’s (1961) challenge to the modernist notion of 
language by characterizing two kinds of philosophies on science. One views 
science as discovering the truth, as describing a real world that is “out there” and 
observable. In this perspective, science advances by better describing an objective 
reality. The second views science as “making truth” rather than describing. Rorty 
(1989) noted, “On this [second] view, great scientists invent descriptions of the 
world which are useful for purposes of predicting and controlling what happens, 
just as poets and political thinkers invent other descriptions of it for other 
purposes. But there is no sense in which any of these descriptions is an accurate 
representation of the way the world is in itself” (p. 4). Mary Hesse (1980), 
promoting this view, suggested we think of scientific revolutions as “metaphoric 
redescriptions” of the natural world rather than more accurate descriptions of 
nature’s intrinsic character. Knowledge, indeed, can be said to exist only in the 
collective dialogue through which communities (of scientists but also of other 
kinds) agree on what is “truth” (Anderson, 1997).  
Because new concepts, once adopted by a community, can influence what 
is observed and can influence behavior (Thomas and Thomas, 1928), they can in 
a more literal sense become the “truth.” They may become self-fulfilling 
(Watzlawick, 1984). As Wachterhauser (1986) wrote, “Changes in the world 
necessitate changes in language, and changes in language affect what we are able 
to grasp about the world.” 
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2.3.2 Words as Tools 
According to the constructionist view, scientific descriptions do not describe an 
objective reality. They are not adopted because of their “truthfulness”, but 
because of their usefulness. New words (or “language tools” or “constructs” or 
“intellectual technologies”) replace older ones when they are deemed more 
useful, just as any new tool replaces a predecessor for tasks for which it is deemed 
more useful. As Rorty (1989) suggested, this process is much like the discarding 
of the lever once the pulley was invented, or the discarding of gesso and tempera 
after one learns how to properly stretch canvas. New words equip us with tools 
for doing things that we could not have done before they were introduced.  
2.3.3 Choosing Useful Vocabularies 
Sometimes new words can come in the form of single concepts (or terms or 
language tools). Sometimes build on each other and evolve into larger groups, or 
systems of words. These might be considered vocabularies. Just as someone 
fluent in the vocabulary of French and the vocabulary of German would likely 
choose their vocabulary based on the usefulness of the vocabulary to the 
situation (e.g., speaking French in France is more useful in getting what you 
want than speaking German) and not from a belief that one vocabulary is an 
innately more accurate description of the world, we can choose our vocabulary 
based on its usefulness in achieving our goals. As Rorty (1989) argued, we may 
choose Newton’s vocabulary over Aristotle’s because it helps us better predict 
and shape the physical world, but this does not mean that Newton’s vocabulary is 
a true (or truer) description of the physical world. The terms Newton introduced 
do not actually exist in the physical world. The physical world does not speak at 
all. In France, we use the French word for “cup” not because it more accurately 
describes the innate character of a cup but because it is the more useful language 
tool for the occasion.  
2.3.4 Traps and the Need for New (Different) Vocabulary 
Later in this thesis, I will suggest that, to study the business strategy concepts 
outlined above and observed as prevalent today, it would be valuable to use a 
vocabulary different from what we typically apply to business and business 
strategy. The rationale for this assertion is that sometimes it is not possible to 
understand a system by using the vocabulary of that system. Stolzenberg (1984) 
called such a situation a “trap” and characterized it as “a closed system of 
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attitudes, beliefs, and habits of thought for which one can give an objective 
demonstration that certain of the beliefs are incorrect and that certain of the 
attitudes and habits of thought prevent this from being recognized” (p. 260).  
I will briefly summarize the concept here and then suggest its relevance to 
this thesis. We all are susceptible to adopting certain givens—beliefs and 
assumptions that we do not tend to question, attitudes, habits of thought, and 
other social and psychological phenomena—that influence how we formulate a 
question, approach its answer, and judge possible answers. We arrive at these 
givens through a process of “acceptance.” This happens when, for example, we 
observe occurrences repeatedly and, over time, stop questioning them. The sun 
first rises in the east, and it is morning. After observing this a few thousand 
times, we stop questioning whether the sun rising means it is morning. We are 
not conscious of this process of “acceptance”; “in fact, from the standpoint of the 
‘performer,’ there is no such act” (Stolzenberg, 1989, p. 262). We may become 
aware of the fact that we have accepted that the sun’s rising means it is morning 
only if we are asked to question whether it really is the morning.  
When we solve problems, we bring to the problem a number of such 
accepted beliefs that we are unaware that we have accepted and have stopped 
questioning. When I cite an authority in this thesis, for example, I am doing so 
with the hope that you will accept that element of my narrative because you have 
come to accept the authority. If you were to read and question each source I cite 
here, your reading of this thesis would grow into an overly-burdensome effort. 
Our accepted beliefs, attitudes, and habits of thought are unavoidable and, 
indeed, necessary for us to function. It is inefficient, perhaps impossible, for us to 
rethink and question everything. When we are presented with a new belief and 
asked to accept it, we conduct some kind of proof. This proof involves testing 
whether it fits observable phenomena (as the models for concept development 
outlined above suggest), but the proof also often involves testing its compatibility 
with our existing accepted beliefs. If the new proposed belief fits observation and 
our currently accepted beliefs, we may also accept the new belief.  
These beliefs build on each other, interrelate, and form a “belief system” 
and lead us to “the desire for a system, a worldview, that can be maintained and 
one will want to maintain” (Rorty, 1984, p. 269). The desire  to maintain such a 
worldview creates the risk that we will seek to protect this belief system. The 
belief system becomes what Rorty called a “self-justifying” or “irrefutable” belief 
system. The consideration and judgment of new concepts are performed from 
inside this belief system; as a result, such concepts are accepted when they 
reinforce the belief system. This process creates the risk of a “trap.” Rorty (1984) 
noted that once a concept “is accepted and incorporated into the system it 
cannot be shown to be incorrect in terms of the system itself.” In other words, if 
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the concept is deemed consistent with and incorporated into the vocabulary and 
beliefs of the system, it is less likely that the system’s vocabulary and beliefs may 
reveal the concept to be false.  
It seems reasonable to say that the field of business strategy is a belief 
system. It is composed of concepts and theories that we incorporated into the 
system because they fit with and contributed to the system. A researcher working 
within business strategy participates in a community of other researchers and 
practitioners with which he shares a common vocabulary and likely shares a 
common worldview. All of these characteristics are helpful in advancing our 
understanding of business strategy, yet they also increase the risk of traps 
emerging.  
Since a trap, as defined, cannot be identified from within the system, 
identifying that one is in a trap requires an outside observer. This outside 
observer uses a different vocabulary and/or a different belief system to approach 
the belief that has since become a trap, he is more likely to correctly notice the 
inconsistency with his system and thereby more likely to see the trap. 
2.3.5 Summary 
I have argued that the introduction of new words or shifts in word use may serve 
as “leading indicators” of new concepts, theories, and/or paradigms. As such, it 
could be useful to understand the role new words and patterns of words may 
play in shaping the discourse. A review of key relevant thought on the subject 
suggests that we can view words not as describing the truth but, for several 
reasons, as making the truth. It can play a role similar to that of a tool, which 
helps us solve new problems or solve old problems more effectively.  
New words or patterns of word use need not be limited to specific terms, 
but can also include alternative vocabularies from which we can choose the ones 
best suited for our purposes. Often, choosing vocabularies based on different 
systems is valuable, particularly because we tend to fall into “traps”—incorrect or 
unhelpful beliefs that we cannot distinguish as such from inside the system and 
vocabulary in which we operate. Words and concepts introduced from different 
vocabularies, which are based in different belief systems, can help us distinguish 
when we are in a trap and extricate ourselves.  
With this thesis, I will attempt to observe shifts in the use of word patterns 
in the area of business strategy. The hope is that we may be able to observe 
indications of new words and word patterns being introduced that are shaping 
the “truths” explored in business strategy. To help mitigate the risk of falling into 
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“traps,” we will apply a vocabulary different from that of the business strategy 
field.  
2.4 Considering “Concepts” to be Narratives 
Until this point, I have used a fairly broad term “concepts” when discussing the 
ideas outlined above. I have proposed that concepts are introduced and evolve to 
have varying levels of impact on business strategy, ranging from being rejected, 
to becoming accepted concepts, new theories, new fields, or new paradigms. I 
would now like to suggest that what I have been calling “concepts” could be 
equally well termed “strategic narratives” and that doing so would offer some 
advantages over studying them as concepts.  
2.4.1 A Definition of Strategic Narratives 
To open my proposal that we consider the “concepts” outlined above to be 
“strategic narratives,” I will first define “strategic narrative.” I draw on three 
areas that have found it useful to study “strategic narratives” in some detail.  
Narrative analysis is related to a broader approach called content analysis 
which originated as a quantitative analysis of newspapers in the early 1900s and 
developed through the 1940s into a sophisticated tool for analyzing mass media 
(at that time, the process was sometimes referred to as “Propaganda Analysis”). 
Content analysis has become a technique used widely across numerous 
disciplines to divide text, images, and symbolic matter systematically into 
categories, following rules of coding (Krippendorff, 2004; Stemler, 2001).  
Military theorists began studying what they term as “strategic narratives” 
about two decades ago (Freedman, 2006; Vlahos, 2009). Experts have defined 
strategic narratives as “compelling storylines which can explain events 
convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn” (Freedman, 2006) or, 
alternatively, “an interlocking framework of ‘truths’” that explains how a conflict 
came to be, where it is going, and how it should be argued and described 
(Vlahos, 2009).  
To further inform my definition of a “strategic narrative,” I will 
additionally draw from management studies. Narratives, as will be outlined in 
the next section, Section 2.4.2 “Reframing strategic concepts as strategic 
narratives,” have been quite broadly applied to advancing our understanding of 
management. “Strategic narratives,” which I will define as a subset or particular 
type of narratives, are explicitly mentioned within the study of scenario 
planning. In general, students of scenario planning define a scenario as a kind of 
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narrative that plays a descriptive rather than a prescriptive role, helping 
managers imagine a possible future state of the environment as a starting point 
for designing a strategy to prepare for the potential future state, by developing 
narratives that describe a range of possible futures (i.e., scenarios) in which their 
firm will need to compete (Brown, 1968; Lempert et al., 2006; Schoemaker, 
1993). In such applications, narratives are used to describe external factors over 
which the firm exerts no control. Such external factors often include exchange 
rates, economic growth rates, changes in the broad regulatory policy, and socio-
demographic shifts. One might say a scenario is a narrative in which the 
corporation creating the narrative plays no role, or at least in which it has no 
influence. The study of scenario planning, then, gives us our clearest definition 
of a strategic narrative by using the term “strategic narrative” to define what a 
scenario is not. A strategic narrative is a narrative in which the corporation does 
play a role and has influence. Van der Heijden (2005) defined a “strategic 
narrative” as: 
a causal story, linking an action option with a goal (“if I do this, then 
this will happen, which will lead to that, and so on until I achieve my 
objective of A”). It can be seen as one pathway through the web of a 
person’s option map. (p. 114) 
This application of narratives exclusively to external factors is consistent 
with the studies of scenario planning scholars (Huss, 1988; Linneman & Klein, 
1985; Wack, 1985a; Wack, 1985; Schoemaker, 1993). Therefore, we unexpectedly 
arrive at the clearest definition of a “strategic narrative” in the management 
studies context, not from scholars who want to understand what a “strategic 
narrative” is, but from those who want to clarify what their topic of interest—a 
scenario—is not.  
Drawing from these two definitions of a strategic narrative—“an 
interlocking framework of ‘truths’” from military science and “a causal story, 
linking an action option with a goal” from business strategy—this thesis defines a 
strategic narrative as a composite of both definitions: a story, or a sequence of 
events, that communicates why strategic actions chosen will result in the successful 
realization of a goal.  
2.4.2 Reframing Strategic Concepts as Strategic Narratives 
To illustrate how the strategic concepts outlined in Section 2.1 “Strategic 
Thinking: A Review” can reasonably fit this definition, consider three of the 
concepts introduced. “Resource based competition” might reasonably be 
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translated into a narrative such as: a company gains control of a critical resource, 
resulting in its competitors being unable to access this resource or requiring that 
competitors access the resource at a higher price; as a result, the company that 
enjoys control over the resource gains a relative advantage. The “strategic fit” 
concept could be said to evoke a narrative such as: a firm assesses a market better 
than its peers (e.g., by using Porter’s industry attractiveness framework) and so 
makes a smart decision as to which industry it competes in, while its competitors 
makes a less optimal decision; as a result, the first firm wins.  
In smaller and/or more centralized organizations, one would expect 
narratives to play a larger role in shaping business strategy. Narratives influence 
individual behavior, as illustrated in some detail in Section 2.4.3.4, “Strategic 
narratives and expertise and expert performance,” so when a company’s strategy 
is influenced more heavily by one or a few individuals, narratives naturally play a 
more central role. This is the case in entrepreneurial firms, where “expert 
scripts”—sequences of events that entrepreneurs develop through experience—
guide an entrepreneur in processing information and making decisions (Mitchell 
et al., 2009). The “hypercompetition” concept could reasonably be interpreted to 
evoke a narrative in which one company is able to react quickly to market 
changes, pursuing a temporary advantage rather than waiting to find a 
sustainable advantage; meanwhile, a competitor responds more slowly, so the 
first company wins.  
Each of the strategic concepts outlined in Section 2.1 “Strategic Thinking: 
A Review” imply, at a general level, that companies that adopt the particular 
concept are more likely to succeed than a company that does not. As such, each 
concept evokes a sequence of events (e.g., one company adopts, another does 
not, resulting in the adopting company winning), so each concept could be 
reasonably reframed a “strategic narrative” as defined in Section 2.4.1 “A 
definition of strategic narratives” above.  
2.4.3 The Application of Narratives and Strategic Narratives to Business 
Strategy 
In this section, I propose that considering strategic concepts to be “strategic 
narratives” is worthwhile because this definition builds on a rich body of work 
applying narratives to business studies. Specifically, I will outline four domains 
in which narratives and, where relevant, strategic narratives have proven to be 
particularly valuable in advancing our understanding of strategy, management, 
and organization: military strategy, organizational behavior, business strategy, 
and expertise and expert performance.  
 34 
Analyzing How Strategic Concepts Emerge
2.4.3.1 Strategic Narratives in Military Strategy 
I have previously mentioned the role strategic narratives have played in military 
strategy with the goal of arriving at a definition of the term “strategic narrative.” 
In this section, I build on that discussion with the aim of helping to illustrate why 
military theorists have found narratives to be helpful tools. I start with military 
strategy because researchers investigating this domain have generally 
approached their goal of understanding strategic narratives with greater urgency 
than in other areas.  
As the nature of modern warfare shifts to decentralized networks away 
from organizations with centralized command and control, strategic narratives 
become increasingly important military tools because they influence the level of 
support within which a military must operate. Militaries find it easier to gain 
support (e.g., financial, moral, and otherwise) when the citizenry it serves is 
sympathetic. This challenge of managing social support for military action has 
attracted considerable interest among military theoreticians, and a prevailing 
conclusion is that narratives play an essential role in shaping support from key 
stakeholders and, therefore, in influencing the likely success of a military strategy 
(Porter & Mykleby, 2011; Culkin, 2013).  
The strategic narrative of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on the 
Twin Towers in New York offers a useful, modern example of the relevance of 
strategic narratives from a military perspective. In 2003, 75% of Americans 
polled supported the US response to the 9/11 attacks—its offensive against Iraq 
(USA Today/Gallup Poll, March 2003). Four years later, in April 2007, 58% of 
participants of the same poll felt that the US attack on Iraq had been a mistake 
(USA Today/Gallup Poll, April 2007). Many military experts find strategic 
narratives, or the discussion of historic events, to be a useful tool in explaining 
this shift. Some have argued that the attack was used as a narrative tool to shape 
public opinion and gather support for the United States government’s military 
intentions. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, Americans overwhelmingly supported the 
US offensive against Iraq. As information entered the national discourse that was 
inconsistent with the narrative that supported an attack on Iraq, however, 
support for the US offensive shifted away. Osama bin Laden, the man considered 
to be behind the 9/11 attacks, was not in Iraq, for example, and reports that Iraq 
was building weapons of mass destruction were increasingly put into question. 
Understanding the narrative that the public holds for 9/11 is central to 
understanding the shift in support, as this excerpt illustrates (note that this 
illustration equates “narrative” to “story”): 
The point of this discourse is that the attacks of September 11th form 
part of a narrative—or a story—for the American public that shall exist 
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in some form forever. While the public regarded the attacks as a 
defining [event]—and a break somehow from the past, the elements of 
the story making up the September 11th attacks are slowly being pried 
apart and reconstituted by a variety of different “communities,” 
including intelligence professionals, academics and the news media. 
Each of these communities struggles to determine when the story of 
September 11th actually began. (Casebeer & Russell, 2005, p. 1) 
Strategic narratives have garnered increased interest among military 
experts in recent decades, but their role as a military tool to mold the psychology 
of soldiers, and thereby influence outcomes, was recognized long before. Carl 
von Clausewitz pointed to their importance in the early nineteenth century, 
writing, “They direct the enquiry exclusively toward physical quantities whereas 
all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and affects” (von 
Clausewitz, 1873, p. 136). Since then, many military theorists have indicated a 
link among narratives, morale, and success (Boyd, 1976; Vlahos, 2009). 
From the beginning of recorded history, strategic narratives have been 
recognized as a critical element of conflict because the prevailing narrative 
communicates who will win the war. People naturally prefer to support the 
winner, as Niccolo Machiavelli eloquently advocated in the early sixteenth 
century: 
…because if the two powerful neighbors of yours come to blows, either 
they are such that, one of them winning, you have to fear the winner, or 
not. In whichever of these two cases, it will always be more useful to 
you to come out openly and make a good war; because in the first case, 
if you do not come out, you will always be the prey of whoever wins, 
with the pleasure and satisfaction of the vanquished, and you have 
neither reason nor anything that might defend you or that might give 
you shelter. Because he who wins does not want suspect friends who 
did not help him in adversity; he who loses does not shelter you, 
because you did not want to rescue his fortune with arms in hand. 
(Machiavelli, 1997, p. 83) 
History is littered with examples of strategic narratives playing significant 
roles in determining the outcomes of military conflicts. In 1453, for example, 
Sultan Mehmed II, leader of the Ottoman Empire, held Constantinople under 
siege. The battle seemed to have fallen into a stalemate, until a critical turning 
point in Mehmed’s favor occurred: after nearly six weeks of battle, the moon rose 
in an eclipse over Constantinople. This occurrence was interpreted to prophecy 
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the fall of the city, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, and so, indeed, it came to 
pass (Runciman, 1990).  
In conclusion, from a military perspective, strategic narratives have long 
been studied as important influences in the outcomes of military efforts through 
their influence on the psychology and motivation of soldiers. In the last decade, 
interest in strategic narratives has accelerated as their role in determining the 
nature and level of support from stakeholders has become more necessary for 
military success.  
2.4.3.2 Strategic Narratives and Organizational Behavior 
Researchers have found that narratives are a useful tool for understanding 
organizations and, more specifically, the role organizations may have in shaping 
a company’s strategy (Boje, 1991; Boje, 2001; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1996; 
Czarniawska, 1997a; Czarniawska & Gagliardi, 2003; Gabriel, 2000; Gabriel, 
2004; Hardy, Lawrence, & Phillips, 1998; Hatch, 1994; Humphreys & Brown, 
2002; O’Connor, 1995; Roe, 1994; Rappaport, 1993; Søderberg, 2006; Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). We see some indication of narratives playing an 
indirect role in influencing strategy through their shaping of culture and identity 
in ways that guide behavior. One theory from such studies that is of particular 
relevance to this thesis is that, while values have a meaningful impact on an 
organization’s culture, strategic narratives may play an equally important (and 
arguably more important) role. This theory is directly relevant to competitive 
advantage because, if strategic narratives impact culture, they impact behavior 
and hold the potential to create a differentiation in behavior between firms.  
Ulf Hannerz (1969) pointed out that even cultures with similar values and 
aspirations have been shown to remain profoundly different in the way they 
organize their patterns of behavior. People in well-off communities and those in 
poor ghettos, for example, share equivalent desires for financial security and 
family, yet the strategies and behaviors they follow to pursue these shared values 
can differ dramatically.  
An alternative view is that behavior is shaped by a culturally-held 
“playbook” of habits or strategies of action. As Ann Swindler (1986) offered in 
her breakthrough article on organization and culture, “Culture in Action: 
Symbols and Strategies”:  
Students of culture keep looking for cultural values that will explain 
what is distinctive about the behavior of groups or societies, and 
neglect other distinctively cultural phenomena which offer greater 
promise of explaining patterns of action. These factors are better 
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described as culturally-shaped skills, habits, and styles than as values of 
preferences.(p. 275)  
In this view of culture being driven by a repertoire or playbook of action 
strategies, rather than by fixed values, one study has proposed that culture does 
not unify action in pursuit of a common set of goals, but rather allows for 
various actions people may take to achieve various goals (Hannerz, 1969). That 
view defines strategy not as a consciously conceived plan, but rather as a “general 
way of organizing action to achieve a variety of goals” (Swindler, 1986, p. 277), 
proposing that, in order to achieve goals, people turn to culturally-embedded, 
subconscious habits or worldviews (Geertz, 1968).  
Narratives may play a role in shaping a company’s strategy also through 
board members whose expertise, captured in the form of strategic narratives or 
“expert scripts,” can influence a firm’s acquisition and other key corporate 
decisions (McDonald et al., 2008). A key insight from the study of narratives and 
organizational behavior, then, is that, if gaining an advantage requires differing 
behaviors, and different sets of culturally-imbedded strategic narratives shape 
behavior, then culturally-embedded narratives influence a firm’s competitive 
advantage. Though this thesis does not depend on showing a linkage between 
narratives and firm behavior, ideas from the study of narratives in organizational 
behavior do point to the possibility that such a link may exist: narratives 
influence actions which define strategy.  
2.4.3.3 Strategic Narratives and Business Strategy 
Narratives have similarly been found useful in advancing our understanding of 
business strategy. For example, many researchers have studied the usefulness, 
particularly in large organizations, of narratives for building awareness, 
understanding, and support for the new strategy (Barry & Elmes, 1997; Ireland & 
Hitt, 1997; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Vaara, 2002; Deighton et al., 1989). 
Research indicates that viewing the strategy process as a narrative development 
process itself and adopting that view involves the organization in a way that 
helps them understand, recall, and make sense of the strategy (Quinn, 1992). 
Corporations that have redesigned their strategic planning processes with this 
view in mind have found that doing so helps build support for the strategy and 
improve recall among the employees (Shaw, Brown, & Bromiley, 1998), 3M 
being a commonly cited example. Strategy as a narrative can be a more helpful 
metaphor for the strategic planning process than prior metaphors such as 
strategy-as-architect (Andrews, 1971) or strategy-as-craft (Mintzberg, 1987) 
because the strategy-as-narrative metaphor captures the collaborative and 
recursive nature of the strategy process (Barry & Elmes, 1997). Further 
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underscoring the role narratives play in strategy execution, narratives have 
proven to be valuable in helping the owner of a strategy (e.g., an entrepreneur) 
win outside support by building legitimacy among investors, competitors, and 
customers for the strategy, thereby opening access to new capital and market 
opportunities (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Aldrich & Kenworty, 1999).  
To summarize, the study of narratives in business strategy points to idea 
that the development and communication of a strategy could be likened to the 
process of creating a narrative and that doing so may help build understanding 
and support of that strategy. This direction of exploration is similar to the 
direction of the study of narratives in military strategy in that both seek to 
understand the role narratives play in building support for the strategy.  
2.4.3.4 Strategic Narratives and Expertise and Expert Performance 
In the field of expertise and expert performance, narratives have long played a 
central role. Researchers in this field study experts from across a broad swath of 
domains—dancers, musicians, artists, athletes, and most frequently chess 
players. Researchers like de Groot (1978), for example, have subjects verbalize 
their thought processes as they contemplate making a move while playing chess 
to analyze the sequences of moves chess players explored and to measure the 
number of moves they considered and the depth with which they studied their 
options. By contrasting chess experts with novices (as well as experts and novices 
across other domains), researchers have found that expertise has less to do with 
innate capability than with the expert’s ability to “circumvent basic limits on 
working memory capacity and sequential processing” (Ericsson & Charness, 
1994, p. 725) and that narratives play an important role in this circumvention.  
Experts retrieve information from long-term memory and store it in 
short-term working memory differently than novices do (Lord & Maher, 1990). 
The experts are able to implement more complex strategies by applying a 
“chunking” process. While a novice might think about moving a specific piece to 
a specific space on the chess board, his expert opponent is thinking about 
applying higher-order formation—the “Lasker-Bauer combination,” for example 
(Feltovich et al., 2006). This chunking process allows experts to hold a larger 
number of piece-position combinations effectively in short-term working 
memory because each combination is composed of multiple pieces. These 
chunks appear to be more like narratives than patterns because they involve 
sequences of moves, one following another.  
A broadly accepted view of short-term memory clarifies why narratives 
are critical to this chunking process. The Baddeley model of short-term memory 
proposes that short-term memory is composed of four systems:  
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a. a phonological loop, which deals with sounds and phonological 
information;  
b. a visuospatial sketchpad, which holds and allows us to manipulate visual 
information;  
c. an episodic buffer, which links units of visual, spatial, and phonological 
information with time sequencing into single units; and  
d. a central executive, which coordinates the three other systems (Baddeley, 
2000).  
The episodic buffer places narratives as critical supporting structures for 
explaining an expert’s ability to identify a winning move more rapidly and 
accurately. When an expert calls forth a narrative—sequence of moves he has 
seen before—he or she is able to think through the likely outcome of that 
sequence more quickly than a novice, who must think through each move as a 
separate event. The expert can thereby process more potential moves than a 
novice can in the time allowed.  
The studies of expertise and expert performance, then, place narratives at 
the center of the ability to devise a superior strategy. Narratives direct our 
attention, help us hold more information (larger “chunks”) in working memory, 
and help us access long-term memory. In other words, narratives help us deal 
with the core cognitive barriers that stand between novices and experts (Ericsson 
& Charness, 1994; Schultetus & Charness, 1999).  
2.4.3.5 Conclusions 
The four perspectives summarized here support the view that narratives and 
strategic narratives specifically have proved useful in advancing our 
understanding of strategy, management, and organization. From military 
science, we see that narratives guide who soldiers and employees believe will win, 
how they will win, and what actions they must take to win. Organizational 
studies lead us to appreciate that strategic narratives can create a unique set of 
behaviors and thereby engineer differentiation, which is essential to competitive 
advantage. From business strategy, we see narratives helping us advance our 
understanding in how groups create strategy and communicate it to build buy-
in. Finally, the study of expertise and expert performance shows us the influence 
that strategic narratives can have over our ability to see winning moves. 
Considering the strategic concepts outlined in Section 2.1 “Strategic Thinking: A 
Review” as strategic narratives, then, may allow us to contribute to and build on 
these rich bodies of work.  
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2.4.4 Narrative Analysis 
I proposed so far that we might consider strategic “concepts” to be “strategic 
narratives” and that this would be consistent with and hopefully build on a rich 
base of related research across military strategy, organizational behavior, 
business strategy, and expertise and expert performance. An additional benefit is 
that it opens up to us the possibility of applying an established methodology, 
narrative analysis, that can help us observe, classify, and draw useful conclusions 
from their study. The “strategic narratives” outlined in Section 2.1 “Strategic 
Thinking: A Review”, then, become useful material for helping us understand 
how word patterns may be shifting in the business strategy field and so 
potentially offer some foresight into what new theories, fields, and paradigms 
may be on the horizon. In this section, I summarize what narrative analysis is, 
how it has been applied, and why it may be useful within the context of this 
thesis. 
Content analysis originated as a quantitative analysis of newspapers in the 
early 1900s and developed through the 1940s into a sophisticated tool for 
analyzing mass media (at that time, the process was sometimes referred to as 
“Propaganda Analysis”). Content analysis has become a technique used widely 
across numerous disciplines to divide text, images, and symbolic matter 
systematically into categories, following rules of coding (Krippendorff, 2004; 
Stemler, 2001).  
Since 1958, when Vladimir Propp’s Morphology of the Folktale was first 
translated into French and English, the application of narrative analysis has 
stretched far beyond its origins in literary theory. Its suggestion that a text or 
narrative can become an insightful subject of study itself, rather than a tool for 
studying the text’s author or the environment in which it was created, has found 
relevance in an expanding breadth of fields including history, anthropology and 
folklore, psychology, sociolinguistics, sociology, law, medicine, nursing, 
occupational therapy, and social work (Riessman, 2001). 
In the field of business studies, narrative analysis has been most 
enthusiastically embraced by those studying organization and culture. It has 
become a popular approach for understanding and explaining the dynamics of 
organizations (Boje, 1991; Boje, 2001; Czarniawska, 1995; Czarniawska, 1997b; 
Czarniawska & Gagliardi, 2003; Gabriel, 2000; Gabriel, 2004; Hardy, Lawrence, 
& Phillips, 1998; Hatch, 1994; Humphreys & Brown, 2002; O’Connor, 1995; 
Rappaport, 1993; Roe, 1994; Søderberg, 2006; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). 
Narrative analysis has contributed important new perspectives and insights. For 
example, it leads us to appreciate the roles narratives play in developing group 
identity and memory (Norrick, 1997; Rowe, Wertsch, & Kosyaeva, 2002; 
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Wertsch, 2009). Different research results have contrasted the traditional logical 
form of knowing with a narrative knowing (Bruner, 1986; Bruner, 1990) and 
have led us to consider that such narrative knowing comes about through a 
process of organizing our experiences into a schema, for which a narrative is a 
natural vessel (Czarniawska, 1997b).  
Disagreements persist about what a narrative is. Some scholars cite as a 
requisite that the narrative has a narrative subject or lead actor, a goal or 
outcome that the subject seeks to achieve, and a set of forces that enable or 
impede the subject attaining the desired goal (Fiol, 1989; Martin, Jennings, & 
Jennings, 2007; Watson, 1989). While others debate whether these three 
elements are necessary, most scholars agree that a temporal sequencing of events, 
or plot, is a necessary component of a narrative (Barry & Elmes, 1997; 
Czarniawska, 1997b; Gabriel, 2004; Glaser, 1984; Labov, 1997; Leddo & Abelson, 
1986; Read, 1987; Riessman, 1993). Most scholars agree that a narrative should 
include an actor who is the primary agent in the narrative (Fiol, 1989; Martin, 
Jennings, & Jennings, 2007; Watson, 1989).  
Narratives, or “scripts” as some researchers call them, also shape the 
reality their narratives create (Bruner, 1991) and can give us a view into how 
their narrators see the world; they help us understand a narrator’s “picture of the 
universe” (Benjamin Lee Whorf as quoted in Carroll, 1956, p. 214). They help us 
predict how efficiently people process information and thereby how likely they 
are, for example, to be successful in launching a new venture (Mitchell et al., 
2009; Glaser, 1984; Read, 1987). They can help us understand what options the 
narrators see and which options they prefer. An entrepreneur’s past success has 
been shown to not only enhance his ability to comprehend and process 
information (Abbott & Black, 1986; Glaser, 1984; Mitchell et al., 2009), but also 
to correlate with his ability to acquire resources, such as investment and staff, 
and thereby his chances at success in future business endeavors (Gompers, 
Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2008). That said, the study of narratives has been 
oriented more often to the past than the future. A narrative’s plot, for example, is 
typically analyzed toward understanding how the narrative explains “what 
happened next” (Hytti, 2003). 
Researchers use a variety of methods to gather the material with which to 
conduct a narrative analysis. First-hand interviews are one of the primary 
methods (Søderberg, 2006) because they can help the researcher adjust for 
certain biases. In analyzing narratives, it is important to consider for whom the 
narrative is being related. In addition to a plot, most narratives also have a teller 
and a listener (Czarniawska, 1995). The narrative then depends in part on who 
the listener is, and in what context the narrative is being relayed. The implication 
of this to some researchers is that, in collecting narratives, one must seek to 
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diminish the influence of the listener and context as much as possible in order to 
isolate what the speaker of the narrative intends. For example, as detailed in 
Section 2.3.4 “Traps and the need for a new (different) vocabulary,” the 
vocabulary the listener uses to categorize or otherwise analyze the narrative he or 
she receives limits the types of narratives he or she recognizes or the meanings he 
or she associates to the narrative. As another example, consider that the way 
someone relays a narrative at work may differ significantly from how he or she 
relays the same narrative at home or in a court. The narrator’s tone, body 
language, and choice of words may differ. He or she may even leave out or add 
entire elements of the narrative. Performing first-hand interviews in the field 
rather than studying edited documents is one means to help account for such 
effects (Czarniawska, 1997b), but studying narratives spoken or written with a 
specific audience in mind can also provide important information about the 
narrative’s production (Hytti, 2003).  
It is not feasible to conduct first-hand interviews to extract the material for 
analyzing most of the concepts or “strategic narratives” outlined in Section 2.1 
“Strategic Thinking: A Review” because it is not clear who one should interview 
for “strategic narratives” that are now broadly adopted. In the rare case that we 
might identify such a person, it is likely that that person is no longer living. Still, 
there is substantial precedence for analyzing data extracted without first-hand 
interviews, particularly in the areas of business and management where 
researchers have analyzed formal corporate documents, public media, and 
internet message boards for linguistic clues that help us understand corporate 
management and performance (Antweiler & Frank, 2004; Bowman, 1984; Das & 
Chen, 2007; Demers & Vega, 2010; Henry & Leone, 2009; Li, 2006; Li, 2008; Li, 
2010; Loughran et al., 2009; Tetlock et al., 2008). Such methods have proven 
useful in helping us better understand a company’s ability to raise capital and 
manage investor sentiment (Martens et al., 2007) and interaction with the 
business media (Core et al., 2008; Davis et al., 2007; Tetlock, 2007). Such analyses 
seek to quantify data drawn from text information, rather than interviews, and 
make such data more easily relatable to numerical financial data, thereby 
approaching a more holistic analysis of a corporation.  
Some studies extract information manually, with researchers reading and 
coding text by hand. Others automate the process with computer programs—
such as General Inquirer (GI) or Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC)—
that count word frequencies following a defined dictionary (Davis et al., 2007; 
Kothari et al., 2008; Pennebaker et al., 2007; Tetlock, 2007). Manual extraction 
allows researchers to extract and classify meanings that are difficult to program 
into an automated system when, for example, a word can take on multiple 
meanings depending on its context and placement. The output of manual 
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approaches, however, can be influenced by the prejudices and predispositions of 
the researcher, if not properly structured. While automated approaches remove 
some potential researcher bias, their ability to dissect nuances of meaning are 
limited.  
For this study I initially attempted to apply both approaches—manual and 
automated—but ultimately found that manual extraction offered the most 
valuable insights. I attempted to deal with the potential researcher bias exposed 
by manual extraction by having two people (me and a research assistant) 
independently code the material. We contrasted our results, found relatively few 
instances of disagreement, discussed these differences, and then agreed on the 
proper coding.  
2.4.5 Summary 
In this section, I have proposed that it is reasonable to considering the 
“concepts” outlined in Section 2.1 “Strategic Thinking: A Review” to be “strategic 
narratives” and that doing so offers several benefits. This allows us to relate our 
exploration of concept emergence to, and to hopefully meaningfully contribute 
to, a rich body of research related to narratives and strategic narratives, 
particularly in the areas of organization and business strategy. More importantly, 
by viewing “concepts” as “strategic narratives,” we are able to apply a narrative 
analysis to our observations of these “strategic narratives” with the aim to extract 
useful insights from the exercise.  
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3. Foundational Elements of the Research  
Having laid out the proposition that we might learn something from applying a 
narrative analysis methodology to the study of concept emergence in the area of 
business strategy, in this section, I will now describe how this thesis will 
approach the opportunity. I present my research question, the core narrative 
analysis tool I applied in order to address this question, and offer a high level 
overview of my approach.  
3.1 Core Narrative Analysis Tool: The 36 Stratagems 
To conduct the analyses proposed by this thesis and research question involves 
observing the narratives told by corporations and their leaders and coding these 
using some kind of catalog or schema. We need, therefore, to define a catalog or 
schema. Several approaches to finding or developing such a catalog or schema 
are available to us, including developing a dictionary of strategic narratives 
specifically for this thesis and searching for a catalog that may already have been 
used for a similar purpose.  
One challenge in developing a catalog or schema for coding is that if we 
use the vocabulary of business strategy we raise the risk of falling into a “trap,” as 
defined in Section 2.3.4 “Traps and the need for new (different) vocabulary.” The 
coding effort could lead a researcher to try to fit a newly introduced narrative 
into categories defined by past strategic narratives and thereby bias the coder 
away from recognizing that a new narrative has been introduced. It is therefore 
helpful for the catalog to be rooted in a vocabulary outside of that of business 
strategy. It would also be important to feel comfortable that the catalog was 
sufficiently broad to enable the coder to recognize new narratives when they are 
introduced. For these two reasons—because the vocabulary is rooted outside that 
of business strategy and because I believe the catalog to be sufficiently broad—
and because of my familiarity with the catalog, I chose to use the set of strategic 
narratives I came across 12 years ago and have been working with since (see 
Section 1.1 “Research Question”). This catalog is a historic Chinese set of 
narratives called The 36 Stratagems (Hou & Luh, 1998; Krippendorff, 2003; von 
Senger, 2000; Verstappen, 1999; Xuanming, 1992). Over the remainder of this 
section, I will provide a brief, relevant background on The 36 Stratagems.  
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The 36 Stratagems was developed during China’s Warring States Period 
(475–221 B.C.). While the precise history and author of the text remains 
unknown, many experts believe that it was written sometime between 500 and 
1500 A.D. and that it references Chinese military and political stories from as 
early as 1000 B.C. The text is a product of oral myth-building. It catalogs, in 
thirty-six narratives, the patterns of military and political stories that were passed 
down through about twenty generations. Many of these stories live on today as 
myths that parents tell their children, and even continue to inspire books and 
popular cinematic dramas such as the 84-episode television series, “A Romance 
of Three Kingdoms” (see http://www.abc-chinese.com/vc00thre.html for an 
English-language description). Produced by China Central Television, this series 
depicts the narrative of three states, Wei, Zhao, and Chi. In this narrative, Zhao 
is under imminent attack from Wei and appeals to a neighboring state, Chi, for 
help. Chi agrees to help, but rather than moving its army to reinforce Zhao, Chi 
leaves its ally undefended while it attacks Wei’s home state. Wei’s forces, already 
en route to attack Zhao, hear news of Chi’s aggression and return home to 
protect their families and home. However, they arrive home too late and find Chi 
has already captured their capital. This complicated plot is synthesized by The 36 
Stratagems into a short title, “Besiege Wei to Rescue Zhao.” Each of the 
stratagems cataloged in The 36 Stratagems represents a strategic plot sometimes 
of considerable complexity, captured in a short metaphorical title phrase. For a 
Western analog to one of the stratagems, consider the relatively broadly-known 
strategic plot synthesized by the phrase, “The Trojan Horse.” This strategic 
narrative is at once a complicated series of moves and counter-moves, a well-
known historical account that continues to inspire movies and books today, and 
a strategic narrative applicable to modern business. One could say that The 36 
Stratagems condenses and catalogs a rich set of historical accounts or strategic 
narratives; these narratives were told, re-told, added to, subtracted from, and 
distilled over the course of 1,500 to 2,500 years. 
The natural process that led to the writing of The 36 Stratagems resembles 
the effort one might undertake to create a catalog of any set of narratives or for a 
content analysis exercise. Stories were told. When stories were found to be 
similar to others stories, they were combined or grouped together. As these 
stories were passed down further, non-critical elements were removed. This 
combination and distilling process is similar to the one commonly used by 
mythologists to analyze myths (Ferro-Luzzi, 1983; Harwood, 1976; Lévi-Straus, 
1969). “By looking for common patterns and schema by stories, mythologists 
seek to identify isomorphic groupings of myths that help the researcher 
categorize and compare narratives across communities” (Carroll, 1978; Fiske, 
1972; Lévi-Straus, 1969).  
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As Lévi-Straus explained, the approach“takes us beyond the study of 
individual myths to the consideration of certain guiding patterns situated along a 
single axis.” Each of the 36 stratagems can serve as such a guiding pattern or a 
generic plot. This pattern or generic plot can then be used as a schema with 
which to classify stories or myths from other time periods and cultures. Lévi-
Straus (1969) illustrated this point with his explanation: “At each point on the 
axis where there is such a pattern or schema we then draw, as it were, a vertical 
line representing another axis established by the same operation but carried out 
this time not by means of apparently different myths originating from a single 
community, but by myths that present certain analogies with the first, although 
they derive from neighboring communities” (p. 2). In other words, if we can 
abstract from one myth a pattern or generic plot, we may then recognize this 
same pattern or generic plot in a different myth. If we do this long enough, we 
may see some patterns or generic plots repeated across many different myths and 
a set of common patterns or generic plots emerge that are frequently found 
across many myths. This is not unlike the process that Vaara (2002) employed 
when studying the narratives managers use during post-merger periods to 
identify four types of discourse: “rationalistic,” “cultural,” “role-bound,” and 
“individualistic.” Porter (1980) similarly concluded that there existed three 
generic strategies—market segmentation, differentiation, and cost leadership—of 
which, he argued, all other strategies were subsets.  
The 36 Stratagems does this work for us. By allowing oral tradition to 
synthesize stories into a catalog of distinct generic plots, it provides us with a 
schema with which to categorize other stories we may come across. The result of 
this process in a concise set of 36 phrases, each of which alludes to a strategic 
narrative. Each phrase is followed by a brief description to clarify its intended 
meaning. Most descriptions reference a historical illustration, usually of military 
or political nature. These historical stories are not included in the original text of 
The 36 Stratagems, but are mentioned in numerous books that seek to explain 
the text. These historical stories serve to point out, through their common 
elements, the distinguishing episodic pattern (or plot) that defines the stratagem. 
This plot is an essential component of a narrative. These stories usually illustrate 
three other components considered by some researchers to be essential to 
narratives: a narrative subject, a goal or outcome that the subject seeks to 
achieve, and a set of forces enabling or impeding the subject from attaining the 
desired goal (Fiol, 1989; Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 2007; Watson, 1989).  
This thesis does do not argue that the catalog represented by The 36 
Stratagems is necessarily complete; instead, I suggest that it offers, if nothing 
more, an advanced starting point and one that originates from outside of 
business vocabulary. It offers a useful tool with which one might conduct the 
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narrative analysis (see Section 2.4.4 “Narrative Analysis”) proposed in this thesis. 
To help illustrate the potential useful of The 36 Stratagems as a narrative analysis 
tool, I studied each of the 36 narratives composing the text and pulled out the 
common plot elements to define a temporal sequencing of events (a generic plot) 
for each stratagem. I then looked at certain key modern business strategy 
concepts and sought to translate these into a plausible narrative plot. Finally, I 
attempted to classify the plot of the modern concept to the generic plot of a 
stratagem. Figure 1 illustrates how one might take the plot pulled from a case 
used to illustrate a modern business strategy concept and fit it into a historical 
case used to illustrate one of the 36 stratagems to asses to what extent the plots 
match.  
Figure 1: Linking two cases with a common generic plot  
 
This exploration indicated that many modern business concepts fit 
reasonably closely a generic plot of The 36 Stratagems. For example, Stratagem 
10, “Remove the firewood from under the pot,” advises that, if a pot is boiling 
and we want it stop, rather than burning our hands trying to remove the pot 
from its heat source, we might instead remove the heat source from the pot. 
Many of the historical narratives used to illustrate this stratagem allude to cases 
in which one army wins a battle by attacking or otherwise restricting its enemy’s 
supply line. This stratagem follows a plot that one might reasonably outline as 
such: (1) rather than engage your adversary head-on, you attack his source of 
power, (2) this weakens your adversary or hinders his ability to attack, and (3) 
you defeat your weakened adversary. This plot can reasonably be said to be 
Modern 
business 
case 
36 Strata-
gems case 
Subject Goal Forces Result 
Subject Goal Forces Result 
Plot 
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equivalent to, or at least closely related to, a well-developed view of modern 
competitive advantage, the “resource-based view.”  
Such possible linkages between the stratagems and key business strategy 
concepts are noted in Table 1. These are presented not to be considered part of 
the research that underpins this thesis nor to argue that the narratives captured 
in The 36 Stratagems are equivalent to modern strategy concepts, but rather to 
simply illustrate that the text can serve as a useful tool for categorizing modern 
business strategy concepts. After extracting a plausible set of generic plot 
elements, I picked several of the key strategy concepts outlined in Section 2.1 
“Strategic Thinking: a Review” and sought to match each concept with a generic 
plot from The 36 Stratagems. 
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se
lv
es
, g
o 
an
d 
sw
al
lo
w
 th
em
 
up
. T
hi
s i
s l
ik
e p
ul
lin
g 
ba
ck
 th
e 
w
he
el
s o
f a
 ch
ar
io
t t
o 
co
nt
ro
l i
ts 
di
re
ct
io
n.
 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
’s 
ad
va
nt
ag
e i
s b
ui
lt 
on
 k
ey
 
su
pp
or
t s
tr
uc
tu
re
s 
 Y
ou
 at
ta
ck
 th
es
e s
tr
uc
tu
re
s 
 B
y 
br
ea
ki
ng
 h
is 
ke
y 
su
pp
or
t s
tr
uc
tu
re
s, 
yo
ur
 
ad
ve
rs
ar
y’
s i
nt
eg
rit
y 
fa
lte
rs
; t
he
n 
yo
u 
ta
ke
 
hi
m
 
 
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Th
e s
tr
at
ag
em
 o
f 
th
e b
ea
ut
ifu
l 
w
om
an
 
W
he
n 
fa
ce
d 
w
ith
 a 
fo
rm
id
ab
le
 
en
em
y,
 tr
y 
to
 su
bd
ue
 th
ei
r l
ea
de
r. 
W
he
n 
de
al
in
g 
w
ith
 an
 ab
le
 an
d 
re
so
ur
ce
fu
l c
om
m
an
de
r, 
ex
pl
oi
t h
is 
in
du
lg
en
ce
 o
f s
en
su
al
 p
le
as
ur
es
 in
 
or
de
r t
o 
w
ea
ke
n 
hi
s f
ig
ht
in
g 
sp
iri
t. 
W
he
n 
th
e c
om
m
an
de
r b
ec
om
es
 
in
ep
t, 
hi
s s
ol
di
er
s w
ill
 d
em
or
al
iz
e, 
an
d 
th
ei
r c
om
ba
t p
ow
er
 w
ill
 b
e 
gr
ea
tly
 w
ea
ke
ne
d.
 T
hi
s s
tr
at
ag
em
 
ta
ke
s a
dv
an
ta
ge
 o
f t
he
 en
em
y’s
 
w
ea
kn
es
s f
or
 th
e s
ak
e o
f s
el
f-
pr
ot
ec
tio
n.
 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 h
as
 a 
w
ea
kn
es
s o
r n
ee
d
 Y
ou
 b
ai
t y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 b
y 
fe
ed
in
g 
th
is 
w
ea
kn
es
s o
r n
ee
d 
 T
hi
s e
nc
ou
ra
ge
s y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 to
 ac
t i
n 
a 
w
ay
 co
un
te
r t
o 
hi
s b
en
ef
it 
 Y
ou
 ta
ke
 ad
va
nt
ag
e o
f h
is 
m
iss
te
p 
 
14
 
Be
at
 th
e g
ra
ss
 to
 
sta
rt
le
 th
e s
na
ke
 
A
ny
 su
sp
ic
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 en
em
y’
s 
ci
rc
um
sta
nc
es
 m
us
t b
e 
in
ve
sti
ga
te
d.
 B
ef
or
e a
ny
 m
ili
ta
ry
 
ac
tio
n,
 b
e s
ur
e t
o 
as
ce
rta
in
 th
e 
en
em
y’
s s
itu
at
io
n;
 re
pe
at
ed
 
re
co
nn
ai
ss
an
ce
 is
 an
 ef
fe
ct
iv
e w
ay
 
to
 d
isc
ov
er
 th
e h
id
de
n 
en
em
y.
 
 Y
ou
 ar
e u
ns
ur
e o
f y
ou
r e
ne
m
y’
s s
tr
en
gt
h 
or
 
str
at
eg
y 
 Y
ou
 la
un
ch
 a 
sm
al
l-s
ca
le
 o
r i
nd
ire
ct
 at
ta
ck
 
on
 y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 re
ve
al
s h
is 
str
en
gt
h 
or
 
str
at
eg
y 
by
 h
is 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 y
ou
r f
ei
nt
 
 Y
ou
 p
la
n 
yo
ur
 re
al
 at
ta
ck
 w
ith
 th
is 
ne
w
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
 H
yp
er
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
(D
’A
ve
ni
, 1
99
4)
 
15
 
Lo
ot
 a 
bu
rn
in
g 
ho
us
e 
W
he
n 
th
e e
ne
m
y 
fa
lls
 in
to
 se
ve
re
 
cr
isi
s, 
ex
pl
oi
t h
is 
ad
ve
rs
ity
 an
d 
at
ta
ck
 b
y 
di
re
ct
 co
nf
ro
nt
at
io
n.
 T
hi
s 
is 
th
e s
tr
on
g 
de
fe
at
in
g 
th
e w
ea
k.
 
 T
ro
ub
le
 st
rik
es
 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 fr
ee
ze
s o
r r
et
re
at
s 
 Y
ou
 ca
pi
ta
liz
e o
n 
yo
ur
 ad
ve
rs
ar
y’
s i
na
ct
io
n 
or
 re
tr
ea
t b
y 
bu
ild
in
g 
po
w
er
 
 
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So
m
et
im
es
 ru
nn
in
g 
aw
ay
 is
 th
e b
es
t 
str
at
eg
y 
To
 av
oi
d 
co
m
ba
t w
ith
 a 
po
w
er
fu
l 
en
em
y,
 th
e w
ho
le
 ar
m
y 
sh
ou
ld
 
re
tr
ea
t a
nd
 w
ai
t f
or
 th
e r
ig
ht
 ti
m
e 
to
 ad
va
nc
e a
ga
in
. T
hi
s i
s n
ot
 
in
co
ns
ist
en
t w
ith
 n
or
m
al
 m
ili
ta
ry
 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
. 
 Y
ou
 fa
ce
 a 
po
w
er
fu
l a
dv
er
sa
ry
 
 Y
ou
 re
tr
ea
t 
 Y
ou
 ex
er
t y
ou
r p
re
se
rv
ed
 p
ow
er
 so
m
ew
he
re
 
el
se
 o
r a
t s
om
e o
th
er
 ti
m
e 
 S
tr
at
eg
ic
 fi
t (
A
nd
re
w
s, 
19
71
; H
of
er
 &
 S
ch
en
de
l, 
19
78
; Z
aj
ac
, K
ra
at
z, 
&
 
Br
es
se
r, 
20
00
) 
17
 
Se
iz
e t
he
 
op
po
rt
un
ity
 to
 le
ad
 
th
e s
he
ep
 aw
ay
 
Ex
pl
oi
t a
ny
 m
in
or
 la
ps
es
 o
n 
th
e 
en
em
y 
sid
e, 
an
d 
se
iz
e e
ve
ry
 
ad
va
nt
ag
e t
o 
yo
ur
 si
de
. A
ny
 
ne
gl
ig
en
ce
 o
n 
th
e e
ne
m
y 
m
us
t b
e 
tu
rn
ed
 in
to
 a 
be
ne
fit
 fo
r y
ou
. 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 fa
ils
 to
 ac
t (
e.g
., 
be
ca
us
e h
e 
is 
di
str
ac
te
d)
 
 Y
ou
 ta
ke
 ad
va
nt
ag
e o
f t
hi
s “
de
er
 in
 th
e 
he
ad
lig
ht
s”
 m
om
en
t t
o 
ad
va
nc
e 
 B
y 
th
e t
im
e y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 re
al
iz
es
 h
is 
m
ist
ak
e, 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 al
re
ad
y 
ta
ke
n 
th
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
e 
 D
isr
up
tio
n 
(C
hr
ist
en
se
n,
 
19
97
) 
18
 
Fe
ig
n 
m
ad
ne
ss
 b
ut
 
ke
ep
 y
ou
r b
al
an
ce
 
A
t t
im
es
, i
t i
s b
et
te
r t
o 
pr
et
en
d 
to
 
be
 fo
ol
ish
 an
d 
do
 n
ot
hi
ng
 th
an
 to
 
br
ag
 ab
ou
t y
ou
rs
el
f a
nd
 ac
t 
re
ck
le
ss
ly
. B
e c
om
po
se
d 
an
d 
pl
ot
 
se
cr
et
ly
, l
ik
e t
hu
nd
er
 cl
ou
ds
 h
id
in
g 
th
em
se
lv
es
 d
ur
in
g 
w
in
te
r o
nl
y 
to
 
bo
lt 
ou
t w
he
n 
th
e t
im
e i
s r
ig
ht
. 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 is
 p
ow
er
fu
l, 
an
d/
or
 y
ou
 ar
e 
w
ea
k 
 Y
ou
 ap
pe
ar
 m
ad
 o
r i
nc
ap
ab
le
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 
av
oi
d 
be
in
g 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
as
 a 
th
re
at
 
 W
he
n 
yo
ur
 ad
ve
rs
ar
y 
pu
ts 
do
w
n 
hi
s g
ua
rd
, 
yo
u 
ta
ke
 h
im
 
 
19
 
W
at
ch
 th
e f
ire
 o
n 
th
e o
th
er
 sh
or
e 
W
he
n 
a s
er
io
us
 co
nf
lic
t b
re
ak
s o
ut
 
w
ith
in
 th
e e
ne
m
y 
al
lia
nc
e, 
w
ai
t 
qu
ie
tly
 fo
r t
he
 ch
ao
s t
o 
bu
ild
. O
nc
e 
its
 in
te
rn
al
 co
nf
lic
t i
nt
en
sif
ie
s, 
th
e 
al
lia
nc
e w
ill
 b
rin
g 
de
str
uc
tio
n 
up
on
 it
se
lf.
 A
s f
or
 y
ou
, o
bs
er
ve
 
cl
os
el
y 
an
d 
m
ak
e p
re
pa
ra
tio
ns
 fo
r 
an
y 
ad
va
nt
ag
e t
ha
t m
ay
 co
m
e f
ro
m
 
it.
 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 is
 en
ga
ge
d 
in
 in
te
rn
al
 
co
nf
lic
t o
r i
n 
co
nf
lic
t w
ith
 h
is 
al
lie
s 
 Y
ou
r a
tta
ck
 m
ig
ht
 u
ni
fy
 y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 (a
nd
 
hi
s a
lli
es
) 
 Y
ou
 re
fra
in
 fr
om
 ac
tin
g 
 A
llo
w
ed
 to
 co
nt
in
ue
, t
he
 co
nf
lic
t d
am
ag
es
 
yo
ur
 ad
ve
rs
ar
y 
 S
tr
at
eg
ic
 fi
t (
A
nd
re
w
s, 
19
71
; H
of
er
 &
 S
ch
en
de
l, 
19
78
; Z
aj
ac
, K
ra
at
z, 
&
 
Br
es
se
r, 
20
00
) 
 C
om
pe
tit
iv
e r
iv
al
ry
 
(P
or
te
r, 
19
80
) 
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Le
t t
he
 p
lu
m
 tr
ee
 
w
ith
er
 in
 p
la
ce
 o
f 
th
e p
ea
ch
 
W
he
n 
lo
ss
 is
 in
ev
ita
bl
e, 
sa
cr
ifi
ce
 
pa
rt
 fo
r t
he
 b
en
ef
it 
of
 th
e w
ho
le
. 
 Y
ou
 ca
nn
ot
 w
in
 o
n 
al
l f
ro
nt
s  
 Y
ou
 al
lo
w
 y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 a 
vi
ct
or
y 
on
 o
ne
 
fro
nt
 
 Y
ou
 p
re
se
rv
e, 
ev
en
 st
re
ng
th
en
, a
no
th
er
 fr
on
t 
 W
ith
 th
is 
pr
es
er
ve
d 
fro
nt
, y
ou
 d
ef
ea
t y
ou
r 
ad
ve
rs
ar
y 
 S
tr
at
eg
ic
 fi
t (
A
nd
re
w
s, 
19
71
; H
of
er
 &
 S
ch
en
de
l, 
19
78
; Z
aj
ac
, K
ra
at
z, 
&
 
Br
es
se
r, 
20
00
) 
21
 
Th
e s
tr
at
ag
em
 o
f 
th
e o
pe
n 
ci
ty
 g
at
es
 
In
 sp
ite
 o
f t
he
 in
fe
rio
rit
y 
of
 y
ou
r 
fo
rc
e, 
de
lib
er
at
el
y 
m
ak
e y
ou
r 
de
fe
ns
iv
e l
in
e d
ef
en
se
le
ss
 in
 o
rd
er
 
to
 co
nf
us
e t
he
 en
em
y.
 In
 si
tu
at
io
ns
 
w
he
n 
th
e e
ne
m
ie
s a
re
 m
an
y 
an
d 
yo
u 
ar
e f
ew
, t
hi
s t
ac
tic
 se
em
s a
ll 
th
e 
m
or
e i
nt
rig
ui
ng
. 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 is
 at
ta
ck
in
g 
or
 p
re
pa
rin
g 
to
 
do
 so
 
 Y
ou
 re
ve
al
 y
ou
r s
tr
en
gt
h 
or
 w
ea
kn
es
s 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 ca
lls
 o
ff 
hi
s a
tta
ck
 b
ec
au
se
 
he
 fe
ar
s y
ou
r s
tre
ng
th
 o
r n
o 
lo
ng
er
 co
ns
id
er
s 
yo
u 
a t
hr
ea
t (
i.e
., 
he
 v
ie
w
s y
ou
 as
 w
ea
k)
 
 
22
 
A
w
ai
t t
he
 
ex
ha
us
te
d 
en
em
y 
at
 
yo
ur
 ea
se
 
Th
os
e w
ho
 ar
riv
e o
n 
th
e b
at
tle
fie
ld
 
ea
rly
 w
ill
 h
av
e t
he
 ti
m
e t
o 
be
 re
ste
d 
as
 th
ey
 w
ai
t f
or
 th
e e
ne
m
y.
 T
ho
se
 
w
ho
 ar
riv
e l
at
e r
us
h 
in
to
 b
at
tle
 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 ar
e a
lre
ad
y 
ex
ha
us
te
d.
 
Th
e o
ne
 w
ho
 is
 sk
ill
ed
 in
 w
ar
fa
re
 
fo
rc
es
 th
e e
ne
m
y 
to
 en
co
un
te
r 
ha
rd
sh
ip
 in
 co
m
in
g 
to
 h
im
 w
hi
le
 
he
 w
ai
ts 
in
 ea
se
. 
 Y
ou
 p
re
di
ct
 th
e b
at
tle
gr
ou
nd
 w
ill
 sh
ift
 
 Y
ou
 se
t u
p 
a d
ef
en
sib
le
 p
os
iti
on
 o
n 
th
e n
ew
 
ba
ttl
eg
ro
un
d 
 Y
ou
 w
ai
t f
or
 y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 
 W
he
n 
yo
ur
 ad
ve
rs
ar
y 
ar
riv
es
, y
ou
 u
se
 y
ou
r 
su
pe
rio
r p
os
iti
on
 to
 d
ef
ea
t h
im
 
 B
us
in
es
s C
yc
le
s (
M
itc
he
ll,
 
19
22
; S
to
ne
, S
ch
lu
te
r, 
&
 
St
ew
ar
t, 
19
22
) 
 L
on
g-
ra
ng
e s
tr
at
eg
ic
 
pl
an
ni
ng
 (E
w
in
g,
 1
95
6;
 
Pa
yn
e, 
19
57
) 
 F
irs
t-m
ov
er
 ad
va
nt
ag
e 
23
 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 th
e r
ol
e 
of
 g
ue
st 
fo
r t
ha
t o
f 
ho
st 
W
he
ne
ve
r t
he
re
 is
 a 
ch
an
ce
, e
nt
er
 
in
to
 th
e d
ec
isi
on
-m
ak
in
g 
bo
dy
 o
f 
yo
ur
 al
ly
 an
d 
ex
te
nd
 y
ou
r i
nf
lu
en
ce
 
sk
ill
fu
lly
, s
te
p 
by
 st
ep
. E
ve
nt
ua
lly
, 
pu
t i
t u
nd
er
 y
ou
r c
on
tro
l. 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 ac
ce
pt
s y
ou
 as
 
un
th
re
at
en
in
g 
 Y
ou
 in
cr
em
en
ta
lly
 b
ui
ld
 p
ow
er
 o
ve
r y
ou
r 
ad
ve
rs
ar
y 
 Y
ou
 ta
ke
 co
nt
ro
l 
 B
uy
er
 b
ar
ga
in
in
g 
po
w
er
 
(P
or
te
r, 
19
80
) 
 S
up
pl
ie
r b
ar
ga
in
in
g 
po
w
er
 (P
or
te
r, 
19
80
) 
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Bo
rr
ow
 th
e r
oa
d 
to
 
co
nq
ue
r G
ao
 
W
he
n 
a s
m
al
l s
ta
te
, l
oc
at
ed
 
be
tw
ee
n 
tw
o 
bi
g 
sta
te
s, 
is 
be
in
g 
th
re
at
en
ed
 b
y 
th
e e
ne
m
y 
sta
te
, y
ou
 
sh
ou
ld
 im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 se
nd
 tr
oo
ps
 to
 
re
sc
ue
 it
, t
he
re
by
 ex
pa
nd
in
g 
yo
ur
 
sp
he
re
 o
f i
nf
lu
en
ce
. M
er
e t
al
k 
ca
nn
ot
 w
in
 th
e t
ru
st 
of
 a 
sta
te
 in
 a 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
po
sit
io
n.
 
 Y
ou
 sh
ar
e a
 co
m
m
on
 o
bj
ec
tiv
e o
r e
ne
m
y 
w
ith
 an
ot
he
r 
 Y
ou
 fo
rm
 an
 al
lia
nc
e t
o 
ac
hi
ev
e t
hi
s 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
 Y
ou
 th
en
 ta
ke
 y
ou
r a
lly
 
 
25
 
Sh
ed
 y
ou
r s
ki
n 
lik
e 
th
e g
ol
de
n 
ci
ca
da
 
M
ak
e y
ou
r f
ro
nt
 ar
ra
y 
ap
pe
ar
 as
 if
 
yo
u 
ar
e s
til
l h
ol
di
ng
 y
ou
r p
os
iti
on
 
so
 th
at
 th
e a
lli
ed
 fo
rc
e w
ill
 n
ot
 
su
sp
ec
t y
ou
r i
nt
en
tio
n 
an
d 
th
e 
en
em
y 
tr
oo
ps
 w
ill
 n
ot
 d
ar
e t
o 
at
ta
ck
 ra
sh
ly
. T
he
n 
w
ith
dr
aw
 y
ou
r 
m
ai
n 
fo
rc
es
 se
cr
et
ly
. 
 Y
ou
 es
ta
bl
ish
 a 
fa
ça
de
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 fo
cu
se
s o
n 
yo
ur
 fa
ça
de
, 
co
nf
us
in
g 
it 
fo
r t
he
 re
al
 ac
tio
n 
 Y
ou
 m
ov
e t
he
 re
al
 ac
tio
n 
so
m
ew
he
re
 el
se
 
 P
ro
fit
 P
oo
ls 
(G
ad
ie
sh
 &
 
G
ilb
er
t, 
19
98
) 
26
 
Th
e s
tr
at
ag
em
 o
f 
in
ju
rin
g 
yo
ur
se
lf 
Pe
op
le
 ra
re
ly
 in
fli
ct
 in
ju
rie
s o
n 
th
em
se
lv
es
, s
o 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 g
et
 
in
ju
re
d,
 it
 is
 u
su
al
ly
 g
en
ui
ne
. 
Ex
pl
oi
t t
hi
s n
aï
ve
té
 to
 m
ak
e t
he
 
en
em
y 
be
lie
ve
 y
ou
r w
or
ds
, t
he
n 
so
w
 d
isc
or
d 
w
ith
in
 en
em
y 
ra
nk
s. 
In
 th
is 
ca
se
, o
ne
 ta
ke
s a
dv
an
ta
ge
 o
f 
th
e e
ne
m
y’
s w
ea
kn
es
s a
nd
 m
ak
es
 
th
e e
ne
m
y 
lo
ok
 as
 if
 h
e w
er
e a
 
na
iv
e c
hi
ld
, e
as
ily
 ta
ke
n.
 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
’s 
su
sp
ic
io
n 
hi
nd
er
s y
ou
r 
su
cc
es
s 
 Y
ou
 in
ju
re
 y
ou
rs
el
f e
ith
er
 (a
) t
o 
w
in
 y
ou
r 
ad
ve
rs
ar
y’
s t
ru
st 
or
 (b
) t
o 
av
oi
d 
ap
pe
ar
in
g 
to
 
be
 a 
th
re
at
 
 Y
ou
r a
dv
er
sa
ry
 ac
ce
pt
s y
ou
 o
r l
et
s d
ow
n 
hi
s 
gu
ar
d 
 Y
ou
 ta
ke
 ad
va
nt
ag
e o
f t
hi
s o
pe
ni
ng
 b
y 
at
ta
ck
in
g 
yo
ur
 ad
ve
rs
ar
y 
 J
ud
o 
St
ra
te
gy
 (Y
of
fie
 &
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In conclusion, what this section suggests is that The 36 Stratagems could 
be a useful categorization tool for conducting narrative analysis on modern 
business concepts because (a) it originates from a vocabulary that is different 
from that of modern business strategy, (b) it was developed using a process 
similar to what one might use to develop a categorization tool, and (c) it works 
reasonably well as a categorization tool to the extent that it seems to represent 
many key business strategy concepts.  
3.2 Key Concepts: Winner and Loser 
I attempted to observe emerging strategic narratives as early as practical during 
their possible emergence in order explore the two-part research question (see 
Section 1.1 “Research Question”):  
How do the strategic narratives that circulate within “winning” 
companies and their leaders differ from those circulating within 
“losing” companies and their leaders?  
Given the answer to the first question: what new business 
strategy concepts are likely to emerge in the business community 
at large? 
As Section 2.2 “How Strategy Concepts May Evolve” suggests, we can 
expect that new strategic narratives are more likely to be adopted if they are 
perceived to be more useful than other strategic narratives. In other words, the 
narratives a successful firm uses are more likely to be noticed, considered, and 
emulated than the narratives of a firm perceived as being less successful. For this 
reason, I chose to structure my analysis as contrasting the strategic narratives 
evoked by companies that others would likely consider to be more successful 
with the strategic narratives evoked by similar companies that one could 
reasonably consider to be relatively less successful. Such an analysis requires that 
we define a measure of success with which we can classify one set of companies 
as Winners and another set as Losers.  
No consensus exists to dictate how one should define a firm’s success, nor 
should we expect to find one; the definition of success depends on the analyst’s 
objectives. The metrics for defining success generally fall into three categories: 
Subjective measures. Depending on the researcher’s objective, 
subjective or reputational factors may be most relevant. In their 1994 
book Build to Last, Jim Collins and Jerry Porras identified a set of 
companies for analysis based on a set of subjective factors. They 
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specifically looked at companies that were premier institutions in their 
industries, were widely admired by knowledgeable business people, 
made an “indelible imprint” on the world, had multiple generations of 
chief executives, had been through multiple product (or service) life 
cycles, and were founded before 1950 and had remained in business for 
long period of time (Collins & Porras, 1994).  
Stock performance measures. In Jim Collin’s second book, Good to 
Great, he and his research team chose subject firms based exclusively 
on one measure: cumulative stock returns relative to the general 
market (Collins, 2001). Studies that have found stock-price or 
enterprise value to be useful measures of firm performance generally, 
as Jim Collins did, use long-term measures (e.g., stock returns over 
more than ten years) (Hendricks & Singhal, 2001). 
Fundamental performance measures. A handful of fundamental 
business performance metrics predominate strategy literature, 
including profitability relative to major competitors, return on 
investment, relative productivity, changes in market share, changes in 
profitability, net cash flow, and annual sales (Fabling & Grimes, 2007; 
Spanos & Lioukas, 2001; White, Conant, & Echambadi, 2003; Wiggins 
& Ruefli, 2002).  
I chose to adopt a definition focused on fundamental performance define 
a Winner as a company that, over a five-year period, has produced significantly 
faster revenue growth and generated significantly higher profit margins than a 
comparable company of similar size—the Loser. Fundamental performance 
statistics about companies are typically presented in one-year, five-year, and ten-
year increments. Commonly used stock analysis tools such as Bloomberg and 
Google Finance offer investors these evaluation options. I felt that one-year 
measures were unlikely to be perceived by analysts, managers, and researchers as 
sufficient to indicate whether a firm is outperforming its peers in a sustainable 
way. Likewise, I felt ten-year measures were too long to measure the appearance 
of new narratives. As Section 2.1 “Strategic thinking: a review” shows, new 
business strategy concepts, particularly post-1960, often emerge more rapidly 
than every decade. Five-year measures seemed a reasonable in-between 
timeframe to study.  
This first part of this definition (revenue growth) aligns with the definition 
of high-growth firms commonly adopted in entrepreneurship studies (Davidsson 
et al., 2006; Brännback et al., 2009). I included a profitability margin because a 
higher margin indicates a firm’s ability to charge higher prices or achieve 
superior cost levels and so is an indicator of that firm’s relative competitive 
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advantage (McKinsey & Company, Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010). Indeed, 
recent studies on the relationship between revenue growth and profitability 
conclude that highly profitable firms are more likely to achieve financial success 
than high growth firms (Brännback et al., 2009; Davidsson et al., 2009; Steffens et 
al., 2009), even though belief in the opposite—that high growth firms have a 
greater chance of achieving financial success—persists among venture capitalists 
and other investors (Brännback, Carsurd, & Kiviluoto, 2010). I excluded stock-
price performance measures because stock price is driven by a multitude of 
factors unrelated to the firm’s fundamental performance, including 
psychological factors, earnings surprises, dividend action, mergers, new 
exchange listings, merger announcements, and initial public offerings, and so is 
loosely correlated with performance, at best (DeBondt & Thaler, 1995; Fama, 
1998; Fama & French, 1988; Kahneman & Riepe, 1998; Malkiel, 2003; Shiller, 
2000). As such, including stock-price, by introducing a multitude of factors 
unrelated to a firm’s strategy, might put into question whether companies 
classified as Winners would be perceived as successful and worthy of emulation 
by managers and researchers.  
This definition ignores many other factors that one could justifiably argue 
should not be ignored, such as a company’s stock-price performance, 
shareholder value creation (Ramezani, Soenen, & Jung, 2002), economic value 
added (Bacidore, Boquist, Milburn, & Thakor, 1997), ability to engage its people, 
impact on society, or impact on the environment (Carroll, 1979; Godfrey, 2005). 
One might equally argue that the five-year time span is too long or too short 
(Baylis & Bhirud, 1973; Campbell & Shiller, 1998). For practical reasons, 
however, and because revenue growth and the earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization margin are two fundamental factors often 
considered by investors when assessing a company (Lie & Lie, 2002; Collins & 
Porras, 1994), I decided to focus on these. Another limitation of the design for 
this analysis is that it considers exclusively publically-traded firms, excluding 
private enterprises which compose the predominant share of the world’s firms. 
However, the lack of reliable and consistent financial information for private 
firms precluded me from considering them.  
So, for purposes of this study, a Winner was defined as a company that 
had, over the course of the five years ending in August 2010, achieved a 
significantly higher average annual growth rate in revenue (cumulative average 
growth rate over five years, named for the purposes of this analysis “5YCAGR”) 
and a significantly higher average margin of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) over the same five years (for the 
purposes of this study, this five-year average EBITDA margin was named 
“5YEBITDA”) than a close peer (that peer being in the same industry and of a 
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similar size in terms of total annual revenue). A Loser is a company of similar 
size to a Winner (in terms of total annual revenue) that operates in the same 
industry, but has grown more slowly and less profitably over the same five-year 
period. The difference in performance between a Winner and a Loser was 
considered to be significant when one of the two metrics of the Winner’s 
performance was 165% or more of the Loser’s performance for that metric. This 
level of over-performance was chosen because a) it is sufficiently high to 
reasonably conclude which firm is the Winner of the pair and b) because beyond 
this level the analysis made it difficult to find pairs of companies of sufficiently 
similar sizes and business models (in other words, when I tried a target above 
165%, I was not able to identify sufficient pairs of companies that exhibited this 
level of disproportionate growth and were also made up of companies of similar 
sizes and business models). See Section 5.1, titled “Process by which we 
assembled findings” for a more detailed explanation. 
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4. Research Process 
From Section 2.2 “How Strategy Concepts May Evolve,” we would expect to see 
new strategic narratives emerge where communities find existing concepts are in 
some way inadequate or suboptimal. We would expect that a strategic narrative 
that is eventually adopted at some level (e.g., as a new concept, theory, or field) to 
begin when its community applies the new strategic narrative, finds it useful, 
improves it through tests and trial, and then others adopt the new narrative.  
As stated in Section 1.1, “Research Question,” this thesis is guided by the 
two-part research question: How do the strategic narratives that circulate within 
“winning” companies and their leaders differ from those circulating within 
“losing” companies and their leaders? Given the answer to the first question: 
what new business strategy concepts are likely to emerge in the business 
community at large? 
To explore this question, I took a pair of companies—a Winner and a 
Loser—and performed a narrative analysis, a particular form of content analysis 
(Krippendorff, K. 1994), of each company’s explanations of their sources of 
competitive advantage and how they plan to maintain these advantages (see 
Section 2.4.4. “Content analysis” for more background). This study involved 
analyzing the public statements of public companies. I wanted to compare the 
narratives told by two types of companies, Winners and Losers, already defined 
in Section 3.2 “Key Concept: Winner and Loser”, and summarized again briefly 
here:.  
 Winners were defined as companies that had, over the course of the five 
years ending in August 2010, achieved a significantly higher average an-
nual growth rate in revenue (cumulative average growth rate over five 
years, named for the purposes of this analysis, “5YCAGR”) than their 
peers and a significantly higher average margin of earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization over the same five years 
(5YEBITDA) than their peers.  
 Losers were defined as close peers to the Winners (meaning that each op-
erated in a Winner’s industry with a total market capitalization closest to 
that of the Winner’s market capitalization) who had significantly under-
performed on these two fundamental metrics (5YCAGR and 5YEBITDA) 
relative to the Winner over the same five-year period.  
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Losers were considered to have significantly underperformed on one of the two 
metrics if the Winner’s performance was 165% or higher than the Loser’s results 
for that metric. This level of over-performance was chosen because it is 
sufficiently high to reasonably conclude which firm is the Winner of the pair and 
because beyond this level the analysis made it difficult to find pairs of companies 
of sufficiently similar sizes and business models. For example, over the five-year 
period, Consolidated Graphics (CGX) had a 10.9% RCAGR, while its peer, 
Vistaprint (VPRT), produced a 54.4% RCAGR. Since 54.4%/10.9%=539%, which 
exceeds the threshold of 165%, VPRT is defined as significantly outperforming 
CGX in terms of 5YCAGR. Using the same test, VPRT’s 5YEBITDA of 19.05% is 
also significantly higher than CGX’s 0.59%. Since VPRT significantly 
outperformed CGX in terms of revenue growth (5YCAGR) and profit margin 
(5YEBITDA), the analysis designates VPRT as the Winner and CGX as the 
Loser.  
As the details of my process will show, I also filtered out companies that 
did not show signs of having produced a significant track record (e.g., they were 
too young or too small), that did not have a reasonably close-for-comparison 
peer (e.g., peers were too large and diversified to offer a fair comparison), or that 
were in industries that had experienced extraordinary performance fluctuations 
in the most recent five years due to macro-economic factors (e.g., I removed oil 
and gas companies, as their relative performance was obscured by historically 
volatile crude oil prices). I also preferred to include companies for which I had 
more information (e.g., I had transcripts of interviews for several public 
companies and so tried to include these companies where possible).  
To define the Winners and Losers I used in this thesis, I followed the steps 
outlined below: 
1. Using Google’s stock filter, I searched for publicly-traded companies that 
met three criteria: (a) they had current market capitalizations valued be-
tween US$2 billion and US$10 billion, (b) their 5YEBITDA was 10% or 
higher, and (c) they produced 5YCAGR of 15% of more. This screen deliv-
ered 198 companies.  
2. I removed from this list companies that operated in industries that had 
experienced abnormal macro-economic market conditions in the last five 
years, specifically the real estate, financial services, and oil and gas indus-
tries. This removed 97 companies from the list, leaving 101 companies. See 
Appendix C.  
3. I then looked for close comparables for each company by identifying the 
two companies that (a) are classified as competing in the same industry 
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segment by Google Finance and (b) are the first and second closest to the 
target company in terms of market capitalization.  
4. For each comparable company, I looked up its 5YEBITDA and 5YCAGR. 
5. I compared the 5YEBITDA and 5YCAGR of each comparable company to 
the target company, noting instances in which the target company outper-
formed the comparable company by 165% or more. This level of over-
performance was chosen because it is sufficiently high to reasonably con-
clude which firm is the Winner of the pair and because beyond this level 
the analysis made it difficult to find pairs of companies of sufficiently 
similar sizes and business models. 
6. I removed instances in which a clear Winner and Loser could not be estab-
lished. Specifically, every target company that did not outperform at least 
one comparable company by 165% or more on both measures 
(5YEBITDA and 5YCAGR) was deemed to not be a clear Winner and was 
removed from the list. This process removed 87 companies, leaving 14 for 
the final study.  
7. I added to this list two companies that did not pass the first filter originally 
because they were too small, but for which I had considerable data and for 
which it could be established that they had outperformed a close compa-
rable company by 165% or more on both measures. This resulted in 16 to-
tal companies for analysis. The complete list of companies analyzed, and 
their comparable companies, is provided in Tables 2 and 3, below. 
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A research assistant and I then independently coded the most recent 
annual reports filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission using The 
36 Stratagems as our narrative schema. We followed a simple process of 
analyzing the contents of the annual reports. We followed five steps to analyze 
the content of the companies chosen for this study: 
1. We identified the text to be analyzed. We retrieved the most recent annual 
reports submitted to the US Securities and Exchange Commission. 
2. We agreed on our coding schema. We reviewed the list of The 36 Strata-
gems and the generic plots as provided in Table 1. We added to this list 
two other types of strategic narratives that were not directly accounted for 
in The 36 Stratagems. The two that we added were “economies of scale” 
and “best practices.” We included these because they are often considered 
to be fundamental sources of competitive advantage (see, for example, 
Greenwald & Kahn, 2005) and, unable to find a reasonably close represen-
tation of these concepts in The 36 Stratagems, we risked excluded from 
our analysis if we did not explicitly add them to our coding schema. The 
two additional narratives we coded were: 
 Economies of scale: We agreed that whenever we noted a reference 
to scale economies, we would note that in the column of this name. 
 Best practices: We agreed that whenever we noted a reference to best 
practices, we would score the reference in the column with this title. 
3. We highlighted in each company’s annual report phrases in which the 
company argued, explicitly or implicitly, that it had or would be able to es-
tablish an advantage over its competition. Then we classified each phrase 
into one of the 36 stratagems by asking, “What plot line does this state-
ment imply, and which generic plot provided by The 36 Stratagems does 
the company’s plot match?” For example, Illumina (ILMN) stated in their 
2010 annual report: 
Our goal is to make our Genome Analyzer, BeadArray and BeadXpress 
platforms the industry standards for products and services addressing 
the genetic analysis markets. We plan to achieve this by seeking new 
and complementary technologies through strategic acquisitions and 
other investments; …. (Illumina 2010 10-K filing) 
This argument implies that, by adding “complementary” technologies, 
the company will be able to sell complementary technologies to 
existing clients, and/or sell existing technologies to clients with new 
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complementary technologies, thereby forcing the competition to either 
match a multiple solution offering or be left with a less-complete set of 
offerings. This plot most closely matches Stratagem 7, in which the 
subject opens a two-front battle, thereby putting the adversary into a 
weaker and/or defensive position. This stratagem is roughly equivalent 
to the modern business concept “economy of scope.” We each 
independently coded this phrase as fitting with Stratagem 7. 
To illustrate how Stratagem 7 matches the strategic narratives of other 
companies, consider an excerpt from Vistaprint’s annual report:  
Although we expect to maintain our primary focus on the small 
business market, we believe that our customer support, sales and 
design services, and low costs are differentiating factors that make 
purchasing from us an attractive alternative for individual consumers. 
We intend to add new products and services targeted at the consumer 
market (Vistaprint 10-K annual report filed Aug 29, 2008).  
Again, this narrative implies that Vistaprint will leverage a set of 
capabilities (e.g., customer support, sales and design services) and 
apply these capabilities to a new market (i.e., individual consumers).  
4. After completing an analysis of each Winner and Loser, the research assis-
tant and I compared our results, discussed points of disagreement, and 
reached a final coding for each company. This process resulted in classify-
ing 376 narratives (227 from Winners and 149 from Losers). We had 22 
points of disagreement, implying a significant inter-rater reliability (with a 
correlation coefficient of 95.6%). The detailed results of this analysis, in-
cluding the phrases identified as claiming a competitive advantage catego-
rized by the narrative theme (or stratagem) with which they match, are 
provided in Appendix B. Tables 4a-d and Tables 5a and 5b summarize the 
stratagems cited by Winners and Losers. 
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The results of the research process detailed in this section suggest several 
interesting conclusions. In the next two sections, Section 5, “Findings,” and 
Section 6, “Summary and Conclusions,” I address what I believe to be the more 
meaningful observations and consider their implications.  
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5. Findings 
The results of the narrative analyses detailed above, in which I categorized 
narratives cited by 16 Winners and 16 Losers, reveal several interesting points of 
difference. In this section, I highlight what I believe to be some of the more 
interesting observations and their potential reasons and implications. In the next 
section, I will discuss potential areas of future research to build on and 
strengthen the findings of this thesis.  
5.1 Winners Cite More Narratives 
Perhaps the most interesting observation of the analysis is that Winners appear 
to cite significantly more narratives than losers. As Tables 5(a) and 5(b) show, 
collectively, the 16 Winners analyzed cite 227 narratives, while the 16 Losers cite 
149. While both groups’ citations converge around a few core narratives, 
Winners also cite a greater diversity of narratives. 
What this observation may point to is that successful companies may be 
more willing to experiment than less successful ones. This willingness to explore 
or pursue more strategies could be driven by resources: companies that are more 
profitable may have a greater capacity to fund new strategies or take risks. There 
may also be a psychological factor at play in which firms that feel they are 
struggling become more risk-averse.  
Inverting the correlation, supposing that the citation of more narratives 
drives superior performance rather than more narratives being the result of 
superior performance, opens another intriguing possibility. Could it be that a 
willingness to test new strategies and pursue new sources of competitive 
advantage is supportive of faster growth, as some research suggests (Day, 2013)? 
It seems reasonable to expect that, if a firm experiments with a greater number 
and diversity of strategies, it can hope to create a greater probability of finding 
strategies that will eventually prove effective.  
The causality question—whether more strategies generate more success or 
more success leads to more strategies—lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, what the observations do support is the idea that there may be some 
correlation. They support a view of successful firms confidently exploring new 
sources of competitive advantage and less successful ones behaving within more 
restricted boundaries.   
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Table 5(a): Frequency with which Winners and Losers Cite Narratives 
W = "Winners" 
L  ="Losers" 
Citations Percentage*
Narrative W L W L Notes:
1 0 0 0% 0%
2 1 2 0% 1%
3 1 3 0% 2%
4 0 0 0% 0%
5 0 0 0% 0%
6 0 1 0% 1%
7 9 3 4% 2% Two-front battle or "economies of scope" 
8 0 0 0% 0%
9 0 3 0% 2%
10 44 21 19% 14% "Remove firewood" or lock up resources 
11 71 38 31% 26% "Shut the door" or customer captivity 
12 0 0 0% 0%
13 0 0 0% 0%
14 3 3 1% 2%
15 0 0 0% 0%
16 0 0 0% 0%
17 0 0 0% 0%
18 0 0 0% 0%
* Number of citations of narrative divided by total narratives cited
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Table 5(b): Frequency with which Winners and Losers Cite Narratives (Cont.) 
W = "Winners" 
L  ="Losers" 
Citations Percentage*
Narrative W L W L Notes:
19 0 0 0% 0%
20 5 0 2% 0%
21 0 0 0% 0%
22 30 30 13% 20% "Await the exhausted enemy" or first mover 
23 10 2 4% 1% "Exchange the role of guest for host" 
24 1 3 0% 2%
25 0 0 0% 0%
26 0 0 0% 0%
27 0 0 0% 0%
28 0 0 0% 0%
29 0 0 0% 0%
30 2 0 1% 0%
31 0 0 0% 0%
32 1 0 0% 0%
33 1 3 0% 2%
34 12 3 5% 2% "Deck the dead tree" or coordinate the unco-
ordinated 
35 0 0 0% 0%
36 1 0 0% 0%
37 13 9 6% 6% Economies of scale
38 22 25 10% 17% Best practices
Total 227 149 100% 100%
* Number of citations of narrative divided by total narratives cited
5.2 Winners Embrace Best Practices but Look Beyond 
Winning and Losing firms cite best practices nearly as often (Winners cite best 
practices 22 times and Losers 25). However, when we consider frequency, the 
percentage of the narrative citations that best practices compose, we see a notable 
difference. 10% of the narratives cited by Winners are related to best practices, 
while 17% of narratives cited by Losers are. This finding, that on a frequency 
basis Winners depend less heavily on best practices, is consistent with the 
concept of sustainable competitive advantage proposed by Michael Porter (1985) 
and his contemporaries who emphasize that advantage comes from taking a 
unique path and making unique choices, not from adopting the paths and 
choices of competitors. One would expect to see that Winners have achieved 
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success because they are better attuned to their own unique approaches, while 
Losers would orient themselves more toward simulating the practices of those 
they perceive to be more successful. One might say that Winners more often set 
best practices and Losers assimilate them. 
However, in absolute terms, the difference between Winners and Losers 
seems insignificant (Winners cite best practices 22 times and Losers 25). This 
supports the view that Winners place the same importance on best practices as 
Losers. They may put equal effort into seeking out, adopting, and maintaining 
best practices. Winners differ in that they go beyond this. They seek out 
additional sources of differentiation to add to their base of best practices.  
Speculating on this finding a bit further, we might conclude that highly 
profitable, fast-growing companies appear to avoid overconfidence risk, in which 
success compels an organization to stop looking outside for ideas. Instead, 
Winners, despite their relative success, continue to seek out and adopt best 
practices.  
5.3 Winners Pursue “Traditional” Sources of Advantage as 
Aggressively as Losers 
When my research assistant and I structured these analyses, we expected to find 
that Winners focus less on what we considered “traditional” sources of 
competitive advantage, such as competition for resources (Stratagem 10, 
“Remove the firewood from under the pot” or the resource-based view), seeking 
customer captivity (Stratagem 11, “Shut the door to capture the thief”), building 
economies of scale (narrative 37, which was added to the coding schema as 
mentioned in Section 3.1: Core Narrative Analysis Tool), and the first mover 
advantage (Stratagem 22, “Await the exhausted enemy at your ease”). Porter 
(1985) helped to popularize such concepts in the 1980s, introducing terms such 
as “barriers to entry” and “switching costs.” However, the popular media often 
suggests that such tactics are being replaced by newer approaches. Microsoft, for 
example, it is often said, has relied on its control of PC operating systems to 
create an unfair advantage over software competitors by raising the relative cost 
of users to use non-Microsoft programs. The firm’s control over the operating 
system is eroding. A similar rationale is often proposed for the fall of Blackberry 
(formerly RIM), which depended on captive chief technology officers (CTOs) to 
ensure its device and service sales. This advantage disappeared when companies 
were forced to introduce “bring your own device” policies and the CTO lost his 
decision-making power. In both cases, the popular story suggests that Apple, 
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offering devices people wanted rather than technology people were forced to 
accept, removed the effectiveness of the “customer captivity” principle.  
Similar popular stories exist that argue that economies of scale and 
resource-based completion are being replaced by newer and often perceived 
“nicer” strategies. Therefore, we expected to find some indication that such 
“traditional” approaches were declining in popularity. Instead, our findings 
support the opposite. 
 Winners cite competition for resources (Stratagem 10) twice as often as 
Losers: 44 times v. 21. Even in percentage terms, Winners cite this strategy 
more frequently (19% v. 14%). 
 Winners cite customer captivity (Stratagem 11) nearly twice as often Los-
ers: 71 times v. 38. In percentage terms, they cite this strategy slightly more 
frequently (31% v. 26%) 
 Winners cite economies of scale (narrative 37) more often than Losers (13 
times v. 9). In percentage terms, Winners and Losers cite economies of 
scale at an identical rate (6%).  
 Winners and Loser each cite the first mover advantage (Stratagem 22, 
“Move early to the next battleground”) 30 times, which means that Win-
ners use the narrative 13% of the time and Losers 20%). 
Thus, these three well-knows, “traditional” sources of competitive 
advantage—access to resources, customer captivity, economies of scale, and first 
mover advantage—remain important to Winners as they are to Losers as well. 
Indeed, in some cases, Winners evoke these “traditional” sources of advantage 
even more frequently than Losers. The difference is, as shown in Section 5.1, 
Winners build upon such sources of advantage and seek out additional, new 
sources.  
5.4 Two New Strategic Narratives may be Emerging 
The findings above suggest that Winners spend an equal or greater amount of 
time speaking of sources of advantage that Losers cite, yet Winners cite more 
narratives and a greater diversity of narratives. This means that Winners appear 
to be exploring narratives beyond those that Losers limit their focus to. It is these 
narratives that have the potential to give us new insight into which new strategy 
concepts may be emerging. These are the ones that Winners appear to adopt and 
Losers do not because, as Section 2.2, “How Strategic Concepts May Emerge”, 
proposes, these are the narratives that enjoy a great chance of eventually being 
broadly adopted. Table 5 shows them to be as follows: 
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 Stratagem 23: “Exchange the role of guest for that of host,” which Winners 
cite 10 times and Losers 2. 
 Stratagem 34: “Deck the dead tree with bogus blossoms,” which Winners 
cite 12 times and Losers 2.   
I will now briefly suggest possible reasons and implications we might draw 
from observing the prevalence of these narratives among Winners. In my 
consulting work, I call the first of these two narratives “Enter as a guest and 
become a host.” The narratives speaks of the principle that, when one approaches 
a customer or supplier as a “guest” without requiring them to make a significant 
initial investment in entering into a relationship, one can more easily convince 
them to engage. One can convince customers to make their first purchase, for 
example, or convince suppliers to commit to their first delivery. Common 
illustrations of this stratagem are Gillette razors on the customer side and Wal-
Mart on the supplier side. Gillette sells a razor at an artificially low margin to 
have customers make a commitment to Gillette platform. Then, they sell 
replacement razors at a higher margin. Gillette thereby moves from a guest 
position toward a host position with their customers. Often termed the 
“razorblade strategy,” this approach is one strategic rationale for why game 
console makers sell consoles for low margins or even at a loss or why airlines run 
loyalty programs. On the supplier side, Wal-Mart has a reputation for paying 
new suppliers high prices to fulfill small orders initially. The company 
supposedly then increases the volume of its orders over time. When Wal-Mart 
represents a large share of the supplier’s business, they have gained bargaining 
power and start demanding lower prices. Again, Wal-Mart moves from a guest 
position toward a host position.  
One possible reason for the relative prevalence of this narrative among 
Winners is the growth in popularity of the “freemium” model, in which 
companies give away free services to capture customers with plans to monetize 
those relationships in the future but without a clear business model for the 
monetization. Facebook is one well-known example of this approach. Skype, 
which offers free phone service, is another.  
A second possible reason for the relatively higher usage of this narrative by 
winners is the shift in many industries toward membership or rental pricing 
models. Adobe, for example, is a maker of high-end and expensive design 
software, including Photoshop® and InDesign®. The company in recent years has 
undergone a shift in its business model from selling software for a high, one-time 
fee to a monthly subscription model. The rationale for such a shift is that, at the 
lower price, one can attract segments of buyers for whom the high price was a 
barrier. When those users come to depend on Adobe software, they become 
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more willing to pay for premium versions and buy new software programs. The 
broad shift toward “cloud computing” or software as a service (SaaS) from 
traditional software licensing is an expression of the growing popularity of an 
approach such as “exchanging the role of guest for that of a host.” It seems 
natural that, if this approach is growing, those who embrace it earlier are more 
likely to perform like Winners.  
The second narrative cited more frequently by Winners than Losers is 
“Deck the dead tree with bogus blossoms,” which can be translated into modern 
business vocabulary as “coordinate the uncoordinated.” It suggests that strategic 
power is created when one can coordinate elements that were previously not 
coordinated. There are a great number of anecdotal cases suggesting that this 
strategic principle is growing in importance. Wikipedia, for example, pushed 
Microsoft out of the encyclopedia business by coordinating independent experts. 
The growing popularity of crowdfunding, crowdsourcing, and “open 
innovation” all relate to the idea of coordinating that which was previously 
uncoordinated. It seems reasonable to think that, if this trend is long lasting, 
firms that embrace this strategic principle will find ways to create competitive 
advantages that are unavailable to those who resist adopting the principle.  
5.5 Summary of Findings 
The analyses presented here attempts to provide some insight into how 
successful companies and their leaders conceptualize the creation of competitive 
advantage. The results support several possible conclusions: 
1. Winners are willing to explore more sources of competitive advantage 
than losers. We see this in the fact that they cite more strategic narratives. 
They may do this because their success gives them more resources and 
confidence to explore than those who are not performing well. Alterna-
tively, their willingness to explore more and a greater diversity of narra-
tives may be a cause of their success.  
2. Winners embrace best practices, citing best practices nearly as often as 
Losers, but they appear to go beyond these practices, exploring new ways 
to differentiate themselves. They do not let their success turn them inward 
and instead remain open to finding and implementing best practices from 
others.  
3. Winners continue to pursue “traditional” sources of competitive ad-
vantage as aggressively as Losers. These include seeking preferred access to 
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key resources, securing customer captivity, building economies of scale, 
and creating first mover advantages. 
4. However, beyond these, Winners are more actively exploring two addi-
tional sources of advantage: exchanging the role of a guest for that of host 
and coordinating what is uncoordinated.  
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
Having laid out the key findings of the study, I now explore the theoretical 
contributions to the relevant bodies of literature and suggest areas for further 
research. 
6.1 Theoretical Contribution  
Laying out the core concepts of modern business strategy, as I attempted to do in 
Section 2.1, “Strategic Thinking: A Review,” illustrates that prevailing 
perspectives on strategy often evolve through cause-and-effect chains of concept 
introductions building upon other concepts and succeed or failing at gaining 
adoption. Often, new narratives can open doors and invite new concepts into the 
conversations and inform action otherwise impossible to imagine. Consider, for 
example, the emergence of the resource-based view (RBV) in the 1990s, when 
attention shifted from the topic of industry attractiveness (an external view) 
toward understanding sources of advantage inside the firm (Barney, 1991; Grant, 
1991; Nelson, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Schumpeter, 1934). 
The evolution of the RBV led researchers to appreciate the power of economies 
of scale. That appreciation, in turn, drew attention to the importance of a 
strategic narrative introduced ten years earlier, labeled “economies of scope,” 
which points out that a firm can create an advantage when it is less costly to 
produce two product lines together than to produce each product line 
independently (Panzar & Willing, 1981). Ironically, the economies-of-scope 
strategy tends to point companies toward expanding their product lines and 
market breadth, steps that the predecessor strategy, with its focus on industry 
attractiveness, would discourage more often than not.  
The final strategic concept that I mention in Section 2.1 is strategy as 
practice. I believe that the introduction of this perspective, in which strategy is 
viewed not as something a company talks about but as something that is 
performed, enacted, and shared, allows to assert a strong relationship between 
strategic talk and strategic actions, mediated by commitment and enthusiasm, 
represents one of the more significant leaps in the evolution of strategic thought. 
This point of view looks at the people, practices, and tools that determine how 
strategy is created, understood, and turned into actions. It allows us to study 
narrative strategies not regarding their truth values but as language tools that 
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may or may not make a difference in the lives of firms and for their employees. It 
allows us to step out of the debate on which concepts are right or wrong and into 
a conversation on which concepts have appeal, encourage adoption, and are 
given a chance to show their usefulness. 
It is to this frame, strategy as practice, that I believe this thesis contributes. 
I am proposing that strategic concepts are language tools that, when used by 
people, may shape their practices and thereby shape strategy. It is my hope that 
this analysis will give us some indication of what kinds of useful insights might 
be available to us by further exploring peoples’ use of language tools to solve 
problems and seek competitive advantages.  
The key issue to be emphasized here is that language is not merely spoken 
and written, but as Wittgenstein’s (1958) language games and Searle’s (1969) 
speech acts suggest, the narratives companies tell about their strategy shape their 
behavior, which should influence their performance. This thesis may not be as 
conclusive as one wishes, but it could show that Winning firms talk and act 
differently than Losing firms.  
The view of language playing a creative, rather than exclusively 
descriptive, role is well accepted in several domains. This thesis focuses on 
narratives and draws on four domains in particular: military science, 
organizational studies, business strategy, and expertise and expert performance. 
What we may notice from how narratives are used in these four domains that is 
that in all but the business strategy domain, narratives are seen as playing role in 
how people behave and thereby influence the system. In organizational studies, 
for example, we see that strategic narratives can establish a unique set of 
behaviors that shape culture. In military science, we see that narratives can 
encourage a soldier’s conviction and shape his patterns of behavior. In expertise 
and expert performance, we see that narratives can enable a player to see 
winning moves.  
However, in the area of business strategy, narratives have been studied 
more heavily as playing a descriptive role, not exerting direct influence. They 
have been shown to be a vehicle to create meaning for employees and an 
understanding of the strategy, for example. Narrative analysis in business 
strategy has focused more on the role that narratives play in aligning the 
organization to a strategy that has already been created and less so on shaping 
the design of that strategy.  
My hope is that this thesis might help show that narratives not only create 
meaning but also do things; they shape behavior, guiding the options that people 
see and the types of problems they can solve. 
As to where within the strategy as practice field of research this thesis 
contributes, I believe it most directly contributes in two areas: proposing 
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strategic narratives to be “tools” and applying narratives at the aggregate actor 
level. I briefly explain each point of contribution here.  
Strategy as practice suggests that strategy can be viewed as “as a situated, 
socially accomplished activity” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007, p. 7), as an ongoing 
activity that is influenced by the people doing strategy, the practices they adopt 
in doing this strategy, and the tools they use. This thesis proposes that while the 
“tools” that one might most readily think to study include ones we can see, such 
as dashboards, reports, memo formats, and frameworks. However, we should 
add to the tools we study the strategic narratives people use when strategizing 
because such narratives are “language tools” that can play a significant influence 
on actions and thereby on strategy. They influence what types of problems 
people notice, which they seek to solve, and what solutions they see and pursue.  
Adopting the framework proposed by Jarzabkowski and Spree (2009), 
such narratives can be studied at any of three levels of practitioner: the individual 
actor within the organization (e.g., the CEO), the aggregate actor within the 
organization (e.g., a functional department), and the extra-organizational 
aggregate actor (e.g., a special interest group, regulator). This thesis has applied 
narratives at the aggregate actor level, observing the narratives used by the 
organization to communicate its strategy to shareholders. Applying narratives at 
this level has limitations and offers opportunities for further research (see 
Section 6.2), however I hope that it will provide new insight into what the 
language tools used at the aggregate actor level can tell us about how strategy 
emerges.  
6.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
This thesis opens numerous areas of further research that lie beyond its current 
scope. In this section I describe five areas that I consider most important to 
consider.  
Exploring new sources of advantage 
I have used the 36 Stratagems as a categorizing tool to measure the frequency 
with which companies cite certain strategic concepts and have shown that many 
of the stratagems related directly to most important strategic concepts outlines in 
Section 2.1, “Strategic Thinking: a Review.” However, as many as 20 of the 36 
Stratagems are still not represented by the major corporate strategy concepts 
adopted by the business strategy field.  
While an analysis of these remaining 20 stratagems is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, a search for an explanation for the relative absence of the use of these 
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stratagems point toward some interesting potential conclusions. Of these 20 
stratagems, six can be related to strategy concepts that have attracted relatively 
less attention because they are often viewed as tactical. Stratagem 30, “Openly 
repair the walkway; secretly march to Chen Cang,” for example, suggests finding 
an alternative path to a goal when one’s competitors are focused on the orthodox 
path and can be said to broadly fit innovations in distribution, such as Dell’s 
introduction of a direct-selling strategy. Stratagem 32, “Create something out of 
nothing,” can be associated with the concepts of creating new categories, 
occasions, and customers. These concepts have attracted relatively limited 
attention in strategy literature, perhaps because they are viewed as fairly 
straightforward tactics.  
The growing prevalence of social technology and its use in marketing 
strategy is closely related to Stratagem 34, “Deck the dead tree with bogus 
blossoms,” or using more modern terminology, “Coordinate the uncoordinated.” 
This stratagem points out that one can create strategic power by coordinating 
things as, for example, many social-media solutions enable users to do.  
Eight of the remaining stratagems deal with influencing an opponent by 
influencing its leaders or management. Stratagem 8 (“the stratagem of sowing 
discord”), for example, speaks to creating discord within an opponent’s 
organization, and Stratagem 13 (“the stratagem of the beautiful woman”) speaks 
to finding a critical need or weakness in the opponent and using it to influence 
them to act against their own interest. Each of these stratagems take the view that 
one firm can influence another firm’s strategy by influenced its people. While 
strategy as practice research has focused most heavily on how the practices of 
people inside a firm affect that firm’s strategy and, to a lesser extent, how 
external stakeholders such as regulators and interest groups affect a firm’s 
strategy, the stratagems highlighted in this paragraph lead us to a potentially rich 
area of further exploration through asking the following question: how do firms 
shape their competitors’ strategies by influencing their people? This question 
opens many interesting areas to unravel.  
Exploring two emerging sources of advantage 
By focusing on narratives rather than numerical indices, this thesis suggests 
several currently ongoing shifts in perspectives on business strategies. One 
relates to how companies create options for new business practices. The speed 
with which the business environments are changing in virtually all branches of 
production, commerce and government, due largely to computer uses for 
routine work, networked high speed commerce, and the globalization of markets 
calls upon companies to continuously explore new advantages. Managers can no 
longer stick with previously successful strategies. They always need to look for 
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new approaches.  Although this thesis did not investigate strategic business 
narratives over time, it seems safe to say that today’s Winners view business 
competition differently and unlike Losers tend to do. While both may draw on 
the same fundamental sources of strategic advantage, such as economies of scale 
and access to resources, current findings suggest that Winners more extensively 
rely on at least two newer strategies: coordinating the uncoordinated and 
exchanging the role of guest for that of host. It would be interesting to investigate 
these two emerging narratives for the openings they provide for other narratives 
to emerge, the advantages they provide, and ascertain whether they evolve into 
independent practices or are adopted into existing ones. 
Expand observations 
This thesis analyzed 32 firms and approximately 96 documents and offered 
several interesting observations. It was surprising to find that the diversity of 
strategies used (Winners cited 17 different narratives and Losers 13) did not 
significantly distinguish the two kinds of firms. They differed significantly, 
however, in the absolute frequencies of using narrative strategies. Although the 
32 firms studied here were selected to represent a broad spectrum of companies, 
my findings could be strengthened significantly, qualified, if not be disproven by 
collecting more observations, including of past documents that could more 
clearly establish whether the shifts I noted are born out in fact. Additionally, 
more observations would allow us to see whether the shifts observed here are 
occurring across communities. For example, are investors’ perspectives shifting 
in ways similar to or in response to how CEOs represent their firms? Are the 
suppliers, distributors, and other partners of these Winners changing how they 
view the sources of competitive advantage? Do the findings apply across 
industries, or do some industries evolve differently, more quickly, and into new 
forms? 
Comparing what managers say and do in private with what they say in public 
This thesis was based on a narrative analysis of public statements made by 
comparable companies. Such statements are usually written, composed and 
edited with great care and approved by whoever has a stake in the issues 
discussed. They are also addressed to and shaped by the perceived need to satisfy 
particular audiences with known interests in these companies, their 
shareholders. Strategic communications like these are constrained by the 
perceptions of their authors. They may not accurately represent how managers 
speak about the strategies they pursue inside their companies, how they act on 
what they said under the watchful eye of critics or friends, and what they say 
inside their company may not be what they would say in a personal interview, 
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that is, informally and spontaneously. Although private opinions are perhaps less 
consequential than public pronouncements, it would certainly be fascinating to 
observe how managers articulate their strategies in less formal settings, perhaps 
by recording team meetings or conversations about strategy with fellow 
executives, or in personal interviews. Would we find significant differences 
between personal views and public personas and how these differences would 
play out when publically articulated strategies are actually pursued? 
Moreover, the public statements of a strategic nature by CEOs, managers, 
and board members, which are shaped likely by the networks of writers and 
committee members that approve these statements, are most likely ineffective 
when not translatable into the behaviors of employees. Strategic narratives need 
to compel employees to act in an aligned fashion. This thesis raises an important 
set of questions concerning how strategic narratives are fuelling or constraining 
the behavior of a firm’s employees who actually carry the burden of a company 
at the front line. Employees talk, exchange narratives of their firm’s problems 
and future. Studying the path through which strategic narrative emerge, from 
top to bottom or the other way around, from outside a company or in, how they 
get hold of the imaginations of executives and workers, will enrich our 
understanding of how strategic narratives actually work, what properties they 
need to have to be appealing, exiting, and motivating.  
Exploring the implications of and reasons for Winners citing more narratives 
One conclusion of this thesis that might warrant further exploration is that 
Winning companies generally cite more strategic narratives than their Losing 
peers. Can this conclusion be strengthened with a larger sample of texts and 
additional observations, and if so, what are the reasons for this finding? An 
intriguing explanation to be explored further is that once successful firms may 
grow satisfied with the advantages they have exploited and therefore see no need 
to expand their search for new opportunities. Over-performance may not persist 
and success dissipates. Another explanation to consider is that Losers lack the 
capacity to manage and execute as many simultaneous strategies as Winners do. 
In either case, if one could measure the variety of strategic narratives that a 
company cites and see this number decline, could that be a leading indicator of a 
pending decline in advantage and performance? Which way does causality drive: 
do more narratives generate more success, or does more success allow managers 
to explore more narratives? At the time that I conducted this analysis, for 
example, Nokia was classified as a Winner, having produced five years of 
superior performance. Today, incorporating in the firm’s recent poor 
performance, the firm might fit into the other column. It would be interesting to 
track the number of narratives Nokia cites over time to see if some conclusion 
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can be derived as to whether a decline in narratives cited might foretell a pending 
decline in competitiveness.  
6.3 Managerial Contribution 
For a business manager or practitioner, the findings of this thesis hold two 
interesting implications and future areas of study for consideration.  
6.3.1 Rethinking the Relative Importance of “Traditional” Sources of 
Advantage 
This thesis suggests that Winning companies aggressively pursue what we might 
consider “traditional” sources of competitive advantage, such as pursing 
preferential access to resources, building economies of scale, achieving customer 
captivity, and adopting best practices. As firms become more successful, these 
four sources remain important, but their relative importance may change.  
One may note from Table 5 that “economies of scale” (narrative 37 in 
Table 5) is of equal relative importance to Winners and Losers. Both cite this 
narrative 6% of the time. Therefore, we could say that Winners continue to 
invest an equal proportion of their strategizing effort on “economies of scale,” so 
managers should do so as well, regardless of whether they consider their firms 
Winners or Losers.  
However, in the case of pursuing preferred access to resources (narrative 
10 in Table 5) and customer captivity (narrative 11 in Table 5), we actually see 
Winners speaking more frequently of pursuing such advantages. Winners cite 
access to resources 19% of the time versus 14% for Losers, and they cite customer 
captivity slightly more frequently, 31% of the time versus 26%. This suggests that 
managers who want to place their firms in the Winner category, rather than the 
Loser category, should consider focusing more heavily on these two advantages. 
Perhaps the prioritization of these two advantages are what will most 
differentiate Winners from Losers.  
The contrast between best practices (narrative 38 in Table 5) and the first-
mover advantage (narrative 22 in Table 5) suggests that these “traditional” 
sources are less likely differentiators and rather prerequisites for success. They 
are things that Winners pursue as often as Losers but not more frequently.  
Considering best practices, we might say that there are two ways to 
succeed: by adopting what works for others and by finding new ways. It is 
reasonable to expect that companies who start outperforming their peers are less 
eagerly looking to adopt ideas that work for others and more likely to embrace 
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ways that make them different, outstanding, visibly successful, defined by best 
practices. Success leads to failure when one believes one’s approach to be the best 
and so turns away from novel ideas regardless of whether they come from inside 
or outside one’s firm. What this thesis shows is that Winners avoid this outcome. 
They cite best practices less often than Losers (referring to best practices 10% of 
the time versus 17% for Losers), but the two remain equal in absolute frequency 
with Winners talking about best practices 22 times versus 25 times for Losers. 
This thesis suggests that successful managers should look elsewhere as well. 
It is as if Winners adopt a “match and build on” approach. They match the 
best-practice efforts of Losers and then build on them by pursuing other sources 
of advantage, such as seeking more ways to capture customers and resources. 
The implication for managers might be to be aware of this “match and build” 
approach to best practices as their companies become more successful. This 
entire section is premised on a “best practices” approach in that I am suggesting 
that managers should consider adopting the narrative practices that differentiate 
Winners from Losers.  
The same approach appears to be in play with regard to the first-mover 
advantage (narrative 22 in Table 5), which Winners cite less frequently (13% 
versus 20%) but just as often in absolute terms (30 times each for Winners and 
Losers). The implication seems to be that managers should consider a “match 
and build on” approach with regard to pursuing first-mover advantage. This 
might involve ensuring that, as people generate strategy, they spend time 
thinking about future scenarios, considering factors such as technological trends, 
socio-demographic shifts, and sector growth rates, seeking to identify and adapt 
more quickly in preparation for the future.  
6.3.2 Exploring the Application of Three New Strategic Narratives 
This study suggests that Winners build on traditional sources of advantage but 
pursue two additional narratives more often than Losers do: coordinating the 
uncoordinated (narrative 34 in Table 5), exchanging the role of a guest for that of 
a host (narrative 23 in Table 5), and forcing a two-front battle (narrative 7), 
which is roughly equivalent to the “economies of scope” concept.  
Embracing these strategic narratives captures an interesting and distinct 
competitive mindset and imparts new types of capabilities. For example, 
companies that embrace Stratagem 34, “Coordinate the uncoordinated,” would 
need to become good community builders. They likely need to claim a mission 
or purpose that inspires communities to support them, and they may need to be 
able to motivate collaboration without the usual incentives of salary and benefits. 
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The growing prevalence of this strategic narrative could lead companies toward 
adopting a more socially responsible stance, a trend we are seeing broadly 
(Hague, 2011).  
The ability to embrace Stratagem 7, “Force a two-front battle” or 
economies of scope is enhanced by a willingness to stretch outside standard 
industry lines. This requires a firm to assess carefully the risk of stepping too far 
beyond their industry-specific knowledge while leveraging competencies that are 
meaningful to create advantages in other sectors. One intriguing implication of 
the relative prevalence of this narrative among Winners (Winners cite this 
narrative 9 times, while Losers cite it 3 times) is that Winners perhaps less often 
define themselves by their industry and instead more often on capabilities they 
can stretch into new industries. Apple, for example, is known for concentrating 
its R&D spending on a limited number of products, yet the company spans the 
software, hardware, and music industries. In 2010, for example, Microsoft, which 
competes almost exclusively in software, was granted 3,094 patents, while Apple 
was granted just 563 (Source: IFI Claims Patent Service), yet Apple’s enterprise 
value exceeds Microsoft’s. These facts are consistent with the view that Apple is a 
relatively focused company but that its focus is not shaped by the industry in 
which it was born. Amazon.com is expanding aggressively into providing Web 
services to small businesses, and some analyst accounts project this business 
eventually to rival its core Internet retailing business. This expansion makes 
more sense when one does not assign Amazon.com’s advantages to knowing its 
industry (online retailing) but rather on its experience running cloud-based e-
commerce assets (servers, payments, content management, etc.).  
Stratagem 23, “Exchange the role of guest for that of host,” implies taking 
a long-term perspective by exhibiting greater willingness to forgo near-term 
profits for longer-term advantage. Winners seem able to maintain a long-term 
outlook despite the shortening of product lifecycles and the acceleration of 
market change that many experts believe we are experiencing. As mentioned in 
Section 5.4, Adobe’s shift away from charging for one-time licenses toward 
charging lower, monthly subscription fees, is one example of this narrative at 
work. The lower monthly subscription makes it easier for new customers to 
begin using Adobe’s software. Over time, as customers come to become more 
familiar with the software, have more people trained in it, and have more of their 
graphical assets in Adobe formats, Adobe moves from a “guest” position toward 
that of a “host.” 
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6.4 Critical Remarks and Limitations of the Study 
While this study points to some meaningful insights, several improvements 
could have been—and still can be—made to enhance the number and 
significance of its findings. As already alluded to in Section 6.2, “Suggestions for 
Further Research,” the study was based on an examination of 16 pairs of 
companies (32 in total). This necessarily limits the strength of conviction with 
which one can draw suggestions from the observations. The narrative “force a 
two-front battle” (narrative 7 in Table 5), for example, is cited nine times by 
Winners and three times by Losers. While it does seem that Winners cite this 
narrative three times more often than Losers, I would feel more comfortable if 
we had more citations to observe. Increasing the number of pairs of companies 
studied would allow us to feel more confident about its findings.  
This study was also limited to publically traded companies, with the 
majority based in the United States. It likely suffers, therefore, from a bias toward 
larger American companies. Expanding the analysis to include private 
companies and more companies from other regions of the world would allow us 
to reach broader conclusions about the differences between Winners and Losers. 
The text that was analyzed in this study was written by companies for 
investors. We drew on the public statements of firms published for investors. 
Such documents undergo careful editing and, being written primarily for one 
specific type of stakeholder, may not accurately represent how the people within 
the firms talk about strategy. It would be interesting to expand the types of 
material that this thesis studied to include material created inside firms for 
internal or non-financial stakeholders. Such an improvement would require 
considerable effort, such as the conducting of first-hand interviews with 
managers in each company, but could offer valuable insights and depth.  
One might also choose to define Winner and Loser differently than I have 
done here. Depending on what one seeks to measure or how one views success 
and depending on what information is available (e.g., additional factors about 
companies that one could incorporate into determining the perceived success of 
a company), one could change and/or enhance the determination of a company 
as a Winner or Loser. Factors that might also be considered include the effect on 
society and employee engagement. Surely other measurable factors are worthy of 
inclusion in this definition, including the happiness of the company’s workforce 
and the company’s effect on society and the environment. Even how one defines 
profitability or revenue growth offers room for debate. Choosing different 
definitions (e.g., five-year average revenue growth versus that of two years or ten 
years or pre-tax or after-tax profit margin) could affect the conclusions of this 
thesis.  
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Appendix A: Results of Public Company Coding 
Listed below are excerpts pulled from the public documents and the code 
assigned to each relevant excerpt. This is provided to illustrate my coding 
process..  
Illumina, Inc. 
7 Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao 
Our goal is to make our Genome Analyzer, BeadArray and BeadXpress 
platforms the industry standards for products and services addressing the genetic 
analysis markets. We plan to achieve this by: 
•  seeking new and complementary technologies through strategic 
acquisitions and other investments 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
“[our strategy focuses] on seeking new and complementary technologies through 
strategic acquisitions and other investments.”... “On January 26, 2007, we 
completed the acquisition of Solexa, Inc. (Solexa) for 26.2 million shares of our 
common stock. As a result of that acquisition, we develop and commercialize 
sequencing technologies used to perform a range of analyses, including whole 
genome re-sequencing, gene expression analysis and small RNA analysis.  
We believe we are the only company with genome-scale technology for 
sequencing, genotyping and gene expression, the three cornerstones of modern 
genetic analysis.”... 
“Using our proprietary technologies, we provide a comprehensive line of 
products and services that currently serve the sequencing, genotyping and gene 
expression markets.”...  
“We have an extensive patent portfolio, including, as of February 1, 2009, 
ownership of, or exclusive licenses to, 135 issued U.S. patents and 168 pending 
U.S. patent applications.”  
 96 
Appendix A: Results of Public Company Coding 
We are party to various exclusive and non-exclusive license agreements and 
other arrangements with third parties, which grant us rights to use key aspects of 
our array and sequencing technologies, assay methods, chemical detection 
methods, reagent kits and scanning equipment. 
14 Beat the grass to startle the snake 
“[our strategy focuses] on expanding our technologies into multiple product 
lines, applications and market segments”...“Using our proprietary technologies, 
our products give our customers the ability to analyze the genome at any level of 
complexity from whole genome sequencing to low multiplex assays. This enables 
us to serve a number of markets, including research, agriculture, forensics, 
pharmaceuticals and molecular diagnostics.” 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
“[Our strategy focuses] on emerging high-growth markets.”  
“In 2009, we expect to enter the market for molecular diagnostics. The molecular 
diagnostic market is currently estimated at nearly $3 billion with the potential to 
grow to over $5 billion by 2012.” 
We have made substantial investments in research and development since our 
inception. We have assembled a team of skilled engineers and scientists who are 
specialists in biology, chemistry, informatics, instrumentation, optical systems, 
software, manufacturing and other related areas required to complete the 
development of our products. 
Our current technologies serve three primary markets.. We have assembled a 
team of skilled engineers and scientists who are specialists in biology, chemistry, 
informatics, instrumentation, optical systems, software, manufacturing and 
other related areas required to complete the development of our products. 
38 Economies of Scale 
Our projects range in size from a few hundred samples to over 10,000 samples. 
Our current capacity peak is 450 million genotypes per day.  
40 Best Practices 
Our goal is to make our Genome Analyzer, BeadArray and BeadXpress 
platforms the industry standards for products and services addressing the genetic 
analysis markets. We plan to achieve this by: 
•  strengthening our technological leadership. 
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Hansen Natural Corporation 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
We continually endeavor to develop back-up sources of supply for certain of our 
flavors and concentrates as well as to negotiate arrangements with suppliers 
which would enable us to obtain access to certain concentrates or flavor formulas 
in certain circumstances. We have been partially successful in these endeavors.  
We presently have approximately 750 registered trademarks and pending 
applications in various countries worldwide 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
We have historically developed and successfully introduced new products, 
flavors and packaging for our products and intend to continue developing and 
introducing additional new beverages and flavors. 
34 Deck the tree with bogus blossoms 
In connection with the development of new products and flavors, independent 
suppliers bear a large portion of the expense of product development, thereby 
enabling us to develop new products and flavors at a relatively low cost.  
Where appropriate, we partner with retailers to assist our marketing efforts. For 
example, while we retain responsibility for the marketing of the Juice Slam® line 
of children’s multi-vitamin juice drinks, Costco has undertaken partial 
responsibility for the marketing of the Juice Blast® line. 
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Vistaprint NV 
7 Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao 
Although we expect to maintain our primary focus on the small business market, 
we believe that our customer support, sales and design services, and low costs are 
differentiating factors that make purchasing from us an attractive alternative for 
individual consumers. We intend to add new products and services targeted at 
the consumer market... 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
We have developed a direct-to-customer solution using proprietary Internet-
based software technologies to standardize, automate and integrate the design 
and production process, from concept through finished product shipment and 
service delivery. 
In addition, we have developed proprietary production methods to improve our 
efficiency and the quality of our products.  
We hold 25 United States patents, 4 patents in other countries and have more 
than 50 patent applications pending in the United States and other countries. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
Customers can use our proprietary design software to easily create and order 
full-color, personalized, professional-looking marketing products and services, 
without any prior design training or experience.  
Customers have access to over 70,000 graphic designs, design templates, 
photographs and illustrations as well as logo design services and content 
suggestions.  
We are also able to automatically match and adapt graphic content from one 
product format to another, which allows us to generate and display 
complementary products and services. 
We sell custom designed and manufactured products and services in quantities 
that are appropriate for small businesses, which can often be as few as a single 
unit. 
Customers who want us to perform some or all of the design work can contact 
our design service representatives, who will provide custom designs. 
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Our easy to use on-line tools and design software allow customers to create their 
own marketing products.  
English and German-speaking customers can also call our creative services toll-
free telephone numbers and purchase design and copyright services from our 
trained graphic designers and copywriters. 
We plan to continue to expand and enhance our product and service offerings in 
order to provide a greater selection to our existing customers and to attract 
customers seeking different products and services 
Split Run Testing technology assigns our website visitors to test and control 
groups. Depending on the test group to which a visitor is assigned, he or she can 
be shown slightly different versions of our website. This technology permits us to 
evaluate changes to our websites on a relatively small but still statistically 
significant test group prior to general release. We then use analytics software to 
correlate the changes on the site with the visitor’s browsing and purchasing 
behavior and to compare our profitability for a given pair of test and control 
groups. Our testing engine allows us to run hundreds of these tests 
simultaneously on our websites, reducing the time to take an idea from concept 
to full deployment and allowing us to quickly identify and roll-out the most 
promising and profitable ideas and promotions to maximize our customer value 
proposition. 
We are committed to providing high levels of customer service and support.  
We believe that the strength of our solution gives us the opportunity not only to 
capture an increasing share of the existing printing needs in our targeted 
markets, but also to address marketing services demand 
We believe our customers currently spend only a small portion of their annual 
budget for marketing products and services with us. By expanding the scope of 
our services and by improving the quality and selection of our products and 
services along with the customer experience, we intend to increase the amount of 
money our customers spend with us each year.  
We compete on the basis of...convenience,...customer and design services, ease of 
use, and production and delivery speed. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
We believe that we have significant opportunity to expand our revenue both in 
the countries we currently service and in additional countries worldwide. In 
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addition, we intend to further extend our geographic and international scope by 
continuing to introduce localized websites in different countries and languages 
and by offering graphic design content specific to local markets. 
We believe that technological innovation and the investment we have made in 
our technology development efforts have been among the principal drivers of 
our success to date. 
24 Borrow the road to conquer Gao 
We have entered into a variety of strategic partnerships that facilitate access to 
customers that we would not be able to reach through direct marketing channels. 
In April 2009, we announced a multi-year strategic alliance with FedEx Office, 
whereby FedEx customers will be able to design, order and print customized 
products either online or in any of 1,600 FedEx Office Print & Ship Centers in 
the United States. 
30 Openly repair the walkway, secretly march to Chen Cang 
We believe that the small business market has been underserved by expensive 
traditional marketing alternatives. 
34 Deck the tree with bogus blossoms 
While we offer a broad selection of designs and formats, we seek to reduce 
manufacturing complexity and costs by using limited characteristics that can be 
reconfigured and combined. This reduces our costs versus comparable 
marketing products and services produced using traditional methods. This 
approach has allowed us to successfully penetrate the large, fragmented and 
geographically dispersed small business and consumer markets. 
We also believe there is a significant advantage to combining the Internet’s 
ability to reach these highly fragmented markets with an integrated design and 
production process that can rapidly deliver sophisticated, high quality marketing 
products and services. 
38 Economies of Scale 
...we believe that the economies of scale provided by our large print order 
volumes and integrated design and production facilities will enable us to 
profitably grow our consumer business. 
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40 Best Practices 
Our long-term goal is to continue to grow profitably and become the leading 
online provider of small business marketing solutions.  
It is our intention to offer high quality design, production and marketing 
services at low price points and in doing so, offer our customers an attractive 
value proposition. 
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Green Mountain Coffee Roasters Inc. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
Our patented single-cup brewing technology...provides coffee and tea drinkers 
with the benefits of convenience. 
The Keurig gourmet single-cup system is based on three fundamental elements:    
•     Patented and proprietary K-Cup ® portion packs, which contain 
precisely portioned amounts of gourmet coffees, cocoa and teas in a 
sealed, low oxygen environment to ensure freshness.    
•     Specially designed proprietary high-speed packaging lines that 
manufacture K-Cups at the coffee roasters’ facilities using freshly-
roasted and ground coffee (or tea or cocoa).  
The Company holds 33 U.S. and 73 international patents covering a range of its 
portion pack, packaging line and brewing technology innovations. 
Our patented single-cup brewing technology, embodied in a premium quality 
machine, provides coffee and tea drinkers with the benefits of convenience, 
variety and great taste. Single-cup systems are designed to provide consumers 
consistent taste, convenience and speed with no mess or coffee waste. 
In March 2009, we completed the acquisition of the Tully’s ® Coffee brand and 
certain assets of its wholesale business. Tully’s wholesale business division 
distributes handcrafted coffees and related products via office coffee services, 
food service distributors, and over 5,000 supermarkets located primarily in the 
western states. The geographic region encompassed by the Tully’s brand creates 
an advantaged opportunity for the Company to accelerate growth in the west 
coast region by capitalizing on Tully’s brand recognition and the loyalty of their 
customer base. On November 13, 2009, we acquired Timothy’s World Coffee ® 
brand and wholesale business. Headquartered in Toronto, Canada, Timothy’s is 
a premium coffee company that produces specialty coffee, tea and other 
beverages predominantly in K-Cup portion packs. The acquisition of Timothy’s 
will enable geographic expansion with a Canadian brand platform that includes 
manufacturing and distribution synergies. In addition, we have submitted a 
proposal to acquire Diedrich Coffee, Inc. which, if successful, we believe would 
enable us to more effectively reach consumers in the southern California region 
and take advantage of manufacturing and distribution synergies in that region. 
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11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
[We] are committed to ensuring that our customers have an outstanding coffee 
experience. We buy some of the highest-quality Arabica beans available from the 
world’s coffee-producing regions and use a roasting process designed to optimize 
each coffee’s individual taste and aroma.  
Through K-Cups, we offer the industry’s widest selection of gourmet branded 
coffees and teas in a proprietary single-cup format. Consumers can choose from 
over a dozen gourmet brands and over 200 varieties of coffees and teas. 
...we utilize our multi-channel distribution network of wholesale, retail and 
consumer direct to make our coffee and single-cup Keurig ® brewers widely and 
easily available to both AH and AFH consumers.  
Distribution facilities are designed to be located within a two-hour radius of 
most customers to expedite delivery. 
Consumer direct provides us the opportunity to effectively...[build] one-on-one 
relationships, and [have] direct correspondence with consumers, all of which 
gives us the ability to illuminate the Company’s points of difference.  
SCBU publishes catalogs and maintains a website to market and sell over 200 
coffee varieties, coffee-related equipment and accessories, gift assortments, hand-
crafted items from coffee-source countries and Vermont, and gourmet food 
items covering a wide range of price points.  
We encourage customers to become members of our “Café EXPRESS” service, a 
continuity program with customized standing orders for automatic re-shipment. 
We believe that our ability to provide a convenient and broad network of outlets 
from which to purchase our products is an important factor in our ability to 
compete. Through our multi-channel distribution network of wholesale, retail 
and consumer direct operations, with particular emphasis for SCBU on brand 
trial through K-Cups, we believe we differentiate ourselves from many of our 
larger competitors, who specialize in only one primary channel of distribution.  
We compete primarily by providing ... easy access to our products, superior 
customer service and a comprehensive approach to customer relationship 
management. 
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33 Hide a dagger behind a smile 
...we are focused on partnering with other gourmet coffee roasters and tea 
packers with strong national/regional brands to create additional K-Cup 
products that will help create consumer demand for the Keurig ® single-cup 
brewing system. 
40 Best Practices 
Our Company’s objective is to be a leader in the coffee business by selling high-
quality, premium coffee and innovative coffee brewing systems that consistently 
provide a superior coffee experience. 
The Company seeks to create customers for life.  
We are focused on building our brands and profitably growing our business. We 
believe we can continue to grow sales by increasing customer awareness in 
existing regions, expanding into new geographic regions, expanding sales in 
high-growth industry segments such as single-cup coffee and tea, and selectively 
pursuing other opportunities, including strategic acquisitions.  
…our constant innovation and focus on quality, all directed to delivering a 
consistently superior cup of coffee, differentiates us among competitors in the 
single-cup coffeemaker industry. 
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Concur Technologies, Inc. 
7 Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao 
In August 2009, Concur acquired Etap-On-Line, a provider of business travel 
and expense management solutions headquartered in Paris, France.  
We may also acquire companies with complementary products and technologies 
that we believe will enhance our suite of services. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
In July 2008, we entered into a strategic alliance with American Express Travel 
Related Services Company, Inc., which we refer to as American Express, in order 
to expand our market presence and broaden our distribution capacity. Through 
this alliance, we will exclusively promote American Express's Corporate Cards to 
our clients and American Express will exclusively promote Concur® Expense to 
its corporate clients and prospects worldwide. 
Our indirect distribution channels consist of strategic relationships with a 
number of reseller and referral partners, which include more than 100 leading 
companies such as American Express...ADP, Inc., a subsidiary of Automatic 
Data Processing, Inc., a global payroll solutions and computing services 
provider; BCD Travel, a leading corporate travel management company; and 
other travel management companies. 
Our success depends, in part, upon our proprietary technology, processes, trade 
secrets and other proprietary information, and our ability to protect this 
information from unauthorized disclosure and use. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
Our solutions are designed to accommodate a wide range of customer business 
needs, technical requirements and budget objectives for businesses of all sizes 
worldwide. To that end, we offer flexible solutions that range from highly-
configurable to standardized.  
We believe Concur Travel & Expense is the most effective solution available for 
providing a single seamless process for managing travel procurement and 
expense reporting within a business. 
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Concur Travel & Expense also leverages our global Concur® Connect platform, 
the global program that connects suppliers from around the world to over $35 
billion of spending driven by our more than 9,000 clients. 
We provide value-added services that leverage our integrated travel procurement 
and expense reporting platform to benefit our customers. Our primary value-
added services are: [Concur® Pay, Concur® Audit, Concur® Intelligence, Concur® 
Meeting, Smart Expense™, Concur® Connect]. 
We offer consulting services in connection with deployment of our solutions to 
assist customers in maximizing their return on investment. 
We provide customer support through our Client Support Services program. 
The program offers telephone and Internet support, including online case entry 
and review, access to technical information documents and technical tips.  
We compete principally on the basis of ...customer service. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
We intend to continue to develop and deliver new solutions and features that 
enhance or expand the value of our current offerings to our customers. 
23 Exchange the role of guest for that of host 
We offer a variety of flexible training programs designed to assist customers 
transitioning to our products and services. These programs are tailored to 
particular user groups, such as administrators, help desk personnel or trainers. 
34 Deck the tree with bogus blossoms 
Extend Relationships With Strategic Third Parties. We believe that working 
closely with strategic third parties, including travel management vendors, 
corporate charge card providers, payroll processors, consulting firms, travel 
suppliers and others, can accelerate the adoption of our solutions among a larger 
customer base. We focus on enabling our partners to realize new economic 
opportunities through the integration and distribution of our solutions. We 
intend to expand our network of distribution partners and increase the value that 
our solutions provide throughout the corporate travel, expense and vendor 
payment processes. 
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38 Economies of Scale 
...our on-demand services enable companies to access and consume technology 
similarly to the way they consume other goods and services: customers access the 
services they need in a cost effective and scalable manner. 
40 Best Practices 
Leveraging industry best practices and our direct experience, our consulting staff 
meets with customers prior to deployment to review existing business processes 
and information technology infrastructure and provides advice on ways to 
improve these processes.  
Our objective is to be the leading global provider of Employee Spend 
Management solutions. 
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Community Health Systems 
7 Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao 
Our initiatives to increase revenue include: ...expanding the breadth of services 
offered at our hospitals through targeted capital expenditures to support the 
addition of more complex services, including orthopedics, cardiovascular 
services, and urology... 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
We seek to increase revenue at our facilities by providing a broader range of 
services in a more attractive care setting, as well as by supporting and recruiting 
physicians. We identify the healthcare needs of the community by analyzing 
demographic data and patient referral trends.  
The steps we take to increase patient flow in our emergency rooms 
include...improving service and reducing waiting times, as well as publicizing our 
emergency room capabilities in the local community. 
One component of upgrading our emergency rooms is the implementation of 
specialized computer software programs designed to assist physicians in making 
diagnoses and determining treatments. The software ... enables our nurses to 
provide more consistent patient care and provides clear instructions to patients 
at time of discharge to help them better understand their treatments.  
All hospitals conduct patient, physician, and staff satisfaction surveys to help 
identify methods of improving the quality of care. 
20 Let the plum tree wither in place of the peach 
We believe that smaller populations support less direct competition for hospital-
based services. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
Our strategy has also included growth by acquisition. We target hospitals in 
growing, non-urban and select urban healthcare markets for acquisition because 
of their favorable demographic and economic trends and competitive conditions. 
40 Best Practices 
We work to identify and communicate best practices and monitor these 
improvements throughout the Company. 
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The [Case and Resource Management] program focuses on developing and 
implementing standards for operational best practices; and using on-site clinical 
facilitators to train and educate care practitioners on identified best practices, 
We share information among our hospital management to implement best 
practices and assist in complying with regulatory requirements. 
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Urban Outfitters, Inc. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
Our retail stores compete on the basis of, among other things,...the level of 
customer service offered ... 
23 Exchange the role of guest for that of host 
Our core strategy is to provide unified store environments that establish 
emotional bonds with the customer.  
Our stores accommodate our customers’ propensity not only to shop, but also to 
congregate with their peers.  
Every element of the environment is tailored to the aesthetic preferences of our 
target customers. 
In our stores, merchandise is integrated into a variety of creative vignettes and 
displays designed to offer our customers an entire look at a distinct lifestyle. This 
dynamic visual merchandising and display technique provides the connection 
among the store design, the merchandise and the customer. 
Essential components of the ambience of each store may include playing music 
that appeals to our target customers, using unique signage and employing a staff 
that understands and identifies with the target customer. 
We also believe that highly visible store locations, creative store design, broad 
merchandise selection and visual presentation are key enticements for customers 
to enter and explore our stores and buy merchandise. Consequently, we rely on 
these factors, as well as the brand recognition created by our direct marketing 
activities, to draw customers into our stores, rather than on traditional forms of 
advertising such as print, radio and television media. 
Anthropologie considers it important to create an individualized and tailored 
store shopping experience for each customer. By providing an inviting and 
pleasant shopping atmosphere and an attentive sales staff, including, in many 
stores, in-store customer care managers, we strive to create a sense of 
community in our Anthropologie stores that encourages our target customers to 
linger and spend time exploring our stores and product offerings. 
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WMS Industries Inc. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
We ...acquire...intellectual property and advanced technologies that we believe 
enable innovative and appealing games which, coupled with a focused product 
portfolio management plan, allows us to expand our offering of differentiated 
products to casino operators.  
During fiscal 2007, we began introducing new product lines ...that utilized our ... 
internally developed portfolio of intellectual properties and technologies.  
Our ability to compete successfully in this market is based, in large part, upon 
our ability to:...identify and develop or obtain rights to commercially marketable 
intellectual properties...  
We are authorized to conduct business in over 100 international gaming 
jurisdictions. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
Our games typically integrate secondary bonus rounds as additions to the 
primary game to create a game-within-a-game for more exciting and interactive 
play. If players attain certain winning combinations on the primary game, they 
move on to play a secondary game for a chance at winning additional bonuses 
without additional wagering. 
Demand for our products is also driven by: ...Our reputation, reliability and 
after-sales service support. 
We place substantial emphasis on our Player Driven Innovation process that 
incorporates player feedback and market research into our development process 
in order to create game content and gaming experiences that appeal to casino 
patrons. 
Our ability to compete successfully in this market is based, in large part, upon 
our ability to:... 
➢   generate brand recognition; 
20 Let the plum tree wither in place of the peach 
A key element of our success has been to limit the number of units of each game 
theme installed in each casino. The result is that due to the popularity of the 
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games, with a limited supply, the performance of the games has remained high 
for a longer period.  
We have also removed participation gaming machines from lower performing 
casinos and placed them in higher performing casinos to enhance our return on 
investment. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
Game platforms and the related computer systems are constantly updated and 
revised to keep pace with the ever-increasing complexity of modern game play 
requirements. 
We expect technology to continue to be a significant element that drives 
demand, along with the emphasis by casinos for the types of gaming products 
that deliver higher net win per gaming machine. We believe that server-enabled 
networked gaming (“NG”) will be the next significant technology development 
in the gaming machine industry.  
Strategies One and Two: Leverage Our Product Development Expertise to 
Introduce Innovative New Games and Expand Our Product Sales Offerings to:  
1) Increase our Ship Share in the United States and Canada and 
2) Expand and Grow Our International Business: During the past six 
years, we have enhanced our product development efforts by adding 
key management, design personnel and software engineers to our 
product development group.  
In the December 2008 quarter we began the global launch of our new gaming 
machine, Bluebird2, which contains advanced technologies that enable this 
gaming machine to support gaming as it exists today and in the server-enabled 
networked gaming world. 
Our ability to compete successfully in this market is based, in large part, upon 
our ability to: ... 
➢   create an expanding and constantly refreshed portfolio of games;  
➢   adapt our products for use with new technologies;  
➢   implement product innovation and reliability. 
38 Economies of Scale 
We also expect to benefit from raw material sourcing initiatives and from an 
expanded volume of business, which should result in greater volume discounts of 
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raw material component parts from our suppliers and enable us to spread our 
manufacturing overhead cost over a larger number of units thereby reducing 
cost per unit. 
40 Best Practices 
We seek to develop games and gaming machines that offer high entertainment 
value to casino patrons and generate greater revenues for casinos and other 
gaming machine operators than the games and gaming machines offered by our 
competitors.  
We strive to develop highly entertaining games that incorporate engaging game 
play, themes, intellectual properties and advanced technologies, exciting winning 
combinations, advanced graphics, and digital music and sound effects. 
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Priceline.com Incorporated 
7 Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao 
In addition, from time to time we explore strategic transactions and acquisitions 
that, among other things, allow us to provide our services to new markets. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
Proprietary Seller Networks. 7 We have assembled proprietary networks of 
industry leading sellers that represent high quality brands.  By establishing 
attractive networks of seller participants with reputations for quality, scale and 
national presence, we believe that we foster increased participation by both 
buyers and sellers. 
…we have renewed or entered into new agreements with several of our major 
airline and hotel suppliers, which we believe improved our access to a better 
selection of travel alternatives and pricing. 
We currently hold twenty issued United States patents. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
Internationally, we offer our customers hotel room reservations in over 75 
countries and 27 languages. 
... services are made available over the Internet through websites that we own or 
control, and are provided by major travel suppliers, including more than 70,000 
hotel properties worldwide.   
We work with over 60,000 chain-owned and independently owned hotels 
offering hotel reservations on various websites and in multiple languages.  
As part of our evolution to a “one-stop-shopping” website, we have added 
thousands of pages of content to allow customers to research destinations and 
hotel properties before booking a reservation.   
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
Because of what we believe to be superior growth rate opportunities associated 
with international online travel, we intend to continue to invest resources to 
increase the share of our revenues represented by international consumers and 
capitalize on international travel demand. We intend to use Agoda, the online 
hotel distributor with operations in Singapore and Thailand, which we acquired 
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in 2007, to further develop our operations throughout Asia, where Internet 
penetration and e-commerce adoption are growing at a substantially greater pace 
than in the United States over the last several years.   
36 The stratagem of linking stratagems 
We believe that the combination of our retail price-disclosed model and our 
Name Your Own Price® model allows us to provide a broad array of options to 
value-conscious travelers, while providing us with diverse streams of revenue. 
38 Economies of Scale 
Our business is supported by a systems platform, which was designed with an 
emphasis on scalability, performance and reliability.  
40 Best Practices 
Our principal goal is to be the leading worldwide online hotel reservation 
service. 
Our strategy is to continue to participate broadly in online travel growth by 
expanding our service offerings and markets. 
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inVentiv Health 
7 Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao 
We have developed sustained relationships with large, mid-tier, emerging 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology clients that provide us with recurring revenue 
streams and cross-selling opportunities. 
We consider the breadth of our client portfolio ... to be an important competitive 
advantage. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
We believe that our expertise in identifying potential acquisition targets, 
assessing their importance to our operational and growth objectives, performing 
due diligence and completing the acquisition of appropriate businesses and 
effectively integrating them with our existing operations is a competitive 
advantage. 
Our focus on building a comprehensive suite of best-in-class service providers 
with strong marketplace awareness has been a key strategy in our acquisitions. A 
few examples of our strong brand names in their respective marketplaces include 
Smith Hanley, GSW Worldwide, Palio, Chandler Chicco, Chamberlain, Ignite, 
Adheris and AWAC. 
We maintain and operate a number of proprietary software programs and 
systems for marketing development and data gathering. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
We are also engaged in a continuous process of expanding and refining our 
service offerings, and pursuing cross-servicing opportunities within and across 
our business segments, in order to respond more flexibly to the market and 
address broader revenue opportunities with existing and new clients. 
We support a broad range of clinical development, communications and 
commercialization activities that are critical to our customers’ ability to complete 
the development of new drug products and medical devices and successfully 
commercialize them.  
Our ability to perform services and add value at every part of the product life 
cycle enhances our ability to develop new business opportunities and form long-
lasting relationships with clients.  
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We are one of the largest providers of services to the pharmaceutical and life 
sciences industry in the U.S. and offer among the broadest range of services. 
These are important factors to our clients and potential clients, many of whom 
prefer to work with organizations that can provide a comprehensive suite of 
complementary services and have a proven track record of execution. 
14 Beat the grass to startle the snake 
We therefore target a broad spectrum of companies within the pharmaceutical 
industry in seeking to develop business opportunities. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
We invest in technology and have developed and deployed cutting-edge 
marketing and sales force automation tools. 
23 Exchange the role of guest for that of host 
Our client base of over 350 pharmaceutical and biotechnology clients is broad 
and diversified, and with many of these clients we have maintained long-term 
relationships that help us in continuing to win new business. 
 118 
Appendix A: Results of Public Company Coding 
Blue Nile 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
While we may selectively acquire diamond inventory that we believe will be 
attractive to our customers, our supply solution enables us to purchase only 
those diamonds that our customers have ordered. We typically enter into multi-
year agreements with diamond suppliers that provide for certain diamonds to be 
offered online to consumers exclusively through the Blue Nile websites. 
We have developed an efficient online cost structure and a unique supply 
solution that eliminates traditional layers of diamond wholesalers and brokers, 
which generally allow us to purchase most of our product offerings at lower 
prices by avoiding mark-ups imposed by those intermediaries.  
Our exclusive diamond supplier relationships allow us to display suppliers’ 
diamond inventories on the Blue Nile websites for sale to consumers without 
holding the diamonds in our inventory until the products are ordered by 
customers. 
We purchase polished diamonds from several dozen suppliers, most of whom 
have long-standing relationships with us. We typically enter into multi-year 
agreements with diamond suppliers that provide for certain diamonds to be 
offered online to consumers exclusively through the Blue Nile websites. Our 
diamond supply agreements have expiration dates ranging from 2010 to 2014. 
Our technology systems use a combination of proprietary, licensed and open-
source technologies. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
We have an obsessive focus on the customer. We believe that maintaining high 
overall customer satisfaction is critical to our ongoing efforts to elevate the Blue 
Nile brand and to increase our net sales and net income. 
We specialize in the customization of diamond jewelry with our “Build Your 
Own” feature that offers customers the ability to customize diamond rings, 
pendants and earrings. 
Our comprehensive websites and expertly trained customer service 
representatives (“diamond and jewelry consultants”) improve the traditional 
purchasing experience by providing education and detailed product information 
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that enable our customers to objectively compare diamonds and fine jewelry 
products, and make informed decisions. 
Our websites feature an interactive search functionality that allows our 
customers to quickly find the products that meet their needs from our broad 
selection of diamonds and fine jewelry. 
The Blue Nile customer experience is designed to empower our customers with 
knowledge and confidence as they evaluate, select and purchase diamonds and 
fine jewelry. 
A key element of our business strategy is our ability to provide a high level of 
customer service and support. We augment our online information resources 
with knowledgeable, highly trained support staff through our call centers to give 
customers confidence in their purchases. Our diamond and jewelry consultants 
are trained to provide guidance on all steps in the process of buying diamonds 
and fine jewelry, including, among other things, the process for selecting an 
appropriate item, the purchase of that item, financing and payment alternatives, 
and shipping services. Our commitment to customers is reflected in both high 
service levels that are provided by our extensively trained diamond and jewelry 
consultants, as well as in our guarantees and policies. 
We typically offer a return policy of 30 days. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
By innovating in the areas of website functionality, product visualization, and 
customer features, we intend to further enhance customer satisfaction. 
We have and will continue to selectively pursue opportunities in international 
markets in which we can leverage our existing infrastructure and compelling 
value proposition. We are pursuing these opportunities based on each market’s 
consumer spending on jewelry, adoption rate of online purchasing and 
competitive landscape, among other factors. 
30 Openly repair the walkway, secretly march to Chen Cang 
As an online retailer, we also do not incur most of the operating costs associated 
with physical retail stores, including occupancy costs and related overhead. As a 
result, while our gross profit margins are lower than those typically maintained 
by traditional diamond and fine jewelry retailers, we are able to realize relatively 
higher operating income as a percentage of net sales. In the year ended January 3, 
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2010, we had a 21.6% gross profit margin, as compared to what we believe to be 
gross profit margins of up to 50% or more by some traditional retailers. 
34 Deck the tree with bogus blossoms 
Our websites showcase tens of thousands of independently certified diamonds 
and styles of fine jewelry, including rings, wedding bands, earrings, necklaces, 
pendants, bracelets and watches. 
40 Best Practices 
Our goal is to provide an unrivaled customer experience such that we become 
our customers’ jeweler for life. 
Our objective is to maximize our revenue and profitability and increase market 
share both domestically and internationally by offering exceptional value to our 
customers through a high quality customer experience that leverages supply 
chain efficiencies and an efficient cost structure. 
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Research in Motion 
2 Exchange a brick for a jade 
...BlackBerry® Messenger (BBM™), have been instrumental in driving RIM’s 
international growth. BBM use increased five-fold during fiscal 2010 and we 
believe this growth is a strong indicator of the potential for key applications to 
drive even greater adoption and loyalty to the BlackBerry platform. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
We continue to invest in the integration of our global supply chain by developing 
relationships with key suppliers to support future product requirements and 
achieve greater forecast accuracy through improved demand management. In 
support of this supply chain integration and growth, RIM is investing in a 
leading edge IT systems infrastructure and global information management 
system, driving a world class supply chain engine to achieve the highest possible 
levels of customer satisfaction. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
RIM is focused on delivering rich user experiences to our customers...  
Both enterprises and consumers recognize our strength as a world class platform 
for all kinds of communications – instant messaging, social networking, e-mail, 
texting, multimedia and more.  
The tight integration of leading edge hardware, purpose built software and the 
BlackBerry infrastructure has generated one of the most robust and secure 
solutions on the market.  
The value of the BlackBerry brand also increased substantially during fiscal 2010. 
Last year we were pleased to have been included on the Millward Brown Top 100 
Most Powerful Brands list. 
Research and development efforts in fiscal 2010 remained focused on developing 
world class products and services that deliver a unique mobile experience for our 
customers.   
...continue to enhance the user experience by launching a new Webkit-based 
browser and new user interface for BlackBerry smartphones, and by growing the 
number of applications and services available for the BlackBerry platform;  
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Providing exceptional support for the growing number of BlackBerry subscribers 
is an important competitive advantage for RIM and its partners. Our customer 
support efforts in fiscal 2010 continued to focus on scalability, ease-of-use, 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
...aggressively targeting small and medium sized business with BlackBerry 
Enterprise Server Express; 
20 Let the plum tree wither in place of the peach 
The BlackBerry platform remains the corporate standard for enterprise mobility. 
In recognition of its leadership in the enterprise market in fiscal 2010, 
BlackBerry® Enterprise Server version 5.0 received the Global Mobile Award for 
the “Best Mobile Enterprise Product or Service” at GSMA’s Mobile World 
Congress and was also the first mobile platform to receive the Common Criteria 
EAL4+ Security Certification.   
We are committed to maintaining our leadership in this market and continue to 
strengthen the BlackBerry platform through enhanced integration of value added 
services such as BlackBerry® Mobile Voice System (mobilizes PBX systems and 
brings office phone features to BlackBerry smartphones), Chalk Pushcast 
Software (for corporate podcasting) and enterprise social networking and 
collaboration tools. We also recently launched BlackBerry® Enterprise Server 
Express to further extend our market opportunity by providing companies of all 
sizes with a cost-effective solution that supports mobile connectivity for 
employees without compromising security or manageability. 
34 Deck the tree with bogus blossoms 
Early in fiscal 2010, RIM launched BlackBerry App World™ and we are pleased to 
report that the developer community is thriving. RIM continues to provide 
developers with robust tools, technologies and business services to assist them in 
creating and marketing even more powerful and useful applications. Related 
initiatives in 2010 included the second annual BlackBerry Developer Conference, 
the introduction of the BlackBerry Academic Program and a variety of new 
development tools, such as BlackBerry® Theme Studio, BlackBerry Widgets, and 
new payment and advertising tools and services to help developers monetize 
their applications. 
38 Economies of Scale 
Our customer support efforts in fiscal 2010 continued to focus on scalability... 
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40 Best Practices 
We focused on efficiency right from the start. 
So efficiency is in our DNA. 
 124 
Appendix A: Results of Public Company Coding 
Apple 
3 Invite your enemy onto the roof, then remove the ladder 
Throughout its history, the Company has focused on the use of technology in 
education and has been committed to delivering tools to help educators teach 
and students learn. The Company believes effective integration of technology 
into classroom instruction can result in higher levels of student achievement, 
especially when used to support collaboration, information access, and the 
expression and representation of student thoughts and ideas. The Company has 
designed a range of products and services to address the needs of education 
customers, which includes one-to-one (“1:1”) learning. A 1:1 learning solution 
typically consists of a networked environment that includes a portable computer 
for every student and teacher. In addition, the Company supports mobile 
learning and real-time distribution and accessibility of education related 
materials through iTunes U, which allows students and teachers to share and 
distribute educational media directly through their computers and mobile 
communication devices. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
The Company’s business strategy leverages its unique ability to design and 
develop its own operating system, hardware, application software, and services to 
provide its customers new products and solutions with superior ease-of-use, 
seamless integration, and innovative industrial design.  
The Company has signed multi-year agreements with various cellular network 
carriers authorizing them to distribute and provide cellular network services for 
iPhones. These agreements are generally not exclusive with a specific carrier, 
except in the U.S., Germany, Spain, Ireland, and certain other countries. 
...the Company has entered into certain agreements for the supply of key 
components... 
The Company may expand the range of its product offerings and intellectual 
property through licensing and acquisition of third-party business and 
technology.  
The Company currently holds rights to patents and copyrights relating to certain 
aspects of its computer systems, iPhone and iPod devices, peripherals, software 
and services. 
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11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
The Company’s strategy also includes expanding its distribution network to 
effectively reach more of its targeted customers and provide them with a high-
quality sales and post-sales support experience. 
The Company believes a high-quality buying experience with knowledgeable 
salespersons who can convey the value of the Company’s products and services 
greatly enhances its ability to attract and retain customers. The Company sells 
many of its products and resells certain third-party products in most of its major 
markets directly to consumers and businesses through its retail and online stores. 
The Company has also invested in programs to enhance reseller sales, including 
the Apple Sales Consultant Program, which places Apple employees and 
contractors at selected third-party reseller locations, and the Apple Premium 
Reseller Program, through which independently run businesses focus on the 
Apple platform and provide a high level of customer service and product 
expertise. The Company believes providing direct contact with its targeted 
customers is an efficient way to demonstrate the advantages of its products over 
those of its competitors. 
At the end of fiscal 2009, the Company had opened a total of 273 retail stores, 
including 217 stores in the U.S. and 56 stores internationally. 
The Company also sells its hardware and software products to customers in 
enterprise, government and creative markets in each of its geographic segments. 
These markets are also important to many third-party developers who provide 
Mac-compatible hardware and software solutions. Customers in these markets 
utilize the Company’s products because of their high-powered computing 
performance and expansion capabilities, networking functionality, and seamless 
integration with complementary products. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
The Company believes continual investment in research and development is 
critical to the development and enhancement of innovative products and 
technologies. 
In addition to evolving its personal computers and related solutions, the 
Company continues to capitalize on the convergence of the personal computer, 
mobile communications and digital consumer electronics by creating and 
refining innovations, such as iPhone, iPod and the iTunes Store. 
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The Company believes it currently retains a competitive advantage by offering 
superior innovation and integration of the entire solution including the 
hardware (personal computer, iPhone and iPod), software (iTunes), and 
distribution of digital content and applications (iTunes Store, iTunes Wi-Fi 
Music Store and App Store).  
Because the personal computer, mobile communication and consumer 
electronics industries are characterized by rapid technological advances, the 
Company’s ability to compete successfully is heavily dependent upon its ability 
to ensure a continual and timely flow of competitive products, services and 
technologies to the marketplace. The Company continues to develop new 
products and technologies and to enhance existing products in the areas of 
computer hardware and peripherals, mobile communication devices, consumer 
electronics products, system software, applications software, networking and 
communications software and solutions, and Internet services and solutions. 
34 Deck the tree with bogus blossoms 
The Company desires to support a community for the development of third-
party products that complement the Company’s offerings through its developer 
programs. The Company offers various third-party software applications and 
hardware accessories for Mac® computers, iPhones and iPods through its retail 
and online stores, as well as software applications for the iPhone and iPod touch 
platforms through its App Store™. 
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AT&T 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
With the expansion of our company through acquisitions and the resulting 
ownership consolidation of AT&T Mobility, and with continuing advances in 
technology, we plan to offer new services that combine our traditional wireline 
and wireless services... 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
…we plan to offer new services that combine our traditional wireline and 
wireless services, thereby making our customers’ lives more convenient and 
productive... 
Our voice service is generally offered on a contract basis for one- or two-year 
periods 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
…we plan to offer new services that combine our traditional wireline and 
wireless services, thereby ...fostering competition and further innovation in the 
communications and entertainment industry. 
As the communications industry continues to move toward internet-based 
technologies that are capable of blending traditional wireline and wireless 
services, we plan to offer services that take advantage of these new and more 
sophisticated technologies. In particular, we intend to continue to focus on 
deploying our AT&T U-verse high-speed broadband and video services and on 
developing internet protocol-based services that allow customers to unite their 
home or business wireline services with their wireless service. 
23 Exchange the role of guest for that of host 
As the wireless industry continues to mature, we believe that future wireless 
growth will become increasingly dependent on our ability to offer integrated 
handsets and other innovative devices such as netbooks and eReaders and 
innovative services that will encourage existing customers to upgrade their 
services and will attract customers from other providers as well as our ability to 
minimize turnover of our existing customer base (customer churn). We intend 
to accomplish these goals by continuing to expand our network coverage, 
improve our network quality and offer a broad array of products and services, 
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including exclusive devices such as Apple iPhone, Wi-Fi enabled devices and free 
mobile-to-mobile calling among our wireless customers. 
We continue to upgrade our network and coordinate with equipment 
manufacturers and applications developers in order to further capitalize on the 
continued growth in the demand for wireless data services. 
38 Economies of Scale 
As of December 31, 2009, we served 85.1 million customers and were a leading 
provider of mobile wireless voice and data communications services in the U.S. 
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Oracle 
7 Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao 
Our database and middleware software offerings are designed to provide a cost-
effective, high-performance platform for running and managing business 
applications for small and mid-size businesses, as well as large, global enterprises. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
As a result of our acquisition of Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Sun) in January 2010, 
we are also a leading provider of hardware products and services. 
We also believe that an active acquisition program is an important element of 
our corporate strategy as it strengthens our competitive position, expands our 
customer base, provides greater scale to accelerate innovation.... In recent years, 
we have invested billions of dollars to acquire a number of companies, products, 
services and technologies. 
We also purchase or license intellectual property rights in certain circumstances. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
The standard end user software license agreement for our products generally 
provides for an initial fee to use the software product in perpetuity based on a 
maximum number of processors, named users or other metrics. 
Our software solutions are designed to help customers reduce the cost and 
complexity of their information technology (or IT) infrastructures by delivering 
solutions via a standards-based, or “open”, integrated architecture, which allows 
our software products to work in customer environments that may include 
Oracle or non-Oracle hardware or software components.  
We seek to protect and enhance our customers’ current investments in Oracle 
software by offering proactive and personalized support services, including our 
Lifetime Support policy, and unspecified product enhancements and upgrades. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
We believe our internal, or organic, growth and continued innovation with 
respect to our software, hardware and services businesses are the foundation of 
our long-term strategic plan. In fiscal 2010, 2009 and 2008 we invested $3.3 
billion, $2.8 billion and $2.7 billion, respectively, in research and development to 
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enhance our existing portfolio of products and services and to develop new 
products, features and services. 
34 Deck the tree with bogus blossoms 
Oracle JDeveloper is an integrated software environment that is designed to 
facilitate rapid development of a variety of different types of applications using 
Oracle Fusion Middleware and popular open source technologies. Oracle 
JDeveloper provides support for developing Java applications; web services, 
composite SOA applications and business processes; rich user interfaces using 
AJAX/DHTML and Flash technologies; and websites using popular scripting 
languages. Oracle JDeveloper also provides comprehensive application lifecycle 
management facilities including modeling, building, debugging, unit testing, 
profiling, and optimizing applications and is integrated with the Oracle 
Application Development Framework, which provides a declarative framework 
for building business applications, and popular open source tools including 
Eclipse and NetBeans. 
38 Economies of Scale 
We offer customers scalable... hardware solutions. 
We also believe that an active acquisition program is an important element of 
our corporate strategy as it ...provides greater scale to accelerate innovation. 
We are the world’s largest enterprise software company. 
40 Best Practices 
We seek to be an industry leader in each of the specific product categories in 
which we compete and to expand into new and emerging markets. 
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Aflac 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
Furthering our initiatives in the broker arena, we acquired CAIC in the fourth 
quarter of 2009. This acquisition equips us with a platform for offering attractive 
voluntary group insurance products that are well-suited for distribution by 
insurance brokers at the worksite. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
In 1974, Aflac was granted an operating license to sell life insurance in Japan, 
making Aflac the second non-Japanese life insurance company to gain direct 
access to the Japanese insurance market. Aflac has had substantial success selling 
cancer policies in Japan, with 14 million cancer policies in force as of December 
31, 2009.  
We have sold our products to employees of banks since our entry into Japan in 
1974. However, December 2007 marked the first time it was permissible for 
banks to sell supplemental health insurance products to their customers. By the 
end of 2009, we had agreements with 353 banks to sell our products. 
34 Deck the tree with bogus blossoms 
Insurance brokers have been a historically underleveraged sales channel for 
Aflac, and we believe we can establish relationships that will complement, not 
compete with, our traditional distribution system. We have assembled a 
management team experienced in broker sales, and we are supporting this 
initiative with streamlined products, targeted broker specific advertising 
campaigns, customized enrollment technology, and competitive compensation. 
Additionally, a new level of management was introduced in 2009 to deliver this 
initiative. Over 100 broker development coordinators have been hired to be 
single points of contact for brokers across the country. Broker development 
coordinators are responsible for building relationships with new brokers as well 
as strengthening relationships with our current brokers. These coordinators are 
assisted by a team of certified case managers whose role is to coordinate and 
manage the account enrollments for brokers. 
As of December 31, 2009, Aflac Japan was represented by more than 19,600 sales 
agencies, with more than 110,500 licensed sales associates employed by those 
agencies at such date. We believe that new agencies will continue to be attracted 
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to Aflac Japan’s high commissions, superior products, customer service and 
strong brand image. 
Our U.S. sales force comprises sales associates who are independent contractors 
licensed to sell accident and health insurance. 
38 Economies of Scale 
We believe AFLAC is the world's leading writer of individually issued policies 
marketed at worksites. 
We continue to diversify our product offerings in both Japan and the United 
States. 
During the past several years, we have enhanced and increased the size of our 
distribution system. We recruited more than 28,400 new sales associates in 2009. 
At December 31, 2009, Aflac was represented by more than 75,300 licensed sales 
associates, a 1.2% increase over 2008. 
40 Best Practices 
Our business depends in large part on our technology systems for interacting 
with employers, policyholders and sales associates, and our business strategy 
involves providing customers with easy-to-use products to meet their needs. 
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Beckman Coulter, Inc. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
Patents and other proprietary rights are essential to our business. We rely on 
trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, know-how and confidentiality agreements 
to develop, maintain and strengthen our competitive position. We own a 
number of patents and trademarks throughout the world and have also entered 
into license arrangements relating to various third-party patents and 
technologies. 
We currently maintain a worldwide patent portfolio of approximately 2,443 
active patents and pending applications for patents, which includes 659 active 
U.S. patents, 163 applications for U.S. patents and the balance being patents and 
pending applications on selected products or technologies in markets outside the 
United States. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
We believe the Beckman and Coulter names have become two of the most 
valuable brand names in biomedical testing. With the leading market share in 
the United States, we are the recognized leader in total laboratory automation. 
We are building on our industry-leading ability to help customers simplify, 
automate and innovate their processes. Our unparalleled knowledge of 
customers’ laboratory processes supports our expansion of automation and work 
cells, growing our installed base of instruments. 
Our breadth of product offering and “building block” designs provide 
laboratories with broad-based testing capability that is highly configurable and 
flexible. We offer a world class menu of more than 600 clinical diagnostics tests, 
capable of meeting nearly 100% of hospital-based routine laboratory testing 
needs.  
Our development capabilities across chemical, biological, hardware and software 
disciplines enable a prolific flow of new systems to meet customer requirements 
for simplifying, automating and innovating laboratory testing. 
We consider our reputation for service responsiveness and our sales and service 
network within our market segments to be important competitive assets. 
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22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
Our first mover approach has enabled us to be the first to provide islands of 
automation, the first to develop an integrated centrifuge and the first with 
refrigerated post-analytical storage. 
From a geographic perspective, we are expanding resources in developing 
markets, including China and India, which we believe will improve our 
opportunities for long-term growth. 
40 Best Practices 
Our strategic initiatives for 2009 focus on key growth drivers, quality and 
operating excellence. 
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Dr. Pepper Snapple Group 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
We have built our business over the last 25 years through a series of strategic 
acquisitions. In the 1980’s through the mid-1990’s, we began building on our 
then existing Schweppes business by adding brands such as Mott’s, Canada Dry 
and A&W and a license for Sunkist. We also acquired the Peñafiel business in 
Mexico.... the integration of acquisitions into our Bottling Group has created the 
opportunity to improve our manufacturing, warehousing and distribution 
operations 
We believe our brand ownership, bottling and distribution are more integrated 
than the United States operations of our principal competitors and that this 
differentiation provides us with a competitive advantage. Our integrated 
business model strengthens our route-to-market. Our integrated business model 
also provides opportunities for net sales and profit growth through the 
alignment of the economic interests of our brand ownership and our bottling 
and distribution businesses. For example, we can focus on maximizing 
profitability for our company as a whole rather than focusing on profitability 
generated from either the sale of concentrates or the bottling and distribution of 
our products. Additionally, our integrated business model enables us to be more 
flexible and responsive to the changing needs of our large retail customers by 
coordinating sales, service, distribution, promotions and product launches and 
allows us to more fully leverage our scale and reduce costs by creating greater 
geographic manufacturing and distribution coverage. 
With third party bottlers, we continue to deliver programs that maintain priority 
for our brands in their systems. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
We have some of the most recognized beverage brands in North America, with 
significant consumer awareness levels and long histories that evoke strong 
emotional connections with consumers.  
Many of our brands enjoy high levels of consumer awareness, preference and 
loyalty rooted in their rich heritage, which drive their market positions. We are 
the #1 flavored CSD company in the United States. Our largest brand, Dr 
Pepper, is the #2 flavored CSD in the United States.  
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Our brands have enjoyed long-standing relationships with many of our top 
customers. We sell our products to a wide range of customers, from bottlers and 
distributors to national retailers, large foodservice and convenience store 
customers. We have strong relationships with some of the largest bottlers and 
distributors, including those affiliated with Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, some of the 
largest and most important retailers, including Wal-Mart, Safeway, Kroger and 
Target, some of the largest food service customers, including McDonald’s, Yum! 
Brands and Burger King, and convenience store customers, including 7-Eleven. 
14 Beat the grass to startle the snake 
The strength of our key brands has allowed us to launch innovations and brand 
extensions such as Dr Pepper Cherry, 7UP Cherry Antioxidant, Canada Dry 
Green Tea Ginger Ale, Mott’s for Tots and Snapple value teas. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
Our marketing strategy is to grow our brands through continuously providing 
new solutions to meet consumers’ changing preferences and needs. We identify 
these preferences and needs and develop innovative solutions to address the 
opportunities. Solutions include new and reformulated products, improved 
packaging design, pricing and enhanced availability.  
Focus on opportunities in high growth and high margin categories.   We are 
focused on driving growth in our business in selected profitable and emerging 
categories. These categories include ready-to-drink teas, energy drinks and other 
beverages. We also intend to capitalize on opportunities in these categories 
through brand extensions, new product launches and selective acquisitions of 
brands and distribution rights. 
38 Economies of Scale 
Our portfolio of strong brands, operational scale and experience across beverage 
segments has enabled us to maintain strong relationships with our customers. 
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Consolidated Graphics, Inc. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
We believe that our broad range of printing capabilities and services, along with 
our ability to use our leading geographic footprint to serve customers on local, 
regional and national levels, gives us a competitive advantage over smaller, local 
printing companies.  
Capitalizing on our national presence and wide range of capabilities… 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
Furthermore, our strong financial position enables us to invest in newer, more efficient 
technology and equipment and to make strategic acquisitions, which expands our 
industry-leading position in terms of locations, capabilities, and services. 
...continuing to invest in new equipment and technology that enables us to 
provide increasingly higher levels of service and a broader range of capabilities. 
38 Economies of Scale 
Because of our size and extensive geographic footprint, we leverage our 
economies of scale to purchase supplies and equipment used in the printing 
process and for newer, more efficient equipment.  
...our printing businesses are supported by the management expertise, 
purchasing power, technology investments, including infrastructure and 
support, national sales and marketing and other operating advantages that exist 
because they are part of a large national organization. 
40 Best Practices 
Participants in our Leadership Development Program follow a curriculum that 
provides them with...sales and best practices training on the nature of 
commercial printing using offset lithography manufacturing processes requires a 
substantial amount of interaction with customers, including personal sales calls, 
reviews of color proofs and “press checks” (customer approval of printed 
materials during the printing process).  
Our overall business strategy is to be the market leader in the commercial 
printing industry by combining the customer service and responsiveness of well-
managed, local printing businesses with the competitive advantages provided by 
a large national organization. 
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Caribou Coffee Company 
7 Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao 
We intend to continue strategically expanding our coffeehouse locations 
predominately in our existing markets. We believe that we have strong brand 
awareness and loyalty in markets where we operate coffeehouses. As we increase 
the density of coffeehouses within these markets we will be able to drive higher 
customer awareness, loyalty and comparable coffeehouse sales. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
Our ability to differentiate the Caribou Coffee brand from those of our 
competitors depends, in part, on the strength and enforcement of our 
trademarks. We must constantly protect against any infringement by 
competitors. 
23 Exchange the role of guest for that of host 
We opened our first franchised coffeehouse in 2004 and as of January 3, 2010, we 
have expanded the number of franchised coffeehouses and licensed kiosks to 121 
with 71 of the franchised coffeehouses in international markets. We intend to 
continue to franchise and license Caribou Coffee branded coffeehouses and 
kiosks both domestically and internationally, where we believe there are 
significant opportunities to grow our business with qualified, multi-unit 
franchise development and licensing partners. 
Our coffeehouses aspire to be the community place loved by our guests as we 
strive to provide them with an extraordinary experience that makes their day 
better. We deliver our guest experience with our unique blend of expertise, fun 
and authentic human connection in a comfortable and welcoming coffeehouse 
environment. We believe we provide a unique experience for our customers 
through the combination of our high-quality products, distinctive coffeehouse 
environment and customer service. 
24 Borrow the road to conquer Gao 
... we sell our blended coffees and license our brand to Keurig, Inc. for sale and 
use in its K-Cup single serve line of business. 
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40 Best Practices 
We source the highest-quality coffees in the world and our skilled roast masters 
personally oversee the craft roasting of every single batch to bring out the best in 
every bean.  
Our retail growth objective is to profitably build a leading premium coffeehouse 
brand 
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Ariba, Inc. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
We depend on our ability to develop and maintain the proprietary aspects of our 
technology. To protect our proprietary technology, we rely primarily on a 
combination of contractual provisions, confidentiality procedures, trade secrets, 
and patent, copyright and trademark laws. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
We offer a comprehensive series of classes to provide the knowledge and skills to 
successfully deploy, use and maintain our products and solutions through Ariba 
University. Ariba University delivers Institute for Supply Management (“ISM”) 
training and change management services to customers and partners. Through a 
comprehensive offering of traditional classroom delivery at an Ariba campus, 
client on-site delivery, web-based training and consulting services, Ariba 
Education Services provide the knowledge and skills required to successfully 
deploy, use and maintain the Ariba product line. 
As such, we deliver an integrated portfolio of enterprise-class software, global 
services, expertise, and a global supplier network to help companies accelerate 
adoption and drive performance improvements and competitive advantage. Our 
solutions allow enterprises to take a step-by-step approach with products and 
services that work together to address six key areas of spend management: [Ariba 
Spend Analysis Solutions], [Ariba Sourcing Solutions], [Ariba Contract 
Management Solutions], [Ariba Procurement and Expense Solutions], [Ariba 
Invoice and Payment Solutions], [Ariba Supplier Management Solutions].  
Ariba has over 700 global consultants, including more than 400 category experts 
that assist our customers in sourcing strategy, supplier identification and 
assessment, negotiation and project execution, and supplier management across 
more than 500 spend categories. These experts are stationed around the globe... 
Ariba Spend Management solutions also integrate with and leverage the Ariba 
Supplier Network. The Ariba Supplier Network is a scalable Internet 
infrastructure that connects buying organizations with their suppliers to 
exchange product and service information as well as a broad range of business 
documents, such as purchase orders and invoices. Over 200,000 registered 
suppliers of a wide array of goods and services are connected to the Ariba 
Supplier Network.  
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We believe the principal competitive factors considered with respect to, and the 
relative competitive standing of, our spend management software solutions are:... 
Quality of customer support; 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
If we are unable to develop new products or enhancements to existing products 
or corrections on a timely and cost-effective basis, particularly on-demand 
versions of our products, or if these new products or enhancements do not have 
the features or quality measures to make them successful in the marketplace, our 
business will be harmed. 
38 Economies of Scale 
Ariba Spend Management solutions also integrate with and leverage the Ariba 
Supplier Network. The Ariba Supplier Network is a scalable Internet 
infrastructure that connects buying organizations with their suppliers to 
exchange product and service information as well as a broad range of business 
documents, such as purchase orders and invoices. Over 200,000 registered 
suppliers of a wide array of goods and services are connected to the Ariba 
Supplier Network.  
We believe the principal competitive factors considered with respect to, and the 
relative competitive standing of, our spend management software solutions are:   
•   Performance, security, scalability, flexibility and reliability of the 
software;... 
40 Best Practices 
Our mission is to transform the way companies of all sizes, industries, and 
geographies operate by delivering software, service, and network solutions that 
enable them to holistically source, contract, procure, pay, manage, and analyze 
their spend and supplier relationships. 
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Universal Health Services, Inc. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
Acquisition of Additional Hospitals. We selectively seek opportunities to expand 
our base of operations by acquiring, constructing or leasing additional hospital 
facilities. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
In addition, we will continue to emphasize innovation in our response to the 
rapid changes in regulatory trends and market conditions ... 
40 Best Practices 
Our mission and objective is to provide superior healthcare services that patients 
recommend to families and friends, physicians prefer for their patients, 
purchasers select for their clients, employees are proud of, and investors seek for 
long-term results. To achieve this, we have a commitment to:  
•   service excellence  
•   continuous improvement in measurable ways 
•   employee development  
•   ethical and fair treatment  
•   teamwork  
•   compassion  
•   innovation in service delivery 
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American Eagle Outfitters 
7 Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao 
Gaining market share in key categories, such as graphic tees and fleece is a 
primary focus within the AE brand. In addition, we will build upon our number 
one position in denim. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
We offer our retail customers a hassle-free return policy. 
38 Economies of Scale 
The expansion of our Kansas distribution center in Fiscal 2007 enabled us to 
bring fulfillment services for AEO Direct in-house. The second phase of this 
expansion was completed in Fiscal 2008 to enhance operating efficiency and 
support our future growth. 
40 Best Practices 
Delivering value, variety and versatility to our customers remains a top priority.  
All of our merchandise suppliers receive a vendor compliance manual that 
describes our quality standards and shipping instructions.  
Our Vendor Code of Conduct (the “Code”), which is based on universally-
accepted human rights principles, sets forth our expectations for suppliers.  
We maintain an extensive factory inspection program to monitor compliance 
with our Code. 
 144 
Appendix A: Results of Public Company Coding 
International Gaming Technologies 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
During the last five years, we completed a number of small business acquisitions, 
including Cyberview in fiscal 2008 and WagerWorks in fiscal 2005, which 
provided additional opportunities to expand the distribution of our content 
across new channels and mediums. Strategic investments over the last five years 
included: CLS to participate in the development of gaming products for the 
China lottery market; WDG for access to a portfolio of gaming application 
concepts; and DigiDeal to expedite access to electronic table games markets. 
We believe IGT has competitive advantage resulting from ... an extensive 
collection of intellectual properties. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
We [are]...endeavoring to create products with superior functionality and 
features, using innovative architecture and technologies, resulting in a high 
degree of customer acceptance and player preference.  
We also strive to maintain an edge in our quality of support and efficient product 
implementation. 
Further, the breadth of our gaming products and diversity of our innovative 
game library contribute to our competitive advantage. 
Our historically high levels of customer service and support, extensive and well-
established infrastructure of sales and manufacturing, worldwide recognition, 
and geographic diversity are competitive assets.  
We believe our reputation for consistently delivering and supporting quality 
products will encourage operators to select our products and enable us to 
maintain our market position. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
We believe IGT has competitive advantage resulting from ...financial strength to 
aggressively invest in R&D. 
40 Best Practices 
IGT is committed to providing quality gaming products at competitive prices. 
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Expedia, Inc. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
We seek to build and maintain long-term, strategic relationships with travel 
suppliers and global distribution system (“GDS”) partners. An important 
component of the success of our business depends on our ability to maintain our 
existing, as well as build new, relationships with travel suppliers and GDS 
partners. 
We strive to deliver value to our travel suppliers through a wide range of 
innovative, targeted merchandising and promotional strategies designed to 
increase their revenue, while simultaneously reducing their marketing 
transaction and customer service costs.  
In addition, we have developed proprietary, supplier-oriented technology that 
streamlines the interaction between some of our websites and hotel central 
reservation systems, making it easier and more cost-effective for hotels to 
manage reservations made through our brands. 
We regard our intellectual property rights, including our patents, service marks, 
trademarks, domain names, copyrights, trade secrets and other intellectual 
property, as critical to our success. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
Our brands provide a wide selection of travel products and services, from simple, 
discounted travel to more complex, luxury travel. Our travel offerings primarily 
consist of airline flights, hotel stays, car rentals, destination services, cruises and 
package travel, which encompasses multiple travel products. 
We offer a comprehensive array of innovative travel products and services to our 
travelers.  
We provide 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week traveler support by telephone or 
via e-mail. We have made significant investments in our call center technologies 
in 2008 and 2009 and have plans to continue these investments going forward. 
We have developed innovative technology to power our global travel 
marketplace. For example, our Best Fare Search technology essentially 
deconstructs segment feeds in the United States from GDS partners for air flight 
searches and recommends the best way to re-assemble multi-leg itineraries so 
that they are less expensive and more flexible for the traveler.  
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We differentiate our brands from our competitors primarily based on ...traveler 
service. 
14 Beat the grass to startle the snake 
We seek to appeal to the broadest possible range of travelers, suppliers and 
advertisers through our collection of industry-leading brands. We target several 
different demographics, from the value-conscious traveler through our Hotwire 
brand to luxury travelers seeking a high-touch, customized vacation package 
through our Classic Vacations brand. 
We believe our flagship Expedia brand appeals to the broadest range of travelers, 
with our extensive product offering ranging from single item bookings of 
discounted product to dynamic bundling of higher-end travel package. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
Expedia has an established tradition of technology innovation, from 
Expedia.com’s inception as a division of Microsoft to our introduction of more 
recent innovations such as Expedia’s introduction of its “Expedia Easy Manage” 
program, offering smaller properties in secondary and tertiary markets in Europe 
and Asia Pacific through an agency model hotel program, Media Solutions 
introduction of rich media display ads called StorePoint Expandables, 
TripAdvisor’s launch of its Family Vacation Critic, which offers reviews of kid-
friendly and parent-tested hotels, resorts, attractions and destinations to help 
parents select the best family vacation, and FlipKey’s launch of self-service 
listings for vacation property owners to merchandise their offerings. 
In expanding our global reach, we leverage significant investments in 
technology, operations, brand building, supplier relationships and other 
initiatives that we have made since the launch of Expedia.com in 1996. 
We intend to continue investing in and growing our international points of sale. 
We anticipate launching points of sale in additional countries where we find 
large travel markets and rapid growth of online commerce. Future launches may 
occur under any of our brands, or through acquisition of third-party brands, as 
in the case of eLong, Venere, Kuxun and Egencia. 
We intend to continue innovating on behalf of our travelers, suppliers and 
advertisers with particular focus on improving the traveler experience, supplier 
integration and presentation, platform improvements, search engine marketing 
and search engine optimization. 
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24 Borrow the road to conquer Gao 
The Expedia.com and hotels.com-branded websites receive bookings from 
consumers who have clicked-through to the respective websites through links 
posted on affiliate partner websites. We have agreements with thousands of 
third-party affiliate partners, including a number of leading travel companies, 
pursuant to which we pay a commission for bookings originated from their 
websites. 
38 Economies of Scale 
Our scale of operations enhances the value of technology innovations we 
introduce on behalf of our travelers and suppliers. 
40 Best Practices 
We are committed to providing travelers, travel suppliers and advertisers the 
world over with the best set of resources to serve their travel needs by leveraging 
Expedia’s critical assets — our brand portfolio, technology and content 
innovation, global reach and breadth of product offering. 
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PDI 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
At each step of the marketing model, we can offer proven research techniques, 
proprietary methodologies and customized study designs to address specific 
product needs. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
We compete on the basis of such factors as ... ability to respond to specific 
customer needs... 
40 Best Practices 
With a focus on best-in-class quality and cost effectiveness, we have intensified 
our focus on strengthening all aspects of our core outsourced promotional 
services business. 
…our focus is to flawlessly execute our customers’ programs in order to 
consistently deliver their desired results. 
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Tiffany's 
6 Kill with a borrowed knife 
Management believes that consumers associate the Brand with ... distinctive and 
high-quality packaging materials (most significantly, the TIFFANY & CO. blue 
box); 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
Gemstones and precious metals used in making Tiffany’s jewelry are purchased 
from a variety of sources. Most purchases are from suppliers with which Tiffany 
enjoys long-standing relationships. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
Management believes that consumers associate the Brand with high-quality 
gemstone jewelry, particularly diamond jewelry; excellent customer service; an 
elegant store and online environment; upscale store locations; “classic” product 
positioning; distinctive and high-quality packaging materials (most significantly, 
the TIFFANY & CO. blue box); and sophisticated style and romance. 
Tiffany competes on the basis of its reputation for high-quality products, brand 
recognition, customer service and distinctive value-priced merchandise and does 
not engage in price promotional advertising. 
Other jewelers and retailers compete primarily through advertised price 
promotion, which has increased due to challenging economic conditions and 
decreased consumer demand. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
Management regularly evaluates potential markets for new TIFFANY & CO. 
stores with a view to the demographics of the area to be served, consumer 
demand and the proximity of other luxury… 
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Nokia 
9 Trouble the water to catch the fish 
An equally important focus for us is the successful combination of the hardware, 
software and services elements to create a rich user experience that positively 
differentiates us from our competitors. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
However, over the past few years we have increased our investment in services, 
including acquiring a number of companies with specific technology assets and 
expertise. 
Over the past few years we have increased our research and development in 
services and supporting software and have made a number of strategic 
acquisitions, like Trolltech, to bring us the knowledge and technology that we 
believe we need to compete effectively in the design, development and 
deployment of our services.  
We have built our IPR portfolio since the early 1990s, investing approximately 
EUR 40 billion cumulatively in research and development, and we now own 
approximately 11 000 patent families.  As a leading innovator in the wireless 
space, we have built what we believe to be one of the strongest and broadest 
patent portfolios in the industry, extending across all major cellular and mobile 
communications standards, data applications, user interface features and 
functions and many other areas. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
Nokia is a pioneer in advancing mobile technology to enrich people’s lives and 
helping to drive sustainability. Today, Nokia is integrating its devices with 
innovative services through Ovi, our Internet services brand, including music, 
navigation, media and messaging.  
Nokia’s NAVTEQ is a leader in comprehensive digital mapping and navigation 
services, while Nokia Siemens Networks provides equipment, services and 
solutions for communications networks globally.  
To create additional value for users of our Series 30 and Series 40­based mobile 
phones, we also offer a range of services that can be accessed with them. One 
such service is Nokia Life Tools, which enables consumers to access timely and 
relevant agricultural information, as well as education and entertainment 
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services, without requiring the use of GPRS or Internet connectivity. During 
2009, we launched the service in India and Indonesia, and we plan to introduce 
the service to additional emerging markets during 2010. 
Nokia has also developed Ovi Mail, a free email service designed especially for 
users in emerging markets with Internet-enabled devices. The service can be set 
up and accessed without ever needing a PC. Ovi Mail launched in late 2008, and 
by March 2010 more than 6 million accounts had been activated.  
During 2009, Nokia introduced Nokia Money, a new mobile financial service. 
The service is targeted to be rolled out gradually to selected markets in 2010 and 
will be operated in cooperation with Obopay, a leading developer of mobile 
payment solutions, in which Nokia has invested. Through the service, people will 
be able to use their mobile device to manage their personal finances, pay for 
products or services, as well as add credit to their mobile account. In February 
2010, Nokia commenced a commercial pilot in Pune, one of the largest 
metropolitan areas in India, in partnership with YES BANK.  
Devices & Services’ research and development (R&D) expenses amounted to 
EUR 3.0 billion in 2009. At the end of the year, Devices & Services employed 17 
196 people in R&D. 
33 Hide a dagger behind a smile 
At Devices & Services, we endeavor to take a human approach to designing 
mobile devices, services and software. Using the customer feedback, information 
on consumer usage patterns and other consumer data collected by us, we are 
focusing on creating designs that consumers will want and love to use. This ethos 
is central to our design work and brand.  
At the heart of our design approach is people—we are focusing our efforts on 
designing products and services and their combinations that are delightful and 
exciting to use.... Based in China, Europe and the United States, our 
multi­disciplinary design team comprising more than 300 people includes 
psychologists, researchers, anthropologists, user experience experts and 
technology specialists representing over 30 different nationalities. 
34 Deck the tree with bogus blossoms 
By deploying different software platforms, Nokia is able to address a wide range 
of market segments, price points and user groups in virtually every geography 
worldwide, which we would not be able to do if we limited ourselves to 
deploying one software platform on our mobile devices.  
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A key part of our software strategy consists of cross-platform development 
technologies, or layers of software, such as Qt and Web Runtime, that run across 
different software platforms. Such technologies enable developers to create 
applications for a variety of software platforms in the mobile market. 
For application developers and content providers, we made available the Ovi 
SDK (software development kit), the Ovi Maps Player API (application 
programming interface) and Ovi Navigation API, enabling the creation of 
sophisticated applications for the web as well as the Symbian and Maemo 
platforms. Ovi developer tools are a key area of focus as we continue to expand 
our services offering for consumers and create opportunities for developers and 
content providers. 
38 Economies of Scale 
Nokia believes it has a number of competitive strengths, notably in its... scale... 
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Microsoft 
3 Invite your enemy onto the roof, then remove the ladder 
Our operating system products compete effectively by delivering ... compatibility 
with a broad range of hardware and software applications, and the largest 
support network for any operating system. 
7 Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao 
The Internet advertising industry has grown significantly over the past several 
years, and we anticipate that this trend will continue long-term. Competitors are 
aggressively developing Internet offerings that seek to provide more effective 
ways of connecting advertisers with audiences through enhanced functionality in 
information services such as Internet search, improvements in communication 
services, and improved advertising infrastructure and support services. We 
believe our search engine, Bing, helps users make faster, more informed 
decisions by providing more relevant search results, expanded search services, 
and a broader selection of content. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
We offer a broad range of consulting services and provide product support 
services that assist customers in developing, deploying, and managing Microsoft 
server and desktop solutions.  
We also provide training and certification to developers and information 
technology professionals about our Server and Tools, Microsoft Business 
Division, and Client platform products. 
Approximately 50% of Server and Tools revenue comes from multi-year 
licensing agreements. 
Revenue is also generated through subscriptions. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
We also conduct research and develop advanced technologies for future software 
products and services. We believe that delivering breakthrough innovation and 
high-value solutions through our integrated software platform is the key to 
meeting our customers’ needs and to our future growth.  
We will continue to introduce new products and services that are aimed at 
attracting additional users through improvements in the user online experience. 
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We believe that we can compete effectively across the breadth of our Internet 
services by providing users with software innovation in the form of information 
and communication services. 
We compete primarily on the basis of product innovation.... 
Innovation is the foundation for Microsoft’s success. Our model for growth is 
based on our ability to initiate and embrace disruptive technology trends, to 
enter new markets, both in terms of geographies and product areas, and to drive 
broad adoption of the products and services we develop and market. We 
maintain our long-term commitment to research and development across a wide 
spectrum of technologies, tools, and platforms spanning communication and 
collaboration; information access and organization; entertainment; business and 
e-commerce; advertising; and devices. 
38 Economies of Scale 
To support the growth of our advertising business, we also are investing in 
improving the scale of our advertising platform. 
40 Best Practices 
Our focus is to build on this foundation through ongoing innovation in our 
integrated software platforms; by delivering compelling value propositions to 
customers; by responding effectively to customer and partner needs; and by 
continuing to emphasize the importance of product excellence, business efficacy, 
and accountability. 
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Sprint 
2 Exchange a brick for a jade 
We generally sell these devices at prices below our cost in response to 
competition, to attract new subscribers and as retention inducements for existing 
subscribers.  
…we may offer higher cost devices at greater discounts than our competitors, 
with the expectation that the loss incurred on the device will be offset by future 
service revenue. 
9 Trouble the water to catch the fish 
We and our competitors continue to offer more service plans that combine voice 
and data offerings, plans that allow users to add additional mobile devices to 
their plans at attractive rates, plans with a higher number of bundled minutes 
included in the fixed monthly charge for the plan, plans that offer the ability to 
share minutes among a group of related subscribers, or combinations of these 
features. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
Through our mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) relationship with 
Clearwire, we are also the first and only nationwide wireless carrier to offer 4G 
services. 
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SAP 
3 Invite your enemy onto the roof, then remove the ladder 
In our traditional core business, we seek to win a greater share of our existing 
customers’ IT budget. 
Collaborating with customers and partners remains one of our core policies. 
10 Remove the firewood from under the pot 
Focused acquisitions: With targeted strategic and “fill-in” acquisitions that add 
to our broad solution offerings, we gain specific technologies and capabilities to 
meet the needs of our customers.  
We rely on a combination of the protections provided by applicable statutory 
and common law rights, including trade secret, copyright, patent, and trademark 
laws, license and non-disclosure agreements, and technical measures to establish 
and protect our proprietary rights in our products. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
Solutions to address the needs of business users remain a central element of our 
strategy for growth. 
To support customers’ increasingly complex solution landscapes and their 
respective needs, SAP offers several support packages.   
To share knowledge and influence SAP development efforts, our customers have 
established user groups in regions around the world. The two largest are the 
Americas’ SAP Users’ Group (ASUG), with more than 75,000 members, and the 
German-Speaking SAP User Group (DSAG), which has around 30,000 members 
in German-speaking countries. In 2007, SAP initiated a program that 
encouraged all of these groups to share their expertise and recommended 
practices with the wider user-group community. 
Traditionally, our sales model has been to charge a one-time, up front license fee 
for a perpetual license to our software (without any rights to future products) 
which is typically installed at the customer site. 
22 Await the exhausted enemy at your ease 
To encourage continuous co-innovation, collaboration, and ongoing 
improvement in a wide range of products, services, and business processes, we 
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foster various communities of innovation — interactive networks of developers, 
customers, and partners that come together to collaborate on a variety of topics. 
…together with leading universities, partners, and customers, we cultivate new 
IT trends and technologies on a global scale.  
Through its exploration of various business areas and based on the findings of its 
research projects, SAP Research is able to identify potential “next big things” — 
maximum impact, next-generation technologies and applications. 
We started the Global Business Incubator in 2008 as the successor to SAP 
Inspire. This program, based in Palo Alto, California, in the United States, and 
Walldorf, Germany, focuses on creating innovative new businesses for SAP. 
24 Borrow the road to conquer Gao 
We now have 21 global services partners, more than 1,200 service partners 
worldwide, and 34 global technology partners, and the SAP solution extension 
offerings continue to grow. 
40 Best Practices 
To succeed, we strive to build from our established leading position in the 
business software market and accelerate business and IT innovation for firms 
and industries. 
We must continuously improve our portfolio of products if we wish to maintain 
and build on our current leading position as a vendor of business software. 
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UNUM 
9 Trouble the water to catch the fish 
We offer group, individual, and voluntary benefits either as stand alone products 
or combined with other coverages to provide comprehensive benefits solutions 
for employers of all sizes. 
11 Shut the door to capture the thief 
As one of the leading providers of employee benefits in the U.S. and the U.K., we 
offer a broad portfolio of products and services to meet the diverse and rapidly 
changing needs of employers and their employees. 
33 Hide a dagger behind a smile 
…we are committed to operating with integrity and being accountable for our 
actions. 
40 Best Practices 
We believe our sound and consistent business practices, strong internal 
compliance program, and comprehensive risk management strategy ensure that 
we operate efficiently and identify and address potential areas of risk from all 
corners of our business. 
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Appendix B: Companies Considered for the Study 
Presented below are the companies considered for inclusion in this study along 
with relevant data used to determine whether each company qualified as a 
Winner or Loser.” These are presented in order of the Company Number.   
 Company Name Ticker Market 
Capitali-
zation 
EBITDA 
Margin 
(%) 
5 Yr 
Revenue 
Growth 
(%) 
1 Liberty Global Inc.  LBTYA 6.25B 39.94 149.89 
5 MercadoLibre, Inc.  MELI 2.23B 33.75 89.55 
6 Illumina, Inc.  ILMN 4.15B 25.82 82.86 
12 Hansen Natural Corporation   HANS 3.59B 19.27 56.43 
13 Vistaprint NV  VPRT 2.39B 19.05 54.4 
28 MetroPCS Communications, Inc. PCS 2.50B 25.47 43.57 
34 Green Mountain Coffee 
Roasters Inc.  
GMCR 3.57B 14.82 42.34 
56 Concur Technologies, Inc.  CNQR 2.05B 25.03 34.36 
65 Community Health Systems   CYH 3.54B 13.53 32.28 
68 Copa Holdings, SA  CPA 2.45B 22.51 30.4 
83 Urban Outfitters, Inc.  URBN 5.73B 20.1 27.32 
85 Guess?, Inc.  GES 4.18B 17.42 26.88 
95 WMS Industries Inc.   WMS 2.53B 31.68 25.14 
120 Ryanair Holdings plc (ADR)   RYAAY 8.12B 14.18 22.32 
170 Apollo Group, Inc.  APOL 9.37B 28.69 17.16 
173 priceline.com Incorporated  PCLN 9.50B 20.04 16.89 
184 PMC-Sierra, Inc.  PMCS 2.05B 21.86 16.05 
198 inVentiv Health VTIV  
2 Covanta Holding Corporation CVA 3.00B 28.63 109.62 
9 TIM Participacoes SA (ADR)  TSU 7.13B 24.92 64.43 
10 salesforce.com, inc.  CRM 9.26B 12.34 62.16 
11 RAXRackspace Hosting, Inc.  RAX 2.68B 27.91 56.53 
23 Discovery Communications Inc. DISCA 9.29B 56.19 46.74 
24 CTC Media, Inc. CTCM 2.46B 22.58 46.29 
31 Equinix, Inc. EQIX 3.69B 39.73 42.98 
32 Shanda Interactive 
Entertainment Ltd ADR   
SNDA 3.96B 45.62 42.85 
37 Inverness Medical Innovations, 
Inc.  
IMA 3.64B 16.91 41.45 
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40 Sohu.com Inc.  SOHU 2.28B 43.29 39.77 
41 Millicom International Cellular 
SA (USA)   
MICC 8.70B 43.13 39.74 
51 MSCI Inc.  MXB 3.46B 40.65 36.4 
53 Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes 
SA (ADR)  Goo 
GOL 3.74B 10.33 35.54 
54 NII Holdings, Inc.  NIHD 6.42B 25.6 35.38 
59 Bruker Corporation  BRKR 2.21B 12.97 33.54 
60 Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.  CMG 2.91B 16.3 33.38 
64 Liberty Media Corporation 
(Interactive)   
LINTA 6.86B 21 32.57 
67 F5 Networks, Inc.  FFIV 4.20B 22.71 30.71 
70 Fidelity National Information 
Services   
FIS 8.96B 24.85 30.18 
77 Roper Industries, Inc.  ROP 4.77B 23.92 28.54 
78 WebMD Health Corp.  WBMD 2.25B 20.04 28.29 
86 Brocade Communications 
Systems, Inc.   
BRCD 3.41B 11.51 26.78 
88 SINA Corporation (USA)  SINA 2.42B 17.61 26.46 
90 Kansas City Southern  KSU 3.25B 29.84 26.08 
98 Tata Communications Limited 
(ADR)   
TCL 2.26B 25.4 24.71 
104 DaVita Inc.  DVA 6.23B 19.19 24.15 
105 Elbit Systems Ltd. (ADR)  ESLT 2.82B 13.98 24.05 
109 TAM SA (ADR)  TAM 3.71B 13.48 23.45 
117 Cephalon, Inc.  CEPH 4.70B 23.19 22.53 
119 The JM Smucker Company  SJM 7.39B 18.93 22.37 
126 Citrix Systems, Inc.  CTXS 8.02B 19.01 21.88 
131 Aeropostale, Inc.  ARO 2.22B 18.39 20.74 
134 Qiagen NV  QGEN 5.23B 30.93 20.51 
142 FactSet Research Systems Inc. FDS 3.21B 40.02 19.82 
145 IHS Inc.  IHS 3.49B 23.27 19.54 
146 Monster Worldwide, Inc.  MWW 2.38B 10.06 19.47 
150 O'Reilly Automotive, Inc.  ORLY 5.20B 13.29 18.79 
152 Education Management Corp EDMC 3.14B 21.89 18.72 
154 VCA Antech, Inc.  WOOF 2.31B 21.66 18.59 
164 PT Indosat Tbk (ADR)  IIT 2.89B 48.62 17.77 
165 ITT Corporation  ITT 9.25B 10.42 17.76 
169 Informatica Corporation  INFA 2.31B 24.27 17.26 
174 DreamWorks Animation SKG, 
Inc.  
DWA 3.53B 26.77 16.65 
175 Pharmaceutical Product 
Development, Inc.   
PPDI 2.70B 20.86 16.65 
176 IDEXX Laboratories, Inc.  IDXX 3.28B 21.61 16.56 
 161 
Appendix B: Companies Considered for the Study 
177 Expeditors International of 
Washington   
EXPD 7.35B 10.45 16.5 
187 American Eagle Outfitters  AEO 3.61B 11.55 15.8 
189 J. Crew Group, Inc.  JCG 2.85B 11.71 15.66 
193 Iron Mountain Incorporated   IRM 4.91B 27.63 15.27 
194 Herbalife Ltd.  HLF 2.66B 15.06 15.27 
29 Garmin Ltd.  GRMN 6.78B 27.92 43.56 
35 Myriad Genetics, Inc.  MYGN 2.52B 41.49 41.95 
36 NetEase.com, Inc. (ADR)  NTES 5.15B 62.97 41.59 
48 Akamai Technologies, Inc.  AKAM 4.54B 40.06 37.44 
72 Morningstar, Inc.  MORN 2.38B 33.71 29.21 
75 Panera Bread Company  PNRA 2.09B 15.12 28.99 
80 FLIR Systems, Inc.  FLIR 5.00B 33.92 28.12 
103 Ebraeir ERJ 4.12B 11.06 24.2 
114 Nice Systems Ltd. (ADR)  NICE 2.04B 14.96 22.72 
116 Lan Airlines SA (ADR)  LFL 5.91B 20.06 22.57 
123 ResMed Inc.  RMD 3.92B 27.22 22.1 
125 Strayer Education, Inc.  STRA 3.03B 36.02 21.93 
127 Amphenol Corporation  APH 7.75B 20.87 21.16 
128 Macrovision Solutions 
Corporation 
ROVI 3.29B 24.86 20.79 
130 MEMC Electronic Materials, 
Inc. 
WFR 3.36B 13.52 20.74 
133 Polycom, Inc.  PLCM 2.10B 14.18 20.53 
135 TransDigm Group Incorporated TDG 2.52B 47.66 20.42 
137 Ralcorp Holdings, Inc.  RAH 3.54B 15.24 20.09 
141 SBA Communications 
Corporation 
SBAC 4.27B 61.84 19.85 
144 Trimble Navigation Limited   TRMB 3.09B 13.72 19.7 
153 Fastenal Company  FAST 6.97B 18.23 18.66 
157 AMETEK, Inc.  AME 4.24B 19.31 18.32 
159 Quanta Services, Inc.   PWR 4.59B 10.74 18.14 
171 Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (USA) RBA 2.40B 41.91 17.04 
172 Wabtec Corporation   WAB 2.03B 15.21 17.01 
179 Embotelladora Andina SA 
(ADR)  
AKO.A 2.27B 20.9 16.4 
182 Endo Pharmaceuticals  ENDP 2.39B 29.24 16.18 
186 Life Technologies Corp.  LIFE 9.10B 20.09 15.81 
192 Pentair, Inc.  PNR 3.34B 10.79 15.33 
196 Fossil, Inc.  FOSL 2.35B 13.59 15.18 
61 ANSYS, Inc.  ANSS 3.88B 46.39 33.33 
81 FTI Consulting, Inc.  FCN 2.29B 22.3 28.04 
42 Red Hat, Inc.  RHT 5.66B 19.09 39.23 
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